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“Wherever I found a living creature, there I found the will to power.” 
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Preface  
 
Focusing on a plethora of statements articulated by interrelated actors 
concerning the unnatural Lapindo mudflow in the region of Porong, East Java, 
Indonesia, this study explores how these actors have been enlivening and 
reviving the discourse of “disaster” following the hazard. The data of this study 
is gathered from a multifaceted research, especially the fieldwork within a 
disaster victim community that I conducted in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2013 and 
a series of critical readings into media reportages, journal articles, and 
memories of the incident. 
Inspired by Michel Foucault’s discourse theory and analysis, this study 
aims to unravel power relations that have been generating the dynamic of the 
society by focusing on the “statements” stored and articulated by particular 
actors in various discursive fields. It is somewhat ethnography of conflicting 
and competing statements about what happened, the statements I collected 
during these periods of research have led me to a focal subject discussed in 
this dissertation, the relation of power and actor in the course of the disaster. 
I found that the mudflow has put particular actors in competing and 
therefore escalating power relations since each party has their own version of 
truth and been struggling to defend their claim and decline the others’ claim. 
Power relation between these actors has been escalation owing to public’s 
blame on the reckless drilling of an oil and natural gas company, Lapindo 
Brantas, has initiated the mudflow. It is very much predicted that the company 
is using its political and economic resources to limit or reduce its liability for 
causing such a calamity to the society and ecology and to such a purpose it 
has been colluded with the Indonesian government. In the course of the 
research, I found that much information has been manipulated by the collusion 
in order to steer public opinion from “industrial disaster” to “natural disaster” 
and as a result an unequal power relation between the collusion and mudflow 
victims has been characterizing the disaster since the beginning. To that end, 
throughout the chapters of this study I want to defend an argument saying that 
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to some extent the mudflow and disaster resulted from it are indeed 
anthropogenic and what happen afterwards is just efforts of certain actors to 
prove or deny it. 
I am very much concerned with the issue of by problematizing of natural 
disaster claim over the mudflow and relating it with the notion of power has 
made me another actor of the disaster. 
Some parts of Chapter 1 have been published in “Mediating the victims: 
The role of an intellectual in the ‘Lapindo Case’,” EthnoScripts, 15(2), 131-147. 
Some parts of Chapter 3 have been presented as a paper entitled “The culture 
of mitigation politics in Indonesia: Lessons from mud-volcano disaster 
mitigation in East Java” and discussed in 2nd Earth Resilience Symposium, 
Berlin (2-3 March 2013). Some parts of Chapter 4 have been published (in 
Bahasa Indonesia) in “Kasus Lapindo oleh Media Arus Utama” in Membingkai 
Lapindo: Pendekatan Konstruksi Sosial atas Kasus Lapindo (Sebuah Bunga 
Rampai) edited by A. Novenanto, 93-115. Jakarta & Yogyakarta: MediaLink & 
Kanisius. Some main findings and arguments have been presented as a paper 
entitled “Environmental Disaster as Cultural Heritage” and discussed in “The 
Resilience of Vernacular Heritage in Asian Cities” Conference, organized by 
Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore (6-7 November 2014). 
 !
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Chapter 1  | Introduction 
1.1. Drown in effigy 
The morning of May 29, 2013, I observed hundreds of Lapindo mudflow 
victims gathered in the Porong Square. They were preparing a march along the 
Porong highway from the square to the western embankment as a series of the 
seventh-year commemoration of the mud eruption. In the course of the rally, a 
victims’ coordinator orated his concerns about recent conditions of the victims 
using a mobile sound system on a truck so that more people could hear it. He 
was the only person who spoke during the rally. He did not give anyone else a 
chance to take over the microphone from his hand. 
The speech was full of statements claiming that the main problem of the 
disaster was due to the government’s negligence to what has been and is 
happening. Instead of punishing Lapindo Brantas (the company blamed for 
triggering the mudflow; henceforth, “Lapindo”), the government has been 
protecting it. Such an attitude has been, according to him, forsaking victims’ 
actual needs. Yet the speech was describing the past and present condition of 
the victims as well as delivering what would happen to Porong if such 
continues to occur. Jumped into a macro social context, he blamed the greedy 
mining companies in the country for bringing a devastating catastrophe to the 
society. Even more, he claimed that the government has hitherto been 
controlled by those corporations. 
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To date the government has been negligent. The government has been 
neglecting the Lapindo case which will put an end to the Porong region 
and its people. […] The government has been absent in this case. Lapindo 
is out of control and it will drill again. We refuse the drilling. We refuse 
mining in this country. Mining will be devastating. It will empower 
corporations. Corporations to which the government has to comply are 
now controlling Indonesia.1 
 
The oration was indeed full of criticism, but the most interesting, attractive, 
eye-catching object of that day procession was a giant puppet or an “ogoh-
ogoh” (as the locals called it) of a male figure wearing a yellow suit, carrying a 
briefcase full of money and sitting on a mud-volcano. The ogoh-ogoh was 
meant to be an effigy of Aburizal Bakrie, a leading figure of the Bakrie family, 
Lapindo’s holding company. The yellow color was meant as the color of the 
Golkar Party (Partai Golkar) in which Aburizal was acting as the chairperson. 
According to my personal communications with Cak Irsyad from Sanggar 
Alfaz (see 1.8 below) a few days before the commemoration, the making of the 
ogoh-ogoh was inspired by a Balinese tradition a few days ahead of Nyepi (the 
first day of the Balinese New Year). The ritual, according to him, aims to 
cleanse the communities of evil spirits when they enter a new year. Nowadays, 
in addition to make effigies of mythological creatures (ogres or demons), the 
Balinese also creatively create some figures of the real life, which are deemed 
to be giving bad influences for the life of communities. The climax of the 
procession is the burning down of the effigy to ashes as a symbol of the 
cleansing of the village of evil spirits and bad lucks. Adopting such an idea, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 My own translation of the oration, cited from a video recording of the rally (May 29, 2013). 
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mudflow victims led by Irsyad made an effigy of Aburizal for they saw him as 
the evil spirit who has brought nothing but miseries and sufferings to the 
people in Porong. The procession that day ended with a finale of victims 
escorting the effigy to the edge of the embankment and throwing it into the 
mud lake. It meant to as of Aburizal drowned in effigy into the mud their 
disaster-related problems would end too. In the course of the drowning, Irsyad 
leading the procession yelled to the crowd: 
Dear all friends, our intention is to remove destruction. This [throwing the 
effigy to the mud] is a sign of throwing our misfortunes, made by [Aburizal] 
Bakrie. We dispose misfortunes.2 
 
 
Fig.  1.1 Drown in effigy (Photo courtesy of Lutfi Amiruddin, 2013) 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 My own translation of the oration, cited from a video recording of the rally (May 29, 2013). 
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The chapters that follow aim to describe sociocultural contexts that make 
the procession on that day possible, the contexts that provide the victims of 
Lapindo mudflow the reason and freedom to assemble and articulate particular 
statements and be resistant to some others. In doing so, this study addresses 
how different interpretations toward an industrial disaster in Indonesia have 
been produced, reproduced, maintained, and to some extent competed by 
particular actors. Focusing on the produced and circulated statements 
concerning the mudflow origin, it investigates the role of power on human 
actors such processes. 
Generally speaking, disaster victims are frequently perceived as powerless 
due to the physical and mental sufferings they experience following 
environmental hazards. These victims not only have to lose time, energy, and 
materials due to the hazards, but they also must recover and pursuit all the 
backwardness. This study, on the contrary, argues that disaster victims are not 
as powerless as many people see them. Calling from Foucault’s discourse 
theory and analysis, this study aims to show how these people are actually 
very creative in inventing own agency to compete in the battle of social 
construction of the disaster through ongoing power relations with other actors. 
Power relations are a key concept to critically understand how certain actors 
maintain the discursiveness of the disaster in various discursive fields. Relying 
on the data gathered from a series of critical discourse analyses into various 
statements regarding the mudflow, each chapter of this study is concerned 
with the notion of freedom in relation to how different actors deal with the 
social and ecological crisis resulting from such a hazardous environmental 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
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force. The sections that follow in this chapter aim to argue of how and why 
such a focus is important and necessary to be done. 
1.2. Framing the problems 
In the first place, I was very much interested in studying the media 
construction concerning the Lapindo case by addressing on the question of 
how political and economic forces influence media workers in representing the 
disaster to broader audience through their mass-mediated outlets of 
information. Anthropologists have noted crucial problems on studying media, 
that is, the production of meaning and ideology in the mass communication 
process, and the process of interpretation. While, at the same time, media are 
economically and politically driven and linked to the development of science 
and technology (Spitulnik 1993). In many situations, anthropologists and 
journalists have become the person who introduce and train indigenous people 
to using media technologies along with the fact that they have become 
affordable, more user-friendly, and accessible to these people. In fact, people 
do not only learn how to use media technologies but also how to frame certain 
facts, perform them, and represent themselves for public consumption. Only 
by this the concern of the socially, culturally, and politically marginalized 
people can be heard by a larger audience. 
In the course of my research, the question of media, which is still a central 
issue that will be discussed in chapter 4, has expanded beyond and reached 
other discursive fields in which statements about the disaster were detected. 
One main consideration is following sociologist John Hannigan who argues 
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that aside from “the media,” where claims of environmental problems are 
(re)presented and morally valued, there are two other institutions that are also 
important in the whole process of social construction of such problems 
(Hannigan 2006). Those two are “science,” where scientific claims concerning 
the nature are fabricated, and “politics,” where environmental-related claims 
are contested (Hannigan 2006, 64–66). This suggests that in order to grasp a 
broader, better understanding of power competitions in the course of an 
environmental issue, one should go beyond media construction and expand to 
an analysis of scientific and political constructions of the issue. Another 
theoretical consideration of the enlargement of the focus of this study to go 
beyond just the question of media construction is a thought that rather than 
being the source of information the media only reproduce information media 
workers gathered and processed from many sources, such as scientists, 
government officials, and politicians, to explain and clarify the incident. Indeed, 
media news is a result of highly intense negotiations between media workers 
and their informants (Ericson, Baranek, and Chan 1989) while publics function 
media news as a “window to see the world” (Tuchman 1978).  
“Bad news is good news” has been the unwritten law of media and 
disaster stories always receive a great amount of public attentions. According 
to a 1973 survey conducted by American Newspaper Publishers Association, 
“accidents and disasters” were read by 39 percent of the readers, which was 
the highest rate compared to that of political news (25 percent) and 
general/non-local/human interest news (25 percent) (in Sood, Stockdale, and 
Rogers 1987). Disasters are therefore always economically beneficial for the 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
      7  
media industry because the more people are curious to know about them the 
more media are consumed. Disasters are newsworthy, a facticity. However, 
mass-mediated reality is resulted from a series of practices of framing and 
reframing certain facts in a certain system of meaning (Gamson et al. 1992). 
The media are not just plain windows and news is not only merely a story; they 
are also discourses constructed within a competed negotiation of several 
actors—media workers and their sources—to frame certain facts based on 
their interests. On the relation of power and framing, sociologist Erving 
Goffman once argues “the very vulnerability of the framing process makes it a 
locus of potential struggle, not a leaden reality to which we all inevitably must 
yield” (cited in Gamson et al. 1992). However, the act of framing is also 
performed by media informants and audiences (Scheufele 1999). On the top of 
that is the argument that the circulation of information is never a linear, close-
ended but rather a circular, floating, and never-ending process. It is not about 
the production, but rather the reproduction of knowledge and therefore of truth 
through framing (and reframing) certain statements in accordance to certain 
political agendas of various actors who have interested in the topic. 
The act of framing is reminiscent of a painting by Belgian artist René 
Magritte, The Human Condition (1933). It frames a view from inside a room 
looking out the outer landscape through a window (Fig.  1.2). 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
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Fig.  1.2 Rene Magritte’s The Human Condition (1933) 
(source: http://www.renemagritte.org/images/paintings/the-human-condition.jpg) 
 
What is intriguing about the painting is the emplacement of a painting 
within the painting. Located in the front of the window the within painting is 
seen as if it is a complementary part of the outer landscape. It frames viewers’ 
perception of what is happening in the outside. Of course, the viewer will have 
a framed perception of beautiful scenery of a pathway, a tree, bushes, a green 
hill, white clouds and a blue sky, as represented by the within painting. Yet it 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
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makes viewers would never know what actually, recently happens outside the 
window. It is very likely that what exists after the painting finished to be 
different from what the framing offers. It is not to say that the artist is lying 
about the outer landscape, but what if the tree is no more? What if, on the 
contrary, there are more trees? What if the hill is flatted to the ground? What if 
there is built a new house there? What if the within painting is not representing 
the truth about the outer landscape? What if there is another hidden alternative 
of the within painting, about which only the painter knows? We can add more 
critical questions concerning what is happening out there but we are just 
viewers inside the room and our knowledge of the outer landscape has been 
framed by the already-painted landscape. We are only viewers with no 
opportunity to ask of whether the whole painting is true. 
1.3. The politics of truth 
In many cases, there is a possibility for different actors have different, 
oppositional frames regarding a same issue, including the Lapindo case in 
Indonesia. Although it is very difficult to alter one’s framing, there is a 
possibility for framing alteration, like in the case of how the Indonesian 
government’s attitude toward the Lapindo mudflow has been shifted in 
sequences from “industrial accident” to “natural phenomenon” (chapter 3). 
However, some scholars note that nowadays the framing of the disaster has 
become more fixed and unchangeable than before (Batubara 2013; Drake 
2013). On the one hand, there is industrial disaster framing and on the other, 
there is natural disaster framing. In the course of my research, I discovered that 
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these different framings have been coloring the competition of production and 
reproduction of knowledge regarding the event. It is then very easy to 
associate the “natural disaster” framing to Lapindo and the government and 
the “industrial disaster” framing to disaster victims and critical public in general 
(Drake 2013). These competitive frames have situated these actors in ongoing, 
conflicting power relations and because different interpretations of the disaster 
may imply different consequences conflicts and fights over the production and 
reproduction of knowledge concerning the disaster and therefore power 
competitions performed by different actors escalate significantly. 
In the course of the fieldwork, I was amazed to find the insistence of many 
people utilizing the term lumpur Lapindo (meaning, “Lapindo mud/mudflow”) to 
name the mudflow event/process in Porong, East Java after the accused 
company and therefore to blame it for causing such a catastrophe. According 
to my archival readings of early media reportages concerning the mudflow, I 
found the term had been circulating from the very beginning of the eruption 
(late-May 2006) and became very popular in the media and everyday lives. 
Nowadays, it is the most spontaneously used term in everyday talks in and 
beyond Porong and an understanding of an anthropogenic mudflow has been 
dominating public opinion and precipitating into a truth shared not only by my 
interlocutors and informants but also by the Indonesian public in general 
(Mudhoffir 2013). 
However, I am noticing that many experts, scientists and government 
officials are very much aware of the political consequences in using the term. 
They view the term lumpur Lapindo to be paramount to blame the company 
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and, to them, blaming is unethical since it will only raise conflict instead of 
harmony which parallels to the Javanese philosophy of maintaining harmony 
(see Magnis-Suseno 1981). For this reason, they have been intentionally 
avoiding the using of such a term. As a replacement, they favor another term, 
lumpur Sidoarjo (meaning, “Sidoarjo mud/mudflow”), which is taken from the 
name of the regency where the hazard is located. They argued that the 
disaster’s name should refer to the location instead of other attributions (see 
also 4.6). Accordingly, these people have been proclaiming to be neutral, 
objective and apolitical in finding solutions to the problems resulting from the 
mudflow for they did not want to involve and add further political intrigues. 
Nonetheless, instead of being neutral and non-political, the insistence for the 
name lumpur Sidoarjo has been another enforcement of power for it has been 
very functional in, at least, three simultaneously ways: to replace the prevalent 
utilization of lumpur Lapindo in society, to erase publics’ memories of the 
company in the event/process and, the most problematic, to insinuate the idea 
that the mudflow is just another regular natural phenomenon. 
As a result, only by looking the term at which each actor has been 
consistently using regarding the incident one can easily see his/her alignment. 
If the actor is insisting to use the term lumpur Lapindo, he/she has a tendency 
to stand in the camp of anthropogenic disaster. On the contrary, if the actor is 
disturbed by the term and resolute for a more neutral term (i.e., lumpur 
Sidoarjo), he/she will very likely to be twisted as one proponent of the natural 
disaster camp. Above all, both terms—lumpur Lapindo and lumpur Sidoarjo—
have been very practical for the analysis of power competition over the 
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mudflow disaster. Such is a starting point to explain the discursiveness of the 
disaster that happens to be the main focus of this present study. 
As for framing may offer a totally different reality, a critical inquiry 
emphasizing on framing more than just an explanation of the reality 
represented is needed and therefore an examination of framing beyond just the 
question of the reality being framed is very crucial. Framing is political in the 
sense that it is a simultaneous act to include some facts and excluding some 
others. The articulation and distribution of certain framings has become 
another power practice consisting of power competition, yet one cannot 
predict the impact of such on other people. Therefore, one should step forward 
to address the social and cultural tensions behind the framing process, the 
authorities to legitimate and distribute certain framings, and the effect of 
framing to the framers and their intended viewers. Framing is a practice of 
power and problems with such are always rooted in the question of power 
within the truth claims, the main concern this study deals with. 
To that end, epistemological and ethical concerns strike in the process of 
research and writing of this present study. Which argument about the origin of 
the mudflow should I accept for this study? Do I have to follow the argument 
that the mudflow is just another natural disaster, like many experts, scientists, 
and government officials? Or, do I acknowledge the idea that the disaster is a 
man-made, anthropogenic following the understanding of my interlocutors and 
informants? 
I began my research with a position that this study was not designed to 
find which argument is the most correct but rather to focus on power relations 
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between certain actors in building and unfolding others’ truth claims of the 
disaster. To collect information in participant observation and to reflect these 
particular data in a theoretical framework are indeed core competences of 
anthropology, but doing a research on environmental disaster related to 
industrial activity is always problematic. Anthropologist Gregory Button argues 
such a study is about collecting incomplete and conflicting information, or even 
more “uncertainties” (Button 2010, 11). Button observes: 
whether labeled “natural” or “unnatural” disasters highlight the 
asymmetrical distribution of power and foreground of the struggle of the 
state, corporation, and human agency for the redistribution of power. The 
control of information in public discourse, as well as the attempt to control 
the social production of meaning, is an attempt to define reality. (Button 
2010, 16, emphasis added) 
 
Although each party (e.g., government officials, experts, company 
representatives, victims, activists, media workers, and many more) has their 
own version of truth that may escalate the level of uncertainty spreading within 
the society, in the course of research I discovered unequal power relations 
between the collusion between the company and the government, on the one 
hand, and the victims, on the other, characterizing the mudflow disaster (cf. 
Drake 2013). Based on my ethnographic fieldwork and media content analysis, 
I found that much information about the mudflow origin was manipulated by 
company’s representatives (see 4.5) and it is very much predicted that the 
accused corporation will be using its political and economic resources to limit 
or reduce its liability for causing such a calamity (Schiller, Lucas, and 
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Sulistiyanto 2008). The government, as many of my victim-informants told me 
about, does not seem to have sovereignty in its decision concerning the 
corporation. Even more, it tends to protect and legitimize corporate’s actions 
responding the mudflow, as the oration cited at the outset of the chapter. The 
victims, as citizens of a country, never get certainty from the government 
concerning the mitigation and risk reduction of the hazard and this has 
become another disaster for the victims (see 2.6 & 3.7). While this situation 
creates public confusion concerning the Lapindo case (cf. Lim 2013), I 
observed that the confusion has been deliberately created in order to weaken 
public criticism against Lapindo for causing the mudflow (see 4.6). Thus, 
throughout the chapters of this study I want to defend an argument by saying 
that to some extent the mudflow hazard and the disaster that follows it are 
anthropogenic and what happen afterwards are just efforts of certain actors to 
prove or deny it. Therefore, the study aims to problematize various claims of 
“natural disaster” over the mudflow by relating it with the notions of power and 
actor. 
1.4. Truth, power, and discourse 
One theorist who has been very critical to the politics of truth is French 
philosopher Michel Foucault from whom the inspiration of this study comes. To 
Foucault, 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms 
of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its 
régime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and 
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instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are 
charged with saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980, 131, emphasis 
added) 
 
Following the passage, Foucault suggests that it is better for us to critically 
perceive “truths” as nothing but “truth claims” shaped by a timely, contextual 
“régime of truth.” The régime provides particular actors in certain times and 
contexts a series code of conducts in accepting some statements to be true 
and some others from consideration to be true. Truth claims should be then 
understood as discourses produced by human actors and producing power 
effects in relation to humans’ freedom to accept or deny them. Although power 
has been central in Foucault’s seminal works, it was not his intention to coin a 
new theory of power. He however does not view it constantly in a negative way 
that power is about how one exploits other humans like preceding theorists of 
power, especially German sociologist Max Weber. 
According to Eric Wolf, Weber views power as “the ability of an ego to 
impose its will to social action upon an alter” (Wolf 1999, 4–6). Such a 
conception has a great influence in the U.S. in the 1960s, especially in the 
work of American political scientist Robert Dahl (Lukes 2005). Dahl suggests 
power should be understood as “relationships” between “individuals, groups, 
roles, offices, government, nation-states, or other human aggregates” (Dahl 
1957, 203). He describes power as “something like this: A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” 
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(Dahl 1957, 202–203). Criticizing Dahl, British political sociologist Steven Lukes 
proposes a more “radical” theory of power as for he defines it as a social 
relation of “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to 
B’s interest” (Lukes 2005, 37). Following this, Lukes suggests an investigation 
of power by considering decision-making processes, in which “direct” conflicts 
of subjective interests are handled and resolved in order to draw a single, firm 
decision. 
All in all, many theorists suggest examination of power through a series 
analysis of power relations, that is, either domination or hegemony of one or 
some actors (the winner) over other actor(s) (the loser). This is not what power 
means to Foucault, because he argues that power exists because of freedom 
of which, according to preceding theorists, applies only to the dominator and 
not to the dominated. According to Foucault, the freedom of each actor is 
fundamental in every power relation as he argues, “power is everywhere, not 
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere” 
(Foucault 1978, 93). To him, power is not something that can be possessed, 
transmitted, or dispossessed by particular actors or localized in certain 
material objects. It is because power is somewhat that all actors—even the 
seemingly “powerless” one, such as disaster victims—have access to and 
therefore they have the freedom to compel or resist it (cf. Downing 2008, 90).  
Relying on such a conception, power has never been localized in some 
governmental apparatuses or some modalities. To Foucault, power is 
omnipresent and can be detected in power relations between human actors, 
the subjects of the social world. As such, one can easily sense the existence of 
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power through interactive, sometimes even conflictive, power relations 
(Foucault 1978, 94). An analysis of power should be done through an 
investigation of power relations and only by this power can be seen as not 
always exploiting humans. Furthermore, one can argue for a prolific function of 
power governing human actions in generating dynamics of a society through a 
series of on-going power relations. Foucault’s conception of power is very 
much influenced by German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and therefore it is 
necessary for us to discuss what it means to Nietzsche and how such meaning 
influences Foucault in discussing the relation between truth claims and power 
in his seminal works. 
Political scientist Martin Saar suggests the using of three-dimension 
psychoanalytical view of forms of power to ease our understanding of what 
power means to Nietzsche (Saar 2010, 457–460). The first dimension is “real 
power” which refers to the capacity for violence exercised by “the powerful,” 
“the masters,” “the riches,” “the owners,” “those in command” (Nietzsche 
2009, 18). Power relations resulted from this kind of power is domination 
(“power over”) and corresponds with Weber’s theory of power (i.e., the 
capability of someone to control others to do according to his/her will). 
Additionally, Marxist theory of power is constructed from the idea that some 
people have accessibility to certain material basis (“modes of production”) in a 
society and for this reason they can dominate other people to do what they 
want. 
A second dimension is “symbolic power” which is performed through the 
creation of meanings. By this Saar was referring to Nietzsche’s idea of 
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hegemonic power performed by ascetic priests over members of a society by 
providing them a full package of moral, religious values (Saar 2010, 458; cf. 
Nietzsche 2009, 22). Living in a so-called modern, scientific era, one can add 
“scientists” as another ascetics to perform such hegemony through the 
production of scientific claims, especially when dealing with rational, modern 
explanation of nature and natural phenomena (Latour 2004). This, of course, 
rehashes Nietzsche’s very question of who gives these actors the authority to 
define something or someone to the society. It is a question that brings about 
an understanding of a third dimension of power, “imaginary power,” which has 
been immanent in Foucault’s seminal study on the relation between power and 
knowledge (Saar 2010, 459). By imaginary, it does not mean that this kind of 
power is a non-real or perhaps fictive concept. On the contrary, it stimulates 
feeling of power (over), constitutes subjects, and therefore fashions knowledge 
production. According to Saar, this is “the power that works on and in subjects 
themselves, that is part of their physic setup, nothing external to them” (Saar 
2010, 462, emphasis original) and this so-called Nietzsche’s conception of “will 
to power,” according to him, has been driving actors to produce, reproduce, 
and fight for what they claim to be true. 
Foucault elaborates the idea of “will to power” from Nietzsche by 
problematizing actors’ “will to truth” through a series of critical discourse 
analysis into human knowledge. To Foucault, critique is a “movement by which 
the subject gives himself the right to question the truth on its effects of power 
and question power on its discourses of truth” (Foucault 2007, 47). Claims for 
an objective truth are nothing but discourses circulating, competed, and 
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generating the dynamics within a society. This is one reason of Foucault 
relating power into a discussion of the politics of truth which makes his critique 
is aimed not onto the search for the truest statements but rather to break down 
political strategies of a truth claiming (Rajchman 2007). What is typical in 
Foucault’s theorization of discourse then is a focus of study centering less on 
the statements articulated than on the structural power that has been shaping 
and reshaping the articulation and silence of certain statements by the society. 
As for Foucault relates discourse to power, he receives reactions from 
other scholars and among them has been German sociologist and philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas, one proponent of modernism. Habermas criticizes Foucault 
for failing “to deal with the persistent problems that come up in connection 
with an interpretive approach to the object domain, a self-referential denial of 
universal validity claims, and a normative justification for critique” (Habermas 
1985, 286). For this reason, he accuses him for delivering a serious threat to 
the philosophical discourse of modernity and therefore destabilizing all 
preexisting systems of meaning, validity and value “not only on the 
metatheoretical, but on the empirical level as well” (Habermas 1985, 286). 
In delivering the critique to Foucault, Habermas is idealizing a critical 
theory that is capable to cleanse critique of power. The purification of critique 
has been a focal concern of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory in which he is 
not only a successor but also a prominent reform of the tradition. Similar to his 
mentors, he argues that Weber to have failed in developing an ideal theory of 
rational action for the “purposive-rational action” cannot free humans from 
exploitation made by reason (Habermas 1989). But, unlike his predecessors 
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who were trapped in the irrationality of human reason, in correcting such a 
failure, Habermas proposes a new theory of communicative action with which 
humans feels liberated from the exploiting power of reason because it is 
grounded on “consensual norms” between interactants, not by exploiting them 
(Habermas 1989, 92). In so doing, he is continuing a modernist agenda by 
insisting for an “ideal” critique, the critique that has been purified from interests 
and power and played out by equal interactants. Thus, in the process of 
developing his discourse theory, Habermas has been guided by the realm of a 
power-free discourse, the realm that is less concrete than a utopia. 
Foucault’s approach to discourse, on the contrary, has been more 
contextual and radical than Habermas’s for he views that rather than being 
universals human reason is always rooted and situated in certain historical and 
social contexts. Instead of perceiving and continuing modernist idea of 
cleansing discourse of power, Foucault observes, “discourse transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders 
it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault 1978, 101). By this, he is 
more concerned with a struggle to dismantle the governing power resulted in 
discourses and the power effects resulting from them. To him, power is 
inherent within discourses and therefore it would seem nonsense for any effort 
to separate power off discourses. This is naturally very different from 
Habermasian theory of discourse because according to Habermas discourse is 
meant to a search for consensual agreements of certain reasonable 
argumentations among interactants, while Foucault views it as something they 
have to struggle with—through acceptance and/or rejection—for practical, 
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contextual or timely purposes. All in all, Foucault’s theorization of discourse is 
offering a theoretical underpinning to conduct a critical discourse analysis by 
looking not only at the statements articulated but also at the historical and 
social contexts of how such statements articulated or silenced by human 
actors. 
1.5. The unnaturalness of natural disaster 
In a recent book The Culture of Disaster, Marie-Hélène Huet does a radical 
analysis in explaining the link between environmental disasters that happened 
in the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment movement in Europe. She 
argues in a condense paragraph: 
The eighteenth-century philosophers made a lasting contribution to a 
modern understanding of disaster by sweeping away the divine explanation 
of human wreckage to seek among human alone the cause of human ills 
and in nature alone the cause of physical chaos. (Huet 2012, 7)  
She concludes that “disaster narrative always combines efforts to express the 
shattering of lives with the desire to assign human responsibility” (Huet 2012, 
158). In line with other scholars of disasters (e.g., Rozario 2007; Zack 2009), 
Huet notes the 1755 Lisbon earthquake as the most prominent natural hazard 
in the history of Western “rational” thinking towards environmental disasters for 
the earthquake emerged a human-centered perspective to open for unnatural 
causes of natural disasters—in contrary to the religious (Christian) view on 
disaster as an “act of God.” 
For it occurred on All Saints’ Day (November 1), the Lisbon earthquake 
raised difficult questions for Christians: why would God send suffering to the 
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innocent on such a day? Although there are still many disagreements about 
what is the core idea of the Enlightenment, yet one thing for sure it challenges 
religious (Christian) beliefs in explaining, especially natural phenomena and 
contest them with scientific, empirical rationalizations. And, as for the 
earthquake happened at the time when the movement began to spark, a 
“modern” perspective to find the relationship between natural hazards, 
development, and disasters began to develop. The Lisbon earthquake was, 
according to Huet, not just a starting point of human efforts to dismiss 
supernatural causes of natural disasters and their reattribution as purely natural 
phenomena, but also the beginning of a history of the politicization of 
disasters, “the emancipation of disasters from nature to the socius” (Huet 
2012, 8). 
Many Enlightenment thinkers at the time tried to find a more rational, vis-à-
vis religious, explanations for the earthquake. While many took it for granted 
that Voltaire’s poem was meant to say the earthquake as literary an “act of 
God” (Rozario 2007, 15–16), Voltaire was in the position of using the 
earthquake to attack Leibniz’s theodicy and simultaneously proposing that the 
taking care of the injured and rebuilding the city in the aftermath of the disaster 
as the government’s responsibility (Dynes 2000, 110–112; Huet 2012, 51). In 
his response to Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau proposed the first 
sociocultural explanation toward “natural” disaster by emphasizing that the 
suffering was a result of the miscalculation of risk management in urban 
development in the city of Lisbon, which is now known as “vulnerability” 
(Dynes 2000, 106, 111). Rousseau also presumed that the victims were more 
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concerned about their possessions than saving lives as the earth began to 
shake (Zack 2009, 3) to say that God does not need to be rescued but man 
does (Huet 2012, 52). Therefore, to Rousseau, disaster is a social and cultural 
phenomenon in relation to extreme changes of nature resulting in sufferings to 
human populations. Later on, German philosopher Immanuel Kant argued for 
such responsibility by suggesting people to utilize their reason to understand 
earthquakes and the disaster resulted from them as a social and political 
matter in the course of recovering from the crisis (Huet 2012, 53).  
Independently from the philosophical debate of what had caused the 
disaster that followed the earthquake, the Marquis de Pombal, the Prime 
Minister of Portugal at the time, had to react quickly and he did so in the most 
rational and pragmatic way, a decision from which he benefitted a great deal, 
politically and economically. He authorized measurements of mitigation by 
preventing the plague spreading by burying corpses or throwing them out to 
sea, feeding the starving by opening shops, markets and kitchens, erecting 
shelters for the homeless, and ordering soldiers to guard the city at night. What 
he did in dealing with the hazard is just evident for a perspective of 
environmental disasters as negative, unwanted, destructive events, which may 
interrupt the national economy, and, as a consequence, an active role from the 
government against such abnormality is required. Yet, he did not only address 
how to normalize the crisis but also how to prevent if such hazard would 
happen again. His intentions went beyond just wanting to rebuild the city, for 
he also planned and constructed what were perhaps the first earthquake-
resistant buildings in modern Europe (Zack 2009, 3). He worked to rebuild the 
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city and breathed energy into the economy in the aftermath of the disaster and, 
for this reason, Pombal has turned the calamity into “an occasion for 
modernization” (Rozario 2007, 18). 
Although the modern thinking of the unnaturalness of natural disaster is 
rooted in the eighteen century Enlightenment, it was not until the 1990s when 
scholars of disaster studies came to a common understanding of the human-
causes of environmental disasters. Early social and cultural studies into 
disaster began with utilizing the concept of “adaptation,” referring to humans’ 
capability to meet with environmental hazards, which is in line with the 
environmental determinism perspective in the field of human ecology arguing 
that the environment where people live determines their culture (see Moore 
1956; J. W. Anderson 1968). In this context, culture is understood as the 
results of human interposing between him/herself and his/her environment in 
order to ensure his/her security and survival (Carneiro 1968 in Milton 1996, 39). 
From this perspective, all existing human beings are seen as active actors to 
be able to institutionally or individually succeed in adapting themselves to 
particular environmental features, including the most hazardous ones. 
Environmental disaster was then culturally perceived as a feature of the nature. 
In other word, a disaster comes from “outside” of human. Indeed, the word 
“disaster” is derived from the Italian dis-astrato, which literally means, “the 
destruction, despair and chaos resulting from the distant power of cosmic 
agencies” (Huet 2012, 4). 
In the process of developing as a new discipline of disaster studies, 
“adaptation” has been advanced into a more specific concept of “vulnerability” 
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which can be defined as the degree of humans’ (dis)ability to acclimatize 
accordingly to sudden, unexpected, hazardous environments (Oliver-Smith 
1999; 2002; Bankoff 2003; Hilhorst and Bankoff 2004). To date more and more 
scholars of disaster studies and of other disciplines acknowledge it as a focal 
concept to build a comprehensive understanding of disaster in accordance 
with the vast growing of “vulnerability theory” since 1990s as it gives a broader 
analysis of cultural and material impacts of environmental hazards (Oliver-
Smith 1996; 2002). This parallels to the introduction of political ecological 
approach in the 1970s to explain the issue of accessibility and control over 
natural resources (Watts 2000; Collins 2008) and in the context of disaster 
studies it suggests the incorporation of political, economic and social 
variables, in addition to sudden, destructive environmental events to get a 
wide-ranging understanding of disaster as merely just a event but also a 
process (Oliver-Smith 2002, 28). 
As an event, a disaster can be seen in its “episodic dimension” for it may 
only occur when massive, immediate, environmental hazard(s) (earthquake, 
hurricane, volcanic eruption, tsunami, etc.) strikes a vulnerable human 
populations at a certain time (Bryant 1998). But as a process, one should 
consider that even though the entire community suffers from the perils, it is 
usually the marginalized poor who experience the most. Obviously, the 
survivors of the poor do not have appropriate social and economic resources 
to restore themselves to a normal state as quickly as the rich do (Cernea 1997; 
2003). In other cases, many poor people who were living in a hazard-prone 
area not because they wanted it, but more because they were socially, 
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politically and culturally marginalized so that they had to dwell in 
environmentally-vulnerable areas (McCabe 2002; Bankoff 2003; Oliver-Smith 
2010). Among others is the 2005 Katrina hurricane that has raised poverty as 
one contributing factor in producing vulnerabilities amongst disaster victims in 
New Orleans (Levitt and Whitaker 2009). Poverty is indeed a result of the long 
process of social and political marginalization that, in line with racial politics in 
the United States, has shaped unequal economic orders of the disaster-prone 
society. As a consequence, many people reject the idea of the disaster 
resulting from the hurricane as purely natural, some people even extremely 
perceived it as a “coldblooded murder” of the marginalized poor in the U.S. 
(Rozario 2007, 210–211). That is to say patterns of vulnerability are resulting 
from long socio-cultural processes which we call “development” (Oliver-Smith 
2010). The approach of political ecology (or “vulnerability theory”) which has 
become increasingly popular today suggests the idea that the production and 
distribution of vulnerability in a society is cultural, social, and political (Hilhorst 
and Bankoff 2004). In other words, to understand the patterns of vulnerability 
in a community one should comprehend the history of marginalization in a 
community. 
But, what is a disaster? According to Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, disaster is 
expected to happen in the complex intertwining of environmental hazards and 
social and ecological vulnerabilities, but they also argue “the conjunction of a 
human population and a potential destructive agent does not inevitably 
produce a disaster” (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002, 3). Indeed, some studies 
have been meant to prevent disaster to reoccur by finding a way to increase 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
      27  
society’s “resiliency,” the capacity to quickly recover from the perils resulting 
from environmental hazards of a society. Accordingly, some disaster reliefs are 
intended not only to recover from the damage (mitigation) but also to bolster 
individual and collective’s resiliencies towards impending environmental 
hazards (preparedness). In other words, although disaster is inevitable, we can 
to some extent control the level of damage if only we have succeeded to 
manage in reducing its vulnerability and increasing its resiliency in facing 
environmental hazard(s). 
This study follows the definition of “disaster” proposed by Oliver-Smith & 
Hoffman as: 
a process/event combining a potentially destructive agent/force from the 
natural, modified, or built environment and a population in a socially and 
economically produced condition of vulnerability, resulting in a perceived 
disruption of the customary relative satisfactions of individual and social 
needs for physical survival, social order, and meaning. (Oliver-Smith and 
Hoffman 2002, 4) 
Following the definition, it shall be understood differently from “hazard,” 
the forces, conditions, or technologies that carry a potential for social, 
infrastructural, or environmental damage. A hazard can be a hurricane, 
earthquake, or avalanche; it can also be a nuclear facility or a 
socioeconomic practice, such as using pesticides. The issue of hazard 
further incorporates the way a society perceives the danger or dangers, 
either environmental and/or technological, that it faces and the ways it 
allows the danger to enter its calculation of risk. (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 
2002, 4) 
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There are two kinds of hazards: natural hazards (e.g., hurricanes, tectonic 
earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic earthquakes and eruptions, typhoons, storms, 
and many more) and technological hazards (e.g., oil spills, explosions of a 
nuclear facility or a pesticide factory, atomic bombings, many more). The 
increasing number of technological hazards nowadays has contributed to the 
growing unwritten consensus among scholars and laypeople to view current 
disasters more as cultural rather than purely natural mechanisms (Stallings 
2002). 
Marxist geographer David Harvey argues “all ecological projects are 
simultaneously political-economic projects and vice versa” (Harvey 1993, 25) 
and therefore one should be open for an awareness that every environmental 
project contains risks. “Risk,” defined by German sociologist Ulrich Beck as 
“the unknown and unintended threat that inheres in every systematic way of 
dealing with hazards and insecurities and might harm local populations or 
broader communities” (Beck 1992, 21–22), has led more people today to arrive 
at an understanding that to a certain degree environmental hazards are 
anthropogenic for they may be resulted from various precedent environmental-
related development projects (Bankoff 2003; Button 2010; Oliver-Smith 2010). 
Disaster is then not only an incident in the sense that it occurs at a certain time 
and place, it is also a result of certain preexisting social structures and 
processes (Kreps 1985; Oliver-Smith 1996; 1999; 2002; Bankoff 2003; Button 
2010). And for disaster is understood here in such contexts, its prevention, its 
production, its mitigation, and to some extent its escalation require human 
actors. 
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1.6. Actors of disaster: some questions to address 
A focus on the role of actors in human-nature relations and how they are 
interrelated is very crucial for discussing power in the course of an 
environmental crisis, including disaster. As Bryant and Bailey argue the 
relations between actors in environmental crisis are never equal for there is a 
tendency of one party to control the environment of another (Bryant and Bailey 
1997, 37). And, as to Foucault actors are subject to and the subjects of power, 
it is crucial for this study to elaborate the contexts that has been governing 
human actors in producing, circulating, and maintaining certain truth claims 
about the mudflow disaster. In so doing, this study reiterates the idea of 
disaster as not only a social construction but also as a crucial feature to 
influence social actions. 
Previous studies into the Lapindo mudflow indicated three interrelated 
main actors: the government, Lapindo, and the victims (Muhtada 2008; 
Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008; McMichael 2009; Gustomy 2012; 
Batubara and Utomo 2012). This study maintains the categorization and adds 
a proposal that the tripartite power relationships of these particular actors have 
been determining maintaining of the discursiveness of the disaster resulting 
from the mudflow. In the following I will deliver brief descriptions of each actor 
of the disaster and raise some questions to be addressed in this study. 
The government 
Disasters are frequently seen as negative, unwanted, destructive events 
that may interrupt national economy and many people expected the active role 
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of the government to deal with the abnormality that follows the hazard as soon 
as possible (Faure 2007; Sugarman 2007; Zack 2009). The government has 
been perceived as one political institution that shall be responsible when a 
disaster occurs in its territory and strikes its citizens (Dynes 2000; Huet 2012; 
Rozario 2007). It has been a duty of the government as a modern institution to 
develop prevention systems and strategies for impending environmental 
hazards (both natural and technological) and to make sure that a disaster, if 
such had happened, will not grow larger and broader. Accordingly, some 
hazard-prone countries have been developing prevention systems and 
strategies to increase their resiliencies towards environmental hazards for such 
would not turn into disasters (J. W. Anderson 1968; McCabe 2002; Bankoff 
2003). Nonetheless, statements from governmental officials have always been 
used as the main reference for developing general knowledge about a disaster 
(Button 2010; Sood, Stockdale, and Rogers 1987). And for the government has 
the authority to define an event to be (or not to be) a disaster (Rozario 2007; J. 
W. Anderson 1968; Button 2010) to some extent it has been one key actor to 
maintain the discursiveness of the disaster. 
Up to recently, there has never been a declaration from the Indonesian 
government concerning the official status of the mudflow hazard and disaster 
in Porong, East Java, whether it is natural or technological, of which would 
affect the politics and mitigation over it. However, to date a growing number of 
government officials have become key campaigners for the “natural disaster” 
discourse followed by the consequence of taking over the corporate’s 
responsibilities by the government in gradual (chapters 4 and 5). But, what kind 
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of power that makes such possible? And to what extent does the disaster 
politics shaped within this context has effects on the social and environment? 
Lapindo Brantas 
The presence of a corporation (i.e., Lapindo) has been the most compelling 
fact in the course of the mudflow disaster in comparison with other 
environmental disasters in Indonesia. Obviously, as the party that has been 
widely accused for triggering environmental hazards, corporations have a 
strong motive to limit and reduce its responsibility to suffer from the damage 
(cf. Button 1999; M. D. Anderson 2011) and one of their efforts has been to 
urge the government to declare a “natural disaster” over the incident, like in the 
case of Lapindo mudflow. The scenario is as follows: if the mudflow is officially 
confirmed as “natural disaster” then Lapindo will not be the party who is solely 
responsible for the disaster aftermath, but the government is (Batubara 2013; 
Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008). 
Lapindo has benefited from the close and collusive connection between 
Aburizal Bakrie, a leading figure of Lapindo’s parent company (the Bakries), 
and former president of Indonesia (2004-2014) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
Aburizal is one cadre of Golkar Party, the ruling party of the New Order 
Indonesia with recognizably strong influence in the country’s national and local 
politics until now. After the fall of the New Order in 1998, the party has been 
dominating the Indonesian parliament elections owing to the fact that it came 
to be the winner of the 2004 election and the runner-up of the 1999, 2009 and 
2014 elections. Aburizal has been in a strong bargaining position in Indonesian 
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national politics since he was acting as a coordinating minister in the cabinet 
(2004-2009), then the chairperson of the party (2009-2015). Hence, the politics 
of the mudflow disaster has been situated in a serious conflict of interest since 
the government has a tendency to protect and shield Lapindo as the culprit of 
the incident (chapters 4 & 5; cf. Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008). To that 
end, more questions shall be raised. In which ways and fields does Lapindo 
maintain such its claim for a “natural disaster” over the mudflow? And to what 
extent does its intervention has power effect on the other actors of the disaster 
this study is focusing on, the government and the mudflow victims? 
Disaster victims 
Every disaster creates a new social category in the society, i.e., disaster 
victims. Whereas most people would think disaster victims are powerless 
actors, to some extent this study argues that they have been very authoritative 
in exercising power in the course and aftermath of the disaster (chapters 3 & 
5). To date, the official disaster zone of the mudflow released by the 
government consists of an area of twenty villages in three districts in Sidoarjo 
regency. The government confines inhabitants of these villages as victims for 
living in an uninhabitable area and for this reason they have the rights to be 
compensated (chapter 3). Intriguingly, the victimization has been accounted on 
the base of certificate of ownership (of land and building) and as a 
consequence there has been no official statement from the government 
concerning the number of the evicted people. An unofficial report mentioned 
that more than 150,000 people have been discharged from their homes 
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(Richard 2011). According to the data I collected from the fieldwork, I found 
these victims underwent unimaginable experiences: uprooted from their 
homes, struggling in evacuation areas, finding new dwellings, starting new 
lives, and haunted by the shadow of their experiences facing the hazard and 
other past memories. However, they are indeed a key actor to nurture the 
discourse of “anthropogenic disaster” in the society, but how do they reinforce 
such a claim? And to what extent does their effort has power effect on the 
power competition of the social construction of the disaster? 
1.7. An ethnography of statements 
One fundamental issue of conducting the study has been the emergent of 
a dominating perspective to view disaster as never purely natural but rather 
highly politically contested event/process by certain actors (see 1.5). Such has 
an intricate effect on the writing of disaster narrative of this study for 
anthropogenic causes of the mudflow have been dominating the production of 
knowledge about the disaster not only among scholars but also common 
people, especially disaster victims. However, some key actors of the mudflow 
disaster are disagreeing with this perspective and the competition among them 
has been a key factor in maintaining the discursiveness of the disaster in the 
course of the mudflow incident in Porong. Either insistently accepting or 
aggressively resisting to certain discourse, these actors are in essential 
exercising power. 
This study is constructed from a series of critical discourse analyses 
towards various statements articulated in various discursive fields. This study 
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takes “statements” from which discourses are assembled as units of analysis 
for they are the basic to conduct an analysis of discourses. This focus is 
inspired from some clues of what Foucault means by “discourse.” 
Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 
“discourse,” I believe I have in fact added to its meaning: treating it 
sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated 
practice that accounts for a number of statements (Foucault 1972, 80, 
emphasis added). 
 
This study is however not meant for just a discourse analysis, but rather a 
“critical” discourse analysis. And, as to Foucault, critique aims to question the 
truth claims and power inheres in such claims (Foucault 2007), a critical 
discourse analysis should be aimed to study the struggle of human actors for 
imposing particular claims, which are believed to be true, and excluding some 
others from consideration to be true (cf. Mills 1997, 16). This study, then, aims 
to examine various, conflicting statements concerning the mudflow disaster in 
Porong by addressing these following questions: how are those statements 
formed? In which institutions are they grouped? In which ways and events are 
they being articulated? To what extent do they have power effects in the 
society? And how do they relate each other? 
Posko 
The statements analyzed in this study are collected since September 2008 
until November 2014 from a combination of a multifaceted fieldwork in the 
Porong region over the period of thirteen months, ranging from 2009 to 2013, 
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and a series of archival researches.3 At first the study was focusing on the role 
of media in the social construction of the incident and during the period, in 
every phase of the fieldwork, I intentionally visited some media offices in 
Jakarta and Surabaya to gain their news archives related to the incident. In 
addition to the media visit, I also spent some time in public and university 
libraries in Jakarta, Jogjakarta, Surabaya and Malang in search of previous 
publications that would be relevant for this study. In doing so, I discovered that 
statements are not only stored in the media but also in various discursive fields 
therefore I began to expand my hunt for “archives” in its dual forms as “the 
depositories of statements and as the statements contained therein” (Zeitlyn 
2012).  
In the course of the 2009 fieldwork, I discovered several alternative media 
produced and circulated to counter information provided by mainstream media 
and it was the beginning of my engagement with some activists of Posko 
Keselamatan Korban Lumpur Lapindo (a coordinating post for the safety of the 
victims of Lapindo mudflow; henceforth, “Posko”) the producers of these 
media.  
The Posko was an outcome of a big meeting of some delegations of 
disaster victims and activists from various local and national NGOs. The 
meeting, which took place in Jakarta in July 2008, resulted in three 
recommendations a) to give legal assistances for victims, b) to design 
strategies for economic recovery of the society and to provide immediate basic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 It began as part of my master’s research at the Leiden University, the Netherlands (2008-
2009). To date, I am still continuing to collect media reportages and other documents 
regarding the case. 
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needs of victims and c) to facilitate such activities everyone agreed for the 
establishment of a coordinating post adjacent to the disaster zone in Porong. 
Over time, the Posko has become a center point of information exchange for 
anyone—not only for victims and activists but also for journalists and 
researchers, including myself—who wants to know more about the latest 
progress of the case. To ease the circulation of information, there are various 
alternative media produced, such as Kanal newsletter, Suara Porong radio, a 
weblog (http://korbanlumpur.info), a Facebook group (Friends of Lapindo Victims), a 
Facebook page and a Twitter account (@KorbanLapindo). The weblog has 
been the most survivable media, while the contents of the Facebook page and 
Twitter account are basically tailing information in the weblog. This is more 
because the weblog has been the least in need of fund and an Indonesian 
NGO for the literacy of information technology, Air Putih, has been providing a 
free quota in its server for the weblog. According to a recent data from the 
NGO, by May 2014 korbanlumpur.info has been the largest weblog on its 
server compared to other existing weblogs the organization maintains.  
From 2008 to 2010, the operational cost of Posko’s activities had been 
relying on grant from TIFA Foundation (the Indonesian branch of George 
Soros’s Open Society Institute) under the scheme of “Support on Strategic 
Issues,” which was intended to articulate victims’ voices through the 
production of alternative media.4 In 2010, the Posko received another grant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Within a period of six months (from July to December 2008), the TIFA foundation also gave a 
similar grant to a team of researchers at the Airlangga University in Surabaya to monitor 
national and local newspapers’ reportages about the disaster. In order to disseminate the 
result of the monitoring to the public, especially disaster victims, the team published a series of 
newsletters, namely Somasi (Suryandaru 2009). 
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from the foundation under a different scheme of “Exercising the Rights to 
Information in Public Advocacy” to conduct a series of advocacy programs, 
namely “Public Information Disclosure.” It was meant to do a series of activities 
of entreating governmental agencies in Sidoarjo, Surabaya (the capital of East 
Java) and Jakarta (the capital of Indonesia) to provide and publish information 
related to their plans and strategies for the following issues: the rehabilitation 
of social and ecological damage resulting from the mudflow, the relocation of 
public infrastructures and other facilities, and the management of social and 
ecological risks. 
The grant ended in the end of 2010 which was also the time of some 
activists started to leave Porong one after another. The reasons are most them 
were not originated from Porong and had to take a better job opportunity in 
other cities, mostly in Jakarta, Indonesia’s capital. To date, these alumni are 
still maintaining relations with the remaining activists in Porong, who are 
predominantly victims-cum-activists. To a certain extent the Posko’s alumni 
have been playing an important role to link the Posko to various national and 
foreign institutions. Occasionally, they visited Porong and/or organized various 
activities in other cities to gather public supports for the mudflow victims. 
These activists have been playing a prominent role as both my interlocutors to 
jointly unravel the complexity of the Lapindo case and gatekeepers in mapping, 
finding and interviewing informants, especially victims-informants of this study. 
In the course of the 2012 and 2013 fieldwork, I have expanded my 
conception of archives not only to the “official” documents organized by some 
governmental institutions or other formal organizations (companies, the media, 
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universities, public libraries) but also to individual documentations, organized 
by the victims. Thus, whereas library study is aimed to some already 
articulated, recorded statements, the fieldwork is aimed to fetch the 
disarticulated, unrecorded statements from disaster victims. This study, then, 
can be seen as an alternative way to mediate the seemingly powerless actors 
in order to disclose these inarticulate statements concerning their experiences 
and viewpoints of the event/process they experienced (cf. J. C. Scott 1990). To 
date, I have collected more and more statements about the incident stored in 
various formats, such as company’s letters, legal documents, government 
policies and regulations, photos, films, literatures, scientific article journals, 
research reports, public forums, group discussions, and interpersonal talks. 
Among others storages of statements, the most fascinating are collective 
memories and commemorative practices, like the one I presented at the outset 
of the chapter, performed by disaster victims, especially those who affiliated 
with Sanggar Alfaz in the Besuki village. 
Sanggar Alfaz of Besuki 
Sanggar Alfaz (henceforth, “Sanggar”) would never exist without the 
initiative of Muhammad Irsyad, a Besuki villager. Cak Irsyad, as many people 
call him, was very concerned with the children in his village who got less 
parental attentions. Their parents were too busy in demanding compensation 
either from Lapindo or the government, while there was no program to deal 
with the victim’s children. In early 2009, with the help of some villagers, 
lecturers and students of several campuses in Surabaya and Malang, activists 
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of local and national NGOs and some religious leaders, he founded Sanggar 
Anak Alfaz (meaning, the open house for children’s happiness).5 It was named 
after his late-foster mother, Fauziah (from Arabic, meaning “happiness”), who 
once had a dream to build a shelter for orphans or abandoned children. The 
initial activity was to provide the children with weekly dance training on the 
front porch of Irsyad’s house. In addition to the training, Irsyad, on behalf of 
Sanggar, began to receive new- and used-books from some individuals and 
non-governmental institutions, with which he installed a small library for 
children in his living room. Over time Sanggar has become one important locus 
of donations for victims in the village that came from many non-governmental 
communities in Indonesia and international as well as a social sphere where 
people, especially the victims meet each other and get acquainted with other 
people. 
One key network of Sanggar has been Jakarta-based NGO Sanggar Anak 
Akar that focuses on providing informal education for marginalized children, 
especially the street children (anak jalanan). Regularly, some of its members 
from Jakarta visited the Besuki village and taught the children some musical 
skills and how to write songs. “Music has been the breath of Sanggar,” said 
Irsyad to almost every visitor. As time goes by, Sanggar has become both 
social and cultural sphere for children to express their feelings (not only 
concerning disaster-related issues but also other private or communal matters) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 It seems that the term sanggar (“open house”) has become a brand for a community 
dedicating its activity to provide informal education for marginalized children in several cities in 
Indonesia. To name some sanggars that have been mostly related to Sanggar Alfaz in Besuki 
Timur are Sanggar Anak Akar in Jakarta, Sanggar Bocah Dolanan in Kediri, Sanggar Merah 
Merdeka in Surabaya and Sanggar Sahabat Anak in Malang from which Sanggar Alfaz has 
been receiving material and immaterial supports. 
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in various artistic forms, especially music and theatrical performances. As a 
matter of fact, owing to their artistic skills these children have been invited to 
various places and major events in some cities in Indonesia to campaign for 
the rights of all marginalized children and especially the children of disaster 
victims in Porong. One prestigious event is the biennial South to South (StoS) 
Film Festival in Jakarta, a festival organized by a consortium of multinational 
NGOs for the increase of environmental awareness in the “southern countries” 
through films. 
Apart from the rights of the children, economic recovery of disaster victims 
has become one main target of Sanggar. In October 2011, the name of 
Sanggar Anak Alfaz was eventually changed into Sanggar Alfaz. The exclusion 
of the word “anak” (children) marked the extension of age limit of its exponents 
and as a result over time more and more villagers from various age and gender 
involved in Sanggar’s activities. These people were mostly peasants working 
for landowners of the village or from other villages, but since the mudflow 
covered most paddy fields at which they used to work many of them had to 
find jobs in agriculture-unrelated fields, mainly in construction projects as 
unskilled laborers (buruh kasar). As an effort to return to their original 
profession, in September 2011 some exponents of Sanggar did an 
experimented with greenhouse farming. It was aimed to restimulate the 
peasants’ enthusiasm in farming after losing paddy fields. Unfortunately, failed 
to generate sustainable profit and could only suffice the daily subsistence, the 
activity did not continue well. In February 2012, Sanggar began a small-scale 
industry of screen-printing (sablon), mainly t-shirts and banners, which was 
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quite a success seeing that so many orders were coming until an essential 
problem arisen when one victim-turn-to-activist, who was responsible as the 
treasurer, left Porong for another activism in Sulawesi for several months 
starting from June 2012. 
Perhaps, one successful key activity of Sanggar was jimpitan sehat 
(community-based health insurance). Every Saturday evening, dozens of 
villagers, mostly women, gathered in Irsyad’s house and collected 1,000 rupiah 
per person. The money should not be used for anything else other than the 
health insurance of the villagers. It was then stored as petty money (uang kas) 
in the hand of the treasurer who would release the money to subsidize those 
who needed immediate medical expenses. Along with the activity to collect 
cash, the participants discussed some problems they faced mostly health-
related issues, e.g., how to get listed and received government-based health 
insurance program of Jamkesmas. For several times, they had invited local 
public officials to provide information as well as to deliver their aspirations to a 
higher authority in the government. To that end, Sanggar has become more 
than a place of public meetings for it has become a public sphere for villagers 
to articulate their thoughts, feelings, and hopes to each other and government 
officials.  
The exponents of Sanggar and other Besuki villagers have given me an 
alternative viewpoint of how a group of disaster victims understands the 
mudflow disaster and how it is different from and/or similar to other victim 
groups. A few weeks ahead of the 2012 fieldwork, the central government 
eventually released a new map of disaster zone that included the village as well 
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as some other villages (chapter 2). It meant also that the villagers of these 
villages would soon receive several aids from the government, such as six-
month living allowances (jatah hidup), two-year house rent (uang sewa) and 
evacuation aid (uang pindah), indicated in a presidential regulation (No. 33 of 
2012). At the time, by learning from the ambiguous payment mechanism to 
earlier victims, Besuki villagers were still not convinced yet that the government 
would pay the compensation accordingly but vision of eviction and 
disintegration began to haunt the people. 
Ahead of my return to the village for the 2013 fieldwork, I was informed that 
the villagers had received the twenty-percent down payment of the 
compensation from the government and they were in the process to manage 
the relocation to new resettlements. I noticed some changes in the lifestyle of 
the villagers. They became consumptive; new motorcycles were wandering in 
the street village; cars, some of them were brand new, were parked in the front 
yards of some houses; kids were playing with new handheld gadgets, such as 
tablets or smartphones. Along with those changes, I sensed a very high level of 
anxiety among these villagers for the vision of community disintegration had 
become more concrete and inevitable. Social tensions between villagers were 
getting stronger due to the existing open competition between different groups 
in gathering families to relocate together in separate locations (chapter 2). 
Simultaneously, leaders of each group had to face other problems with land 
brokers and inhabitants of the new places. 
A few months after I left the village to begin the writing of this study, I 
received information from my interlocutors that the Besuki villagers eventually 
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received all of the compensation from the government. They vacated their 
village and began to rebuild their lives in separate places. 
1.8. Positionality and limitation of this study 
If someone ever asks me about my position in the Lapindo case, my 
answer is bold and solid: “I believe that the disaster is anthropogenic and what 
happen afterwards are just some efforts to prove it or to deny it.” Such 
positionality has been a major issue that has been haunting the entire process 
of writing this study for I have become another agent of power of the disaster. 
Ethnography is a “situated knowledge” (Haraway 1988) and therefore the main 
concern in the methodology is not only about how to collect information about 
and from the informants but also how to maintain mutual trusts with these 
people in the process of writing “their culture.” And since ethnography offers 
nothing but “partial truths” (Clifford 1982), it is important to briefly clarify my 
position as an ethnographer in the fieldwork and how such positionality 
contributes to this study. 
Being a native 
If ethnography meant to the writing of the cultures of “the others,” the most 
challenging positionality in the course of this study has been my status as a 
native ethnographer. Nowadays, especially after exoticism and the rise of 
postmodernism, the number of anthropologists investigating their own 
societies has been growing significantly but this issue has been very little to be 
discussed widely since many has taken for granted anthropology’s tasks as to 
write “other cultures” (Peirano 1998; Elie 2012). Malinowski, based on his 
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experience living in New Guinea, suggested anthropologists to “go native” 
emphasizing their roles in “participating” instead of only “observing” the 
society. However, “going native” has a different state from “being” native 
(Kanuha 2000). In the former state, an ethnographer mainly represents 
his/herself an “outsider” for it is very difficult for the ethnographer to be 
accepted as “insider” of the observed community. On the contrary, in “being 
native,” the self-representation of the ethnographer would be much depended 
on the expertise in locating his/herself to be only “outsider,” only “insider” or 
both “insider/outsider” of the community he/she studied (Kanuha 2000; 
Ohnuki-Tierney 1984; Nakhleh 1979; Jones 1970). I have to admit that being a 
native ethnographer has indeed been more beneficial rather than detrimental in 
the course of the fieldwork, yet it has been increasingly challenging in the 
writing up process because it deals with the ethnographer’s own knowledge 
system (cf. Rabinow 1986). 
For I speak the same languages (Bahasa Indonesia and Javanese) as my 
interlocutors and informants do, I hardly found any problems in understanding 
what they said and their language play as well in the course of the fieldwork. In 
many instances, interviews with victim-informants were conducted in informal 
conditions. The hardest part was how to control the conversation because 
informants tended to dominate it. In fact, though I have prepared a list of 
guiding questions, interviews were conducted as if I was listening to them 
telling me their experiences, their complains, and their hopes regarding the 
catastrophe they experienced. It seemed to me that they just wanted to be 
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heard as they felt that the government and the mass media never listened to 
their voices and concerns. 
But having the same skin color and speaking the same language does not 
guarantee me to be fully accepted as an “insider” of the community. There 
were some reasons for the issue to emerge. First, I was born and raised in 
Java, but I spent my previous years mostly in big cities, such as Surabaya (the 
capital of East Java) and Malang. Despite the fact that both are located just a 
few kilometers from Porong, I was educated more as a “city person” (orang 
kota) rather than as a “village person” (orang desa) and as a “city person” I 
have to admit that I am not very familiar with the live in rural areas, where I 
conducted most of the fieldwork for this study. A second factor is my Christian 
background living in a predominantly Moslem community. In the beginning, I 
though that this would be a problem, however it did not appear as a big issue 
owing to the fact that my informants never asked or questioned my religious 
background directly. Moreover, daily talks on religious issues were almost 
never occurred for they would rather discuss their experiences as disaster 
victims which I found very interesting to be explored their reasons to not link 
their sufferings to religious (Islamic) doctrines. Even so, I noted that many 
victim-informants actually have been disappointed with their religious leaders 
who only concerned with their own worldly/economic-interests rather than 
keeping the solidarity as one community. In many cases, many religious 
leaders have become Lapindo’s lackeys in recovering the company’s images in 
its presence of victims and the public at large. Such a disappointment was also 
one factor that urged the recalling and reproduction of preexisting pre-Islamic 
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Javanese narratives, instead of religious (Islamic) principles, by the exponents 
of Sanggar Alfaz in explaining their state (chapter 5). 
Despite some small cultural shocks during my first stay in the village due to 
the abovementioned factors, it was the status of “disaster victims” that has 
came out to be a bold line between my informants and me. It is like they were 
saying, “we’re the victims and you’d never felt the way we feel.” Such has 
been the most difficult for I can only give a great sympathy for them as disaster 
victims and although I have tried hard to comprehend their feelings I would 
scarcely claim that I had empathy for their lost and sufferings. But one thing for 
sure, the status has been a mark for the Otherness of this study. 
Mediating the victims 
Doing a research into the Lapindo case has put me, and perhaps everyone 
else too, in a dilemma (see also Drake 2013). As described in 0 and 1.6 above, 
the production and reproduction of knowledge concerning the disaster has 
been situated in ongoing power relations between two oppositional camps. 
One camp believes that the mudflow is initiated by mining activity of Lapindo 
and therefore it is an anthropogenic disaster. The other camp argues for a 
major earthquake triggered the mudflow to say it is a natural disaster. The 
dichotomy has generated an ongoing battle of power between different actors. 
Hence, whichever options I take for delivering this present study, anyone can 
easily raise critical questions concerning my positionality in conducting this 
study and the knowledge produced from it. I have to admit, it is nearly 
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impossible for me or anyone else, to present an objective, impartial narrative 
about the disaster to the readers. 
To a certain degree I do not really care whether the eruption is proven as 
anthropogenic (drilling error) or natural (earthquake trigger) because I am more 
interested with power relations between three interrelated actors (the 
government, Lapindo, and disaster victims) in promoting and maintaining 
particular statements related to the incident. However, since ethnographic 
fieldwork is about participant observation, it seems to me that it is crucial to 
point out that this present study is not only about “how to observe” but also 
“how to participate” in such relations. For this very reason, I tend to not using 
either lumpur Lapindo or lumpur Sidoarjo to name the hazard. Instead, I am 
proposing another term, i.e., Lapindo case, for it allows scholars to discuss the 
complexity of the incident beyond just an environmental hazard. As I will show 
in the following chapters, the danger and risk of the mudflow has faltered the 
mediocre social system and the destruction of the society and ecology 
resulting from it has led to various fundamental rearrangements of human-
nature relationship in Java and generally in Indonesia. 
I realize that my activist-interlocutors and victim-informants do not expect 
much hope on me as they put it on White, foreign, bule researchers or 
journalists. The first time I got the impression of this was during the visit of the 
United Nations (UN) special rapporteur on adequate housing, Raquel Rolnik, 
on June 6, 2013. Raquel and her team went to a group of women victims of Ar-
Rohmah to have a small focus group discussion in which one female victim 
spontaneously meddled in the conversation: 
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Please, tell to the world, so that [the world] know our suffering. […] Please, 
tell to the world, is there anyone who wants to help us? Let the world know 
that we are very, very suffering. […] Tell to the world that Lapindo is 
irresponsible. For seven years we are living in uncertainty.6 
Raquel responded to her by saying that the Lapindo case and the current 
condition of the mudflow victims would be a part of her report to the UN. Even 
more, she promised to the victims on that meeting to bring the case in the UN 
general meeting, sometimes in March 2014. However, she could not make a 
promise her whether if and about when the UN would finally intervene in the 
Lapindo case. Sadly, in a preliminary report, which was released in a press 
conference at the UNDP office in Jakarta on June 14, 2013, no single 
paragraph mentioned the Porong visit, or the Lapindo case. 
“Taking side” 
I learned that my victim-informants value me to be harmless, in comparison 
with journalists or government officials, because by having discussion with me 
they got some lessons especially in how to frame the case within a broader 
and more sustainable perspective than general public would see it. Still, 
although they do not expect much from me as they do from other researchers, 
I can feel a major force that has been driving me in the course of writing this 
study to empower their position. Hence, in constructing the whole study 
(designing, doing the fieldwork, and the writing up) I have to be frank that I had 
to struggle with some unsettled problems. First and foremost has been the 
difficulty to describe the event/process in a structured, chronological, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Cited from a voice recording of the meeting (June 6, 2013). 
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comprehensive narrative for the production of statements concerning the 
hazard has been situated in complex power relations between Lapindo, the 
government and disaster victims. Throughout this study, I have tried my best to 
stay focus on conducting a critical discourse analysis into various, conflicting 
statements that have been articulated by different actors of the Lapindo case. 
By doing so, I discovered unequal power relations between disaster victims 
and the coalition of the government and Lapindo. The government, according 
to many victim-informants, does not seem to have enough, strong political will 
and sovereignty in facing the corporate for there has been a mutual interest 
shared with these two actors, of which has made the collusion to secure their 
position instead of solving the actual problem of the victims stronger than ever.  
I am very aware that taking side is inevitable in this study and the side I 
take is the marginalized, vulnerable and seemingly powerless actor, i.e., 
disaster victims. I believe such positionality provides simultaneously the 
strength and weakness of this present study. Frankly, the most challenging 
factor of being a native ethnographer has been not in the fieldwork phase but 
rather in the course of the “writing up” and in the aftermath of the whole study. 
In the long run, as a native I have to do a reverse activity like most foreign 
anthropologists would do. Subsequent to the completion of this study, it is 
very likely for me to be more engaged with and become a part of the case for I 
will be very much “coming back to” rather “departing from” the field. In 
addition to this, my status as a university lecturer will be very critical for the 
future campaign and advocacy of the fulfillment of the victims’ rights. So far, 
together with activist-interlocutors and victim-informants, I have conducted 
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several activities to empower some victims by supplying them with reliable 
information and critical thinking about the case. To precondition victims with 
these modalities has been very strategic for them in negotiating with the 
government and Lapindo. Such efforts will increase the bargain power of the 
victims and I believe that this is my responsibility as an intellectual in the case. 
1.9. The organization of the study 
The following chapters begin with an introduction to the field in and about 
which this study is taken and addressing (Chapter 2, “Porong, a Space of 
Contestation”). Relying on a combination of ethnographic and historical data, 
the chapter addresses a history of political ecology of the Porong region and 
how the politicization of the region has become more apparent following the 
mudflow hazard in May 2006. Although the chapter mainly focuses on 
historical descriptions of the field, to a degree it traces the formation of a 
“heterotopia” (Foucault 2008) over which power has been contested by certain 
actors of disaster. 
Chapter 3 (Risky Mitigation) mainly explores the role of the government as 
one actor of power in the Lapindo case. It is constructed mainly from a critical 
discourse analysis into disaster policies produced by the Indonesian 
government to mitigate the mudflow hazard. It is intended to reveal the gradual 
transposition of the government’s framing of the disaster. Additionally, the data 
collected from the fieldwork will show how mitigatory measurements 
performed have created more social and ecological risks and damages in the 
“official” disaster zone and beyond. The chapter argues that the government is 
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playing a significant role in making the disaster to be more systematic on the 
grounds that inherent in the disaster politics of environmental disaster is risks 
to cause social disasters. 
Chapter 4 (Contesting Statements) focuses on the role of Lapindo as the 
accused-party initiating the mudflow to win the battle of power over other 
actors by producing certain claims about the initiation of the mudflow. The 
chapter concentrates on a discussion of some conflicting statements, which 
were articulated in various discursive fields of social construction of 
environmental problems (Hannigan 2006). It addresses how the company has 
been struggling to contest the spreading discourse of “anthropogenic disaster” 
with a counter-discourse of “natural disaster” and as a result it has been one 
actor in enlivening and reviving the battle of power/knowledge. 
Chapter 5 (Muddied Memories) mainly explores in which ways disaster 
victims engage in the battle of power by producing their version of truth. It is 
constructed through my observation into a series of mudflow anniversaries. 
Although no uniformity of how victims commemorate the mudflow, the 
commemorations are victims’ efforts to articulate a persisting statement from 
time to time. The statement is clear: the mudflow has not been just an 
environmental catastrophe, but also a “political tragedy”—which reiterates the 
basic argument of political ecology (cf. M. D. Anderson 2011; Bryant and 
Bailey 1997; Button 2010; Huet 2012; Oliver-Smith 2010; Rozario 2007). The 
chapter explores how disaster victims who are to many people perceived as 
powerless are indeed a very powerful actor of Lapindo case through 
performing those various commemorative practices. 
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Chapter 6 addresses some questions that this introduction has raised and, 
as a conclusion chapter, it aims to recapitulate conflicting framings over the 
Lapindo case performed by each actor and in which ways the framings are 
inter-related one another. 
  
 !
 
 
Map 1 Porong and its surroundings 
 !
Chapter 2  | Porong, a Space of Contestation 
2.1. Everything is no more? 
One afternoon of mid-June 2012, I was heading to the Besuki Timur hamlet 
(dusun) through the dysfunctional toll road of Gempol-Porong. When I 
crossed over the bridge of the Porong River I saw beautiful scenery of a 
sunset. One thing that came on my mind at the time was I had to capture 
that rare moment from the top of the mud embankment. 
In Sanggar Alfaz there was a seventeen-year-old Hisyam and without any 
further question I asked him to bring me to Titik 25 (Point 25) on the 
embankments. There where some local tourists escorted by some ojek 
tanggul (motorcycle-taxy drivers) (Fig.  2.1). While the tourists took pictures 
of the twilight and some other things, one ojek tanggul acting as a 
professional tour guide explained to them about the history of the Lapindo 
mudflow and its impacts. He pointed some areas in which he claimed as 
the location of his former village. “Now all has gone” (semua sudah hilang), 
one ojek tanggul said to his guests.  
Shortly after taking some pictures and as the day was getting dark, Hisyam 
and I headed back to the Besuki village. This time he took a different path, 
to the northeast (we entered from the south), but still over the embankment 
in the eastern of the main eruption. I could see more areas were covered 
by mud. Hisyam recalled that the embankment we passed over was new. It 
was built between 2008 and 2009 as a secondary layer encircling the 
inner-embankment ring (tanggul cincin). The reason was if the inner-
embankment collapsed there would still be outer-walls to hold the mud 
from flowing to the east, where his village was located. Driving the 
motorcycle, he told me some of his childhood memories playing around on 
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that area with friends. “There were houses, buildings and schools, places,” 
he said, “but everything is no more” (semuanya sudah tidak ada lagi). 
 
 
Fig.  2.1 Everything is no more (Photo courtesy of Anton Novenanto, 2012) 
 
The writing of this chapter was at first intended to introduce the field of this 
study, the Porong region. The intention to introduce the field is however still 
unchanged, but to a degree has expanded on the grounds that in the course of 
the fieldwork I discovered unexpected so-called “local knowledges” about 
human-nature relationship in the region. These knowledges provide 
explanations of historical and social contexts of the local people and their 
interrelationships with other people and their environment. Calling from political 
ecological perspective, it examines Porong as a space of power contestation 
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over time. Porong is therefore not only a place for living, but also a living space 
and as the chapter shows it has been a space to which humans performing 
various ecological modifications resulting in the increase of power relations, 
especially between local people and outliers. 
2.2. Space and power 
Following an understanding that anthropological knowledge is grounded 
on ethnographic data collected from fieldwork and by definition fieldwork is “a 
series of activities collecting ethnographic data from the field” (cf. Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997; Sluka and Robben 2007), a question shall be raised: where is 
the field of this study? The illustration of the top of the embankment on that 
afternoon, which is taken from my fieldnote, demonstrates this issue of the 
space of fieldwork of this study. The mudflow has engulfed an area of more 
than 800 hectare and its physical impacts have a tremendous ecological effect 
on another 600 hectare surrounding. There are no more villages to live in, but 
does this also mean that there is no more space for ethnographic fieldwork to 
be done? 
The space for ethnographic fieldwork can be categorized as Foucault’s 
conception of heterotopia (Foucault 2008); a space where ethnographer 
presumes otherness in existence (Foucault 2002). Accordingly, the field from 
where ethnographic data to construct anthropological knowledge is collected 
is not a field that has already there waiting for an ethnographer to do the 
fieldwork. Rather, it is a result of a negotiation between the ethnographer’s 
theoretical understanding of some topics and his/her practical experience in 
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exploring the space of fieldwork. It is to say that the field of ethnographic study 
is socially, culturally and to some extent politically constructed. Currently, the 
location(s) of a fieldwork activity is very likely to shifting and expanding in 
accordance to theoretical quests of the ethnographer (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997). 
Geographers Stuart Elden and Jeremy Crampton summarize how 
Foucault’s works are very much concerned with space in relation to power: 
From architectural plans for asylums, hospitals and prisons; to the 
exclusion of the leper and the confinement of victims in the partitioned and 
quarantined plague town; from spatial distributions of knowledge to the 
position of geography as a discipline; to his [Foucault’s, AN] suggestive 
comments on heterotopias, the spaces of libraries, of art and literatures; 
analyses of town planning and urban health; and a whole host of other 
geographical issues, Foucault’s work was always filled with implications 
and insights concerning spatiality. (Elden and Crampton 2007, 1) 
One good example of Foucault’s concern of space is perhaps can be found in 
The Birth of the Clinic in which his questions on the hospital and hospitalization 
are essential in addressing the politics of space and localization of the sick 
(Foucault 1976, 3–5). Another example is Foucault’s lectures on asylums 
(delivered in Winter semester of 1973/1974) in which he addressed the 
question of how a specific doctor, i.e., psychiatrist, has been very powerful to 
define madness and therefore determine to localize a person in an asylum 
instead of hospital or prison (Foucault 2006). The practice of localizing of mad 
persons into asylums has been, according to Foucault, practices of power in a 
way that people create other space(s). He writes, 
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[T]he asylums had to be similar to the colonies, workshops, colleges, and 
prisons, that is to say, that the specificity of the asylum is to be exactly 
homogeneous to that from which it is differentiated, by virtue of the line 
separating madness and non-madness. (Foucault 2006, 166) 
  
Although Foucault never wrote about environmental disaster, he had done 
critical analysis into various aberrant spaces which he calls “heterotopias” 
(Foucault 2008). It is meant to be different from “utopia”—where the ideal and 
good is located and therefore it is rather an imaginary than a real space. On the 
contrary, “heterotopia” is a combination of our imagination of otherness and of 
physical space where people locate abnormalities; it is the place of 
“otherness” (Mead 1995, 13). It can be a new space formed by the society to 
locate what is considered abnormal in specific places, like in the case of 
hospitals, asylums, or prisons. But in most cases the space and its inhabitants 
have already existed and we tend to attach our imagination of “otherness” to 
them, such as “the colony” (D. Scott 1994), “the Orient” (Said 1995), 
“madness” (Foucault 2006), “sickness” (Foucault 1976), “deviants” (Foucault 
1995), and many more. To Foucault, heterotopia is a site of struggles (Topinka 
2010, 55); it is universal, existing in every society in different forms (Foucault 
2008, 18). One key initiator of heterotopias, according to Foucault, has been 
crisis and in the context of disaster studies, one can add environmental 
hazards as well as patterns of vulnerability to be sources of crisis to generate 
the heterotopia of disaster in existence. As for disaster has been frequently 
considered as going against the normal pattern of life, it has compelled people 
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to define what is “normal” and what is “abnormal” in their lives since every 
disaster results in material and immaterial crises (M. D. Anderson 2011). 
Since 1990s political ecological approach has become increasingly 
dominating in the effort to define disaster suggesting the incorporation of 
political, economic, social, and cultural factors in getting comprehensive 
knowledge of disaster (Oliver-Smith 2002, 28). In this context, disaster should 
be understood differently from hazard as for the former should be perceived as 
a social and cultural concept that may exist when the latter meets with 
vulnerable populations (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002). However, some 
recent studies have been focusing on how development projects have led to 
various man-made environmental hazards, destructions, and degradations in 
the so-called “Third World countries” (Bryant 1992; Bryant and Bailey 1997; 
Oliver-Smith 2010). It is to say that there is a possibility of environmental 
hazards and society’s vulnerabilities are both anthropogenic as a result of a 
series of social, cultural, and political modifications of the environment. 
Calling from this framework, the chapter is concerned much with the ways 
of the Porong region has been treated as a space of power contestation over 
times through looking at various ecological projects. This rehashes a basic 
assumption of political ecology saying that humans’ modifications of physical 
environment put into a question of how one exercises power over others by 
controlling their living space (Harvey 1993; Bryant and Bailey 1997). To that 
end the sections that follow are predominantly efforts to unravel ecological 
projects performed into the Porong region and show how these projects have 
shaped not only physical environments but also social and political lives of the 
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people in the region. Combining together archival readings and ethnographic 
data from the fieldwork, I discovered that the politicization of the region has 
begun since the ninth century and owing to its prospective natural and mineral 
resources it has been increasingly politicized during the colonial and post-
colonial era marked by several major ecological modifications. And like other 
development projects, these modifications have been oriented in intertwined 
political economy interests of the government and some corporations and 
therefore marginalizing the need and interest of the local people (cf. Oliver-
Smith 2010). In Porong, the story of marginalization of local people is 
manifested in so-called “local knowledges” shared within the region. The 
marginalization recurs in the course and aftermath of the hazardous mudflow 
eruption occurring since May 29, 2006. The mudflow has been a destructive 
environmental force to cause disruption and alteration of social lives in Porong 
and beyond. The chapter then is not only to describe the space of the 
fieldwork but also provide historical and social contexts for a more 
comprehensive explanation of the Lapindo case. 
2.3. “Porong”: origin and development 
In the course of the fieldwork, I noted that my interlocutors and informants 
spontaneously mentioned “Porong” to designate the location of the mudflow. 
At first I thought that it was taken from the name of a district (kecamatan) in 
Sidoarjo regency. This conclusion is taken on the ground that according to a 
recent map of disaster zone released by the government in 2013 the main 
eruption is located in the district’s administrative area. The district is 
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nevertheless only one of three mud-affected districts, i.e., Tanggulangin and 
Jabon, in Sidoarjo, but somehow it has become the most popular name in 
everyday use to designate the mud-affected region. It is used not only public in 
general but also the victims themselves, which I found intriguing since not all of 
them came from Porong district. The Besuki village, where I conducted the 
2012 and 2013 fieldwork, for instance, is located in Jabon district but the 
villagers I met used “Porong” to identify their living space. 
While Porong district has been running into the most severe perceptible 
physical damage resulting from the mudflow, the spatiality of the term 
“Porong” is meant to a region of more than the district’s administrative area. It 
is to designate a region located in the lower Brantas River basin in the 
southernmost tip of the Sidoarjo regency of the East Java province, named 
after a river that crosses the region, the Porong River. Apparently, the river is 
man-made and exists only after the construction of a dam, named Waringin 
Pitu (Javanese, meaning “seven gates”), in the ninth century, to control the 
Brantas River, as the main river in East Java, as mentioned in the Kalagyan 
inscription (1037 AD) (Nurcahyo 2014, 127–128). It was also meant to 
overcome flooding in Surabaya as before the damming the Brantas River 
flowed only northwards, passing through the city. The damming resulted in the 
split of the river stream into two main tributaries: the Surabaya River 
(northwards, the original stream) and the Porong River (eastwards, the new 
stream) (see Map 1). 
The word “porong” is originated from the Javanese “poro” or “paro” 
(meaning, “to split” or “to divide”) which is rooted in a prominent political event 
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in pre-Majapahit Java, the division of the Kahuripan Kingdom (Amig et al. 2008, 
8). In 1052, the kingdom was divided into the two kingdoms of Janggala and 
Panjalu at the end of King Airlangga’s reign (Gomperts, Haag, and Carey 2012). 
The aim was to bequeath the kingdom equally to both Airlangga’s sons. The 
event forms a major part of Nagarakretagama, a famous work of literature 
written by Mpu Prapanca about King Hayam Wuruk’s royal journey in 1359. 
The key figure in that political division was Mpu Bharada, Airlangga’s political 
advisor. In Nagarakretagama, it is told that Mpu Bharada divides the island of 
Java using magic water from a pot that could separate the earth from west to 
east up to the sea, north and south (Riana 2009, 335; Slametmulyana 1979, 
308). The southern region formed the Panjalu Kingdom, the center of which is 
now known as the town of Kediri, and the northern region formed the territory 
of the Janggala Kingdom, the center of which is believed to be located 
somewhere in the Sidoarjo regency. Although the era of the Janggala and 
Panjalu kingdoms was characterized by conflict and war between the two 
kings, Airlangga’s descendants, over who would become the sole ruler of Java 
(Rahardjo 2011, 57), the local government of Sidoarjo is very proud to bestow 
some terms associated with the Janggala Kingdom in naming public places or 
facilities in the regency. Moreover, they are preserved as evidence of the “local 
identities” differentiating Sidoarjo from other regions and cities in East Java. 
Indonesian historian Slametmulyana argues that the story of “magic water” 
in Nagarakretagama was adapted from the myth of Bhagiratha who made the 
Ganges River in India (Slametmulyana 1979, 30). The term “bagi rata” in 
Indonesian shares the same meaning with the Javanese “poro” or “paro,” that 
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is, “to divide or to share something equally.” Thus, according to 
Slametmulyana, by adapting the myth the author of Nagarakretagama wanted 
to say that the boundary of the new kingdoms was a river, the Porong River, or 
the divider river (cf. Amig et al. 2008). Using environmental feature, especially 
river, as administrative and political boundary is indeed a common practice 
and it exemplifies the role of nature on human politics. Since the colonial era, 
the river has marked the administrative border of the Sidoarjo and Pasuruan 
regencies.  
The Porong River, which is currently the main tributary of the Brantas River, 
has been agriculturally important in serving as the major irrigation system for 
the development of agriculture in the lower Brantas Basin from Mojokerto to 
Pasuruan with many rice and sugarcane fields being situated along its banks 
(Christie 2007; Fox 1993; Hefner 1990, chap. 2). Apart from rice, the Porong 
Basin has been famous for its sugar but it was not until the fifteenth century 
sugar and coffee became the flagship of agriculture in (east) Java as a result of 
increasing demand of such products in Europe. Whereas coffee was a success 
for the upland regions in Pasuruan, sugarcane (tebu), which was cultivated in 
the same fields as rice, was a success too (Hefner 1990, 41). The situation, 
however, changed drastically entering the nineteenth century when the Dutch 
were getting serious in developing sugar industries. 
In 1820s, the Dutch brought new machineries to the island, established 
new factories, and opened new sugarcane plantations in Java, including in 
Porong. Moreover, they established a research center in Pasuruan regency to 
monitor the sugar quality in the Porong Basin. The center is still running 
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currently as the Research Institute for Sugar Plantations (Balai Penelitian 
Perusahaan Perkebunan Gula, BP3G). Ironically, sugar production was a total 
failure at that time. One of the causes was the fact that the sugarcane did not 
get enough, intensive water supplies during the cultivation resulting in the poor 
quality of the sugar produced. Many investors and managers of the sugar 
factories were frustrated because they experienced huge losses. Whereas the 
production costs had drawn quite a lot of money, the revenue was not as 
much as they predicted. These conditions led to the bankruptcy of many sugar 
factories in 1850s. Concurrently, it was also the years when the Dutch suffered 
from serious economic crisis in financing two different wars: against Prince 
Dipanegara in Java (1825-1830) and against Belgium in Europe (early 1830s). 
Recovering from the war in 1870 the Dutch Colonial Government issued a new 
Agrarian Law which marked the beginning of economic liberalism era in the 
archipelago (Ricklefs 2001, 161–162). The law permitted and secured the 
establishment of new private enterprises to cultivate agricultural plantations in 
the archipelago, especially in Java. Meanwhile, the government would support 
investors with developing infrastructures, such as transportation and irrigation. 
The policy has led to major ecological alteration in Porong. According to 
my readings of the colonial maps of Porong,7 during the second half of the 
nineteenth century the Dutch ran a huge development project along the Porong 
River. It constructed a canal redirecting the river starting from the Pejarakan 
village in the Jabon district eastwards toward the Madura Strait. The canal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The maps were available online free on the website of Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (KIT, 
the Dutch Royal Tropical Institute) by accessing http://maps.kit.nl. Sadly, owing to changes in 
the Dutch Government´s economic financial policy, the KIT library was closed down on August 
1, 2013. As a result, the Institute’s collections are not currently available to the public. 
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project let the original Porong River run dry and people now call it Kali Mati 
(Javanese, meaning “Dead River”) because it has no more water flowing in it. 
The canal was designed as both flood control and irrigation to support the 
increase in agriculture production, especially sugarcane in the Porong Basin. In 
addition to the construction of the canal, in the same years the Colonial 
Government also began railway projects to transport goods more easily from 
the region to the Surabaya port. 
The existence of the canal did not redraw the administrative border of the 
Sidoarjo and Pasuruan regencies. Currently, the Indonesian Government still 
uses the Kali Mati as the natural political border between the two regencies. 
Nevertheless, the canal resulted in both major ecological and social change in 
some villages in Porong, such as the division of the Kedungcangkring and 
Pejarakan villages in the Jabon district, into north and south. It resulted in 
Kedungcangkring Lor and Pejarakan Lor, which refer to the areas located north 
of the canal (lor; Javanese, meaning “north”), and Kedungcangkring Kidul and 
Pejarakan Kidul, which refer to the areas located south of it (kidul; Javanese, 
meaning “south”). Many inhabitants of both villages had to travel across the 
canal to reach public services at the village offices on the other side of the 
canal. In 2008, the government included the region on the north side of the 
canal in the official map of mudflow disaster zone. This means 
Kedungcangkring Lor and Pejarakan Lor are omitted because the government 
would purchase land and houses in the region and compel the inhabitants to 
move out of their homes in order to build new mud container ponds there 
(announced in July 2008). 
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2.4. Knowledge and power of spatiality 
This section addresses how human-nature relation in Porong and power 
relations in relation to spatial management and alteration of the region before 
the mudflow colored by the marginalization of local people’s needs and 
interests—as also the case in other ecological projects elsewhere (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997; Oliver-Smith 2010). The marginalization is manifested in so-called 
“local knowledges” shared within the people in Porong by maintaining an idea 
of the subordination of local people to outliers. 
Agriculture in Porong 
Like many other rural areas in Java, in Porong we can found various 
versions of the mythology of Javanese rice goddess Dewi Sri circulating. In 
general, the main structure of the mythology is about how farming was 
introduced to the Javanese (Heringa 1997; Headley 2004, chap. 3). There are 
three major variants of the stories in Javanese villages: first, the plants were 
grown from a dead female ancestor or goddess; second, the seeds were gifts 
from a “different world” (dunia lain), either heaven or the underworld; and, third, 
humans stole the grains from heaven (van der Weijden 1981:212-213 in 
Heringa 1997, 368). All the variants are suggesting that the culture of farming 
was never initiated by the locals but rather came from their gods/goddesses. 
In southern Porong, I recorded a legend of Nyi Srigati (Javanese, meaning 
“the lady of seedlings”) that can be summarized as follows:8 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The legend I represented here is reproduced from stories I collected from villagers who live 
around the temple during a field trip to Gunung Gangsir village on June 17, 2012. 
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Long ago, the natives knew nothing about farming or agriculture. They lived 
as nomadic people and gathered food from the forest. There was a time 
when the food sources were scarce and famine struck the community. The 
people did not know what to do. Until one day came a woman, named Nyi 
Srigati, who asked the natives to pray to gods to find the solution of food 
scarcity. On the next day, the gods sent some sparrows, gelatik (Latin, 
Padda oryzivora) bringing two kinds of grains to her. She, then, planted and 
grew them into two kinds of plants: rice and gemstone trees. This made 
her very famous and wealthy, yet she was very generous to the locals. She 
taught the natives farming and it was the beginning of agricultural practices 
in the region. They called her Mbok Randa Derma (Javanese, meaning “the 
generous widow”). In commemoration of her, the locals built a temple, 
namely the Gunung Gangsir temple.9 
 
The legend complies with the second version of Dewi Sri mythology. The 
sparrows bringing grains, which is the main character on the temple, 
symbolizes that the seeds were gifts from heaven. The narrative structure of 
the legend tries to assert a message that although the natives had been living 
in a fertile area, they had to wait for divine gifts and an outsider to teach them 
how to farm. If only one is willing to go further with the logic in explaining of 
how industries were established in Porong, the same logic applies with 
agricultures. Industrial areas in Porong were introduced and developed mostly 
by the outsiders. Even more foreign capital was invested to develop industrial 
areas in the region. I will come back to discuss this issue. 
In the course of the fieldwork, I also discovered an unusual variant 
narrative about the beginning of farming in Porong shared among people in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 The name of the temple was taken from the village where it is located. 
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western Porong. Instead of telling about a rice goddess, it tells of two brothers 
that can be summarized as follows: 
Once upon a time, there was a man, namely Jaka Walang (Javanese, 
meaning “the grasshopper boy”). He was born and raised by a single-
mother, named Ijingan. He never knew about who his father was. One day, 
he asked his mother’s permission to do a “clearing of the forest” (babad 
alas). There, he built a new village named Kedung Solo10 and tried to 
cultivate rice there. During the clearing, he caught a snake-headed fish 
(Javanese, iwak kutuk; Latin, Channa striata) that could speak in human 
language. It turned out that the fish was a cursed man.11 With his power, 
Walang released the curse in the fish and it turned back into its original 
form, a human. Walang named him Jaka Pandelegan (from deleg, a 
vernacular name of the fish) and admitted him as his brother. 
Later on, Pandelegan helped Walang in planting the new village. The 
harvest was a failure because they could not get good seeds. They went to 
a hermit who lived on the foot of Mount Penanggungan to ask for better 
seeds. The hermit refused to meet them, but the hermit’s daughters (Nyi 
Sangit and Nyi Angin) fell in love with their father’s guests and deliberately 
stole the seed from their family’s storage. Not only that, both girls sneaked 
away from their home to help the two men planting on their village. 
Knowing that his daughters had ran off, the hermit was very angry and 
searched for them. However, the hermit failed to convince his daughters to 
return home with him and eventually permitted them to marry the two 
young men. Then, Walang was married to Sangit and Padelegan to Angin. 
With the seeds they had, the couples harvested more rice than they ever 
expected, exceeding their communities’ subsistence needs. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 It is also the name of the village where members of a victim group of the Renokenongo 
village built new resettlement. They began to reside there since June 2009. See discussion of 
the Renokenongo case in the chapter. 
11 Both in Javanese and Indonesian, kutuk [v] means, “to curse” and kutukan [n] means, “the 
curse.” 
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At the time, the Majapahit Kingdom was experiencing famine. Many paddy 
fields failed to be harvested because too many peasants were ill. When 
King Brawijaya heard about the rice production in Kedung Solo, he ordered 
his vizier (patih) to go and bring some of the harvest to the capital of 
Majapahit through the Porong River. When the vizier came back to the 
palace with the rice, the king asked, “Who owns the rice?” “Jaka Walang, 
the son of widow Ijingan,” replied the vizier. The king recalled the widow 
with whom he had a relationship once. He commanded his vizier to invite 
Walang and his wife to the palace. When they met, the king realized that 
Walang was really his son. He did not want to disclose this secret, 
especially his past relation with Ijingan, because it would trigger a 
commotion across the entire kingdom. 
The king persuaded the couple to live in the palace and Walang told the 
king about his foster brother, Pandelegan, who had been helping him all 
this time. The king, then, invited Pandelegan and his wife to the palace. 
Unexpectedly, instead of receiving the invitation the couple refused to 
come to the palace. It turned out that Pandelegan had known that he was 
an unwanted child of the king, which was also the reason why he was 
cursed to be a fish. Instead of obeying the king, Pandelegan led a civil 
disobedience of the people of Kedung Solo refusing to send more rice to 
Majapahit. The king considered Pandelegan as a danger for the kingdom 
and sent troops to arrest the couple. Knowing this, Padelegan ran and hid 
in the middle of rice pile where he went into thin air. Simultaneously, his 
wife, Angin, entered a well and also vanished. 
In remembrance of the couple, the king initiated the construction of two 
temples: one temple, namely “pari” (Javanese, meaning “rice”), to mark the 
location where Pandelegan faded away and another temple, namely 
“sumur” (Javanese, meaning “well”), to designate the location where his 
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wife, Angin, disappeared. Currently, the temples are located in a village 
named after the temple, the Candi Pari village.12  
 
Apart from this vernacular narrative, I also found scholarly explanations 
about the origin of both temples delivered by historian Denys Lombard (1987). 
According to Lombard, both temples were built around 1371 AD signifying the 
close relationship between the Majapahit and Champa kingdoms at the time. 
He concluded this from his analysis of the architectural design of the temples, 
especially the Pari Temple, which has much in common with the temples in 
Champa. The history of the temples is however not the main concern of this 
study but rather the discourse immanent in local knowledge produced based 
on the objects and shared within the society. 
First of all, the legend interests me owing to the fact that its structure does 
not properly follow the general structure of Javanese rice goddess mythology. 
The main character of the legend is not even female, but the unwanted sons of 
the ruling king. Secondly, although it tells us that the seedlings came from 
stealing, the legend focuses more on the consequences rather than the origins 
of agriculture in the region. The legend suggests that the lush growth of 
agriculture has resulted in not only prosperity, but also conflict to the society. It 
demonstrates that Porong has been a fertile ground since centuries and people 
will easily cultivate it as long as they can get good, abundant seedlings. Such 
is represented in the character of the two brothers who work together hand in 
hand cultivating a newly opened field. As they harvested rice more than they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 The legend is reproduced from tailoring the stories collected from villagers who live around 
the temples and a written narrative of the brochure of the temple during a field trip to the Candi 
Pari village (on June 3, 2012). 
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needed and even sent the surplus to other regions, new problems emerged 
when a higher authority as of the king of Majapahit also demanding their crops. 
Farming has turned into a political matter of how one party tries to control the 
environment of other. However as for power always stimulates counter-power, 
there are some people who resist the power to control them, symbolized by 
the character of Jaka Pandelegan refusing to send the harvest to the king. 
Although the rationale of the resistance is more on a personal matter (a son’s 
revenge on his father), the legend suggests that arable soil has always been 
both a blessing and a curse for the people who are living in an agriculture 
society. Thirdly, the legend shows how the local narrate power relations 
between actors following the politicization of environment through a production 
of a popular folktale. However, instead of giving a story of people as victors, it 
builds an imagination of the defeat of local people by their rulers. The story of 
people’s loss was not only detected in folktale but also occurred in the real 
lives, especially in the Colonial era marked by peasant rebel. 
Peasant rebel in Sidoarjo 
Sidoarjo was to a certain degree developing as a settled region, in which 
almost no large-scale social and political movements or conflicts occurred. 
Nonetheless, in one of his historical novels, entitled Anak Semua Bangsa (1980; 
English translation, Children of All Nations, published by Penguin Books in 
1996), the Indonesian prominent writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer illustrates the 
story of Trunodongso, an ordinary peasant who was planning to participate in 
a rebellion against a Dutch sugar factory that impinged on their land starting 
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from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Unfortunately, the colonial government heard the plan and used 
violence to attack the rebels. It was the moment that makes Minke, the 
protagonist in the novels, developed a more concrete class consciousness of 
his nationalism from anti-Dutch to pro-peasant (Foulcher 1981, 12–13). It 
seems to me that the story of Trunodongso’s rebellion in the novel is a 
representation of an uprising that really happened in late-May 1904 in northern 
Porong. The uprising was led by Kasan Mukmin, a kyai (Islamic clerics) and 
leader of an affluent peasant group in the region. It ended with a success of the 
colonial government to suppress the rebels in a vicious battle in which Mukmin 
and many of his followers were killed and many more were arrested, including, 
perhaps, Trunodongso. Currently, the local government of Sidoarjo bestows on 
Kyai Mukmin by naming one main street in the town after him. 
In contrast to the official colonial report that stated the prime cause of the 
rebellion was due to (Islamic) religious reasons of a holy war against 
Christianization (Kristenisasi) in Sidoarjo, Fernando argues that the uprising 
was triggered by a series of political economy reasons (Fernando 1995). Many 
big landowners in Sidoarjo, who were mainly Muslims, did not want to lease 
their land to the sugar factories because the lease rate in Sidoarjo was lower 
than the rate in other regencies, such as Mojokerto and Jombang. To deal with 
the problem, owners of sugar factories looked for political supports from local 
administration authorities in Sidoarjo, which were headed by a Dutch, L. A. 
Arends who made a new arrangement with village heads (lurah) in the regency. 
He facilitated these factories to rent paddy fields, sawah, in their village for a 
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specific period of time, with one-third of it to be cultivated under sugarcane in 
a given year (Fernando 1995, 251). It was the beginning of collusion between 
local officials, especially the village heads and the sugar factories, which 
became a source of frictions between many landowners and the officials owing 
to the officials’ preference to foreign (Dutch) sugar factories instead of local 
people. 
Another critical issue was the cropping pattern that the officials applied 
changed the traditional cropping cycle of the peasants. They no longer had the 
freedom to determine the crops they wanted to cultivate and were forced to 
follow a new policy to plant sugarcane in accordance to the interest of the 
sugar factories (Fernando 1995, 252–253). In other words, there also existed 
some potent frictions between the peasants and sugar factories owing to the 
different perspective of cropping pattern. On the one hand, the peasants were 
practicing a subsistence, long-term farming. On the other, the factories were 
aiming an intensive, short-term farming. The peasants allocated some parts of 
their paddies to planting sugarcane and some other parts to planning 
“secondary” crops, such as corn, cassava, peanut, soybean, etc. Of course, 
the sugar factories were not willing such practices to continue because in their 
viewpoint all paddies must be planted with sugarcane in order to augment the 
production. So, when there was a flooding over the paddies with secondary 
crops in September 1903 causing many peasants to harvest prematurely their 
crops, rumors that the local officials intentionally planned the flooding by 
controlling the irrigation. The rumors say that the flooding was intended to fulfill 
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the need of the sugar factories in advancing the planting of sugarcane into late 
October instead of early December (Fernando 1995, 254–256). 
The rumors added to some preexisting piques of a group of Muslim 
peasants over the Dutch. Economic issues twisted to a religious discourse of 
“Christianization” (Kristenisasi), which was easily spread within members of the 
group. Before the flooding, these people had already irritated by the railway 
construction that has led to the desecration of several graves of their ancestors 
and by the use of chemical to purify the water from the canal into drinking 
water. These peasants’ hatred against the Dutch accumulated and manifested 
in a plan for uprising. The meetings were taken place in Mukmin’s house but as 
of more and more people gathered in order to support the plan, local officials 
began to receive some reports about the meeting and the plan for uprising 
(Fernando 1995, 259–260). The uprising began in the early morning of May 26, 
1904 marked by the raising of a tricolor flag at Kebon Pasar village. By 
afternoon, more and more people from Sidoarjo and other regencies came to 
Mukmin’s house to join the rebellion. In the following morning, the rebels 
began to march and targeted to attack the Europeans workers in sugar 
factories. In the meantime, local officials had called for help from their 
superiors in Surabaya to send military troops, which met the rebels at a bridge 
on the Mangetan Canal. The first two shots from the troops made the rebels 
disordered and the battle resulted in the death of 38 rebels and one native 
official. The reinforcement went to Mukmin’s house and killed four people in 
the house, including Mukmin himself. 
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Although the figure of Kasan Mukmin (an affluent, literate, educated 
landowner) is a rather different from Trunodongso (a poor, illiterate, 
uneducated peasant) in Pramoedya’s novel, the motive of the rebellion is the 
same: the local’s resistance against the invasion of the industrialization, 
modernization of agriculture in their region. The rebel runs parallel with the 
legend of the Pari Temple discussed previously and adds another evidence in 
the history of the Porong region as a contested landscape owing to its arable 
land and strategic location. Local people are framed as victims, instead of 
victors of power contestation of the accumulation and intensification of space. 
This is however not the only marginalization occurred to the locals. 
Brackish economy 
Paddy fields where rice and sugarcane are produced have been a primary 
asset in the Javanese agrarian society, but in Sidoarjo they are not the largest 
contributor to the economy. By 2009, 58.75 percent of the total 71,423 ha area 
in Sidoarjo is being used for agricultural purposes and almost half of the 
population (43.06 percent) is working in this sector. Ironically, in 2010 the local 
government of Sidoarjo claimed that rice production in the regency has no 
longer sufficient for its population. According to a calculation of rice production 
in 2008, the regency only produced 103,235.3 tons whereas the demand 
reached 192,363.5 tons. It means there was a shortage of 89,128.3 tons of rice 
in that year indicating that the regency can no longer subsist on rice 
production. According to the government, the decline in rice production is one 
consequence of the deagrarianization—the shrinking of wet paddies (sawah) 
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(Table 1)—and the changing labor patterns resulting from rapid urbanization in 
the region (BPS Kabupaten Sidoarjo 2010, 169–171). 
 
Table 1 Agricultural land in the Sidoarjo regency (in 2005 & 2009) 
Fields 2005 (ha) 2009 (ha) 
Wet paddies and fields (sawah & ladang) 
Fishponds (tambak) 
26,335 
15,630 
22,684 
15,541 
Agricultural land in Sidoarjo 41,965 38,225 
Source: BPS Kabupaten Sidoarjo (2010: 169, 173) 
 
Table 2 Economic income of the Sidoarjo regency (in 2008) 
Sectors Income (in million IDR) 
Rice and other food crops (corn, cassava, etc.) 
Stock’s raising (goat, cow, chicken, etc.) 
Plantations (sugar cane, coconut, tobacco, etc.) 
Fisheries (shrimps & fishes) 
Mining sectors 
Non-mining industries 
Public services (electricity & clean water) 
Construction 
Trading 
Hotels and restaurants 
Transportations 
Communications 
Finance (banks & non-banking institutions) 
Services (private & public) 
400,827.46 
177,902.51 
174,629.03 
732,553.89 
307,731.71 
21,087,155.48 
1,017,447.27 
947,816.10 
11,513,582.66 
469,828.29 
4,060,330.53 
365,874.78 
595,326.51 
2,308,624.21 
Total income 44,159,630.43 
Source: BPS Kabupaten Sidoarjo (2010: 345-346) 
 
Not all the land in Sidoarjo is agriculturally fertile for paddies. Indeed, some 
areas are showing a brackish soil with no source of fresh water, only salt water 
(air payau). On this area people build fishponds (tambak) to cultivate shrimps 
and various kinds of fishes. The flagships of fisheries in Sidoarjo are giant tiger 
prawns (Indonesian, udang windu; Latin, Penaeus monodon) and milkfish 
(Indonesian, bandeng; Latin, Chanos chanos). Moreover, these two species 
appear as the main characters on the regency’s logo, along with rice stalk and 
sugarcane, marking the importance of fisheries to the regency. According to 
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the statistic, fisheries have been more profitable than other agricultural product 
of the regency (Table 2) and in the national level Sidoarjo accounted for almost 
thirty percent of Indonesia’s fisheries export until 2006 (cited in Fitrianto 2012, 
171). 
Nonetheless, brackish area has always been marginalized in Javanese 
traditional agricultural society. The marginalization is manifested, for instance, 
in a legend of Arya Damar that I discovered in a field visit to Buncitan village in 
northern Porong in the course the 2012 fieldwork. The visit was at first aimed 
to observe a preexisting mudflow, named by the local “Kalang Anyar.” There is 
also a small temple of Tawang Alun located adjacent to the mudflow. Located 
c. 20 km to the northeast of the newborn in Porong (Map 1), the Kalang Anyar 
mudflow does not show massive eruptions of hot mud for it only demonstrates 
small streams of mud flowing out from several tiny spots on the area of less 
than 200 square meters and it is unclear where the location of the main 
eruption is. From Saiful, the caretaker of the temple, I did not receive any 
satisfactory explanation of the connection between the temple and the 
mudflow. According to him, who originated from that village, both objects have 
already been there since the Dutch Colonial era. 
Intriguingly, in his book, local environmentalist-cum-journalist Henri 
Nurcahyo argues that the temple was built in the era of the Majapahit reign in 
order “to dampen the mudflow” (Nurcahyo 2014). This argument is very 
problematic and very much questionable owing to the lack of archaeological 
evidence and historical records in proving the relation between the two objects 
and the fact that the book is written after the mudflow in Porong erupted. 
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There are some unanswered questions: Did the establishment of the temple 
have a connection with the adjacent mudflow? Was the temple built after or 
before the eruption? To address these questions further historical and 
archaeological investigations are needed and it is not the aim of this present 
study to seek answers for those questions. I am nonetheless more interested in 
a question of power in the legend. In the following, I will summarize and 
discuss the legend of Arya Damar I recorded from Saiful.13 
Long ago, there was a girl, namely Putri Alun, who lived in Buncitan village. 
She had a very weird habit: eating human flesh. One day, Majapahit’s king 
Brawijaya visited the village and met her. Having no information about her 
strange habit, the king fell in love with her. He ordered the local to build a 
temple as a monument of the king’s love to her and name it the Tawang 
Alun temple (Javanese, meaning “looking at Alun”). The king took her to the 
palace and married her. During her pregnancy, the bizarre habit 
reappeared and the king began to realize it. Unexpectedly, he expelled 
Alun from the palace and sent her back to her village, Buncitan. She 
delivered the king’s son in the village and named him Arya Damar 
(Javanese, meaning “the prince of torch”).14 
Damar grew up without knowing whom his father was. As of his adolescent 
years, he began to ask about his father but his mother refused to tell him. 
His grandfather, on the contrary, told him everything that had happened. 
Knowing that he is a son of the Majapahit king, he paid a visit to the palace 
and met his father demanding recognition as a prince. The king did not 
directly admit Damar as his child. Instead, he gave a term for Damar before 
he could recognize him as his child. The king ordered Damar to bring 
handful of soil from his origin village. If the soil were the same as the soil in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The legend represented here is reproduced from the story of Saiful, the caretaker of the 
Tawang Alun temple, during a field visit to Buncitan village. For a comparision of the legend, 
see Nurcahyo (2014) & Nurwicaksono (2011). 
14 The story of Brawijaya’s son whose mother was a demon maid appears also in some other 
Javanese legends, who was named Jaka Damar (Florida 1995, 101–103). 
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the palace, then he would acknowledge Damar as his child. The king knew 
that the land in Buncitan would not be the same as the land in Majapahit, 
because it has brackish, infertile soil.15 In other word, the task he gave to 
Damar was a subtle way to reject Damar as a prince of Majapahit. 
Unexpectedly, Damar brought a handful of soil with similar characteristic to 
the Majapahit’s, fertile and not salty. The king was very surprised and still 
rejected to accept him as his child. Damar was very disappointed with the 
fact. He returned home and imprisoned himself in the Tawang Alun temple 
and moksha. 
 
One thing that interests me about the legend is the fact that it does not 
comply with any variant of Javanese rice goddess Dewi Sri mythology. It is 
very understandable because it is circulated among people living in brackish 
area and it shows how these people are perceived as lower, marginalized class 
in the Javanese agricultural society. It raises then a question of the civilizing 
process in an agricultural society that mainly started with the beginning of 
farming (how humans interact with their environment) and of morality (how 
humans interact with other humans). According to the storyteller, since the 
legend ends with the king’s denial to his child, it raises a question of morality: 
Will a civilized person rejects and wants to get rid of his (or her) own bloodline? 
One crucial symbol in the legend is the appearance of an anthropophagous 
character of Putri Alun, Arya Damar’s mother. According to the legend, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 It is the characteristic of the soil in the Buncitan village, which is similar to the soil 
surrounding Bledug Kesanga in Grobogan, central Java (see 5.4). From the experience visiting 
other mudflows in the island, I discovered the area surrounding a mudflow characterizes with 
similar type of soil: dry, infertile, and brackish, although it is located hundreds kilometers from 
the nearest beach. It is hardly to find wet paddies (sawah basah) in surrounding a mudflow, 
which is different with the situation in surrounding a “regular” volcano, such as, mounts Merapi 
or Semeru in Java. 
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anthropophagy is unacceptable in a civilized, royal, noble society therefore 
anthropophagus must not be living together within such a society. 
It is crucial to say upfront that many scholars accepted that instead of 
being real an idea of human eating human (anthropophagy or “cannibals”16) is 
nothing but a product of imagination of the outsiders in framing the habits of 
the natives and legitimizing their act to civilize of the natives (Lindenbaum 
2004; Arens 1979). Cannibalism validates the effort to repress the natives for 
they are perceived to be having a lower degree of civilization than the 
newcomers. Furthermore, to some extent cannibalism can be seen as a way to 
articulate philosophy of moral since it is often being used as an idea to 
maintain social stratification in the society and legitimize the civilizing process 
(Lindenbaum 2011). Thus, the myth cannibalism should not be interpreted 
literally as the act of one human eating other human, but rather as a symbol of 
oppression of human over other, of the civilized over the uncivilized 
(Lindenbaum 2004, 491–493). 
As for the legend of Arya Damar is structured in a story of a child searching 
for his father and ends with the rejection of the father, which is similar to 
Javanese mythology of other mudflows in central Java (see 5.4). In the context 
of agriculture society, the legend can be interpreted as the struggle of people 
in brackish area to be accepted in the same level as peasants in a society of 
agriculture. However, as the legend tells us such struggles are failing. These 
people will always be marginalized in the traditional agricultural society owing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 The word cannibal itself derived from the Spanish who mispronounced the Caribs as 
“canibs,” then “cannibal”; hence, it can be interpreted as the way of the Spanish framing the 
Caribs who resisted against them (Arens 1979, 44). 
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the fact that they are not poor and have a significant contribution to the 
society’s economy. 
The road to “Renomencil” 
A discussion of Sidoarjo’s spatial development cannot be separated from a 
discussion of the interaction of Surabaya, the capital of East Java province, 
and its hinterland.17 Surabaya has been a prominent port, even before the time 
of the Majapahit Kingdom, connecting the inland towns in Java with other 
ports in Southeast Asia (Silas 2002). From that time onwards it steadily 
developed as a major port of the archipelago from the sixteenth century until 
the establishment of the Dutch colonial government. According to economic 
historian Howard Dick, by 1905 Surabaya was still the biggest city in the 
archipelago, before the Dutch developed a major port in the capital city of 
Batavia (now Jakarta) (Dick 1993, 326–327). Up to that point, the populations 
of both cities were growing at the same rate. However, entering the 1920s the 
population of Jakarta increased twice as fast as Surabaya’s and Surabaya is 
now the second largest city in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Dick argues that there 
has been no fundamental change in Surabaya’s economic role in its fore- and 
hinterland since the Colonial era (Dick 1993, 330). Even after the change of 
international shipping pattern in the 1980s as a result of Singapore’s location 
as the main port on the main trade line between Southeast Asia and Europe 
and North America, Surabaya port Tanjung Perak, functioning as a subsidiary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  There is a popular name for this region of greater Surabaya: Gerbangkertosusila (an 
abbreviation of Gresik, Bangkalan, Kertosono, Surabaya, Sidoarjo, and Lamongan). It appears 
correspondingly with Jabodetabek (an acronym for Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and 
Bekasi) referring to “the greater Jakarta.” 
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port, is still the main entry point for goods and commodities before they are 
distributed to other cities in East Java and eastern Indonesia (Dick 1993, 337). 
The port is also the exit point for exported commodities from Surabaya’s 
hinterland towns in East Java. 
The strategic position of Surabaya has affected the development of 
Sidoarjo, one of its satellite cities. Sidoarjo has to deal with the fallout from 
Surabaya’s urban problems, such as high living costs and housing problems. 
Many workers, especially young families with children, cannot afford to buy a 
home in Surabaya. These workers need cheaper housing, but that is not too far 
from their workplace. Sidoarjo is the most logical region for them to find 
appropriate living accommodation. They can buy a home in the region by 
borrowing money from a bank, with a monthly installment that fits their salary, 
which is somewhat difficult if they buy in Surabaya. In the meantime, 
commuting from Sidoarjo to Surabaya only takes about thirty-to-sixty minutes 
by motorcycle or commuter train or an hour or two by car/bus during the rush 
hour. 
One major political ecological project in the post-colonial Porong was the 
development of transportation infrastructures performed by the Central 
Government under the New Order regime. In the 1980s, the government began 
the first project of toll road between Surabaya and the highway from/to 
Pasuruan and Malang in the Gempol district, which passed through the middle 
of Porong. The project occurred at the same time with more than 500 new 
factories were built in southern Sidoarjo (Toer 2005, 118). The idea of the toll 
road was to connect the Pasuruan Industrial Estate Rembang (PIER) in 
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Pasuruan with the Surabaya port Tanjung Perak (Silas 2002, 683). In turn, the 
toll road sparked the construction of more industrial areas in southern Sidoarjo, 
especially in Pandaan district, Pasuruan (Guinness and Husin 1993), the 
growth of new settlements, formal real estates and informal self-built 
neighborhoods, and the extension of the urban problems surrounding them 
(Silas 2002). The road project was followed by other development of 
transportation infrastructures in Sidoarjo. In 1990, the Surabaya airport, 
Juanda, which is actually located in the Sidoarjo regency, was open for public 
(before that, it was a navy airbase). A year later, Surabaya intercity bus station 
Purabaya which is the largest bus station in Southeast Asia, began to operate 
in Bungurasih district, Sidoarjo. In February 2004, former president Megawati 
Soekarnoputri officially launched a commuter train, which connects Surabaya 
Central Station to Porong Station on the southernmost tip of Sidoarjo.18  
Yet the development of such transportation infrastructures and services 
seem to favor Sidoarjo above Surabaya’s other satellite cities, Sidoarjo has 
both benefitted from these transportation developments and struggled with the 
growth in the urban problems associated with them. There has been a big 
increase in built-up urban areas nevertheless the population still relies heavily 
on the agricultural sector for employment. While some residents commute to 
Surabaya everyday, most of Sidoarjo’s residents depend on the agricultural 
sector, especially paddy and sugarcane fields and fishponds. In the meantime, 
the fact that more people are choosing to live and settle in Sidoarjo instead of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The formal name of the train released was Delta Express, however, the people and popular 
media used another name “Susi,” an acronym for Surabaya and Sidoarjo. It was the result of a 
tripartite agreement between the Municipal of Surabaya, the Regency of Sidoarjo, and the 
Indonesian railway company (PT KAI). 
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in other cities around Surabaya has brought about the rapid growth of the 
property industry. More housing is being built, formally and informally. New 
shopping centers, such as Ramayana, Giant, and Matahari, and amusement 
parks are being constructed to meet the needs of its inhabitants so that they 
do not have to travel to Surabaya. 
Similar to the case of the canal project that has divided villages into north 
and south, the toll road turned out to be the main cause for the division of 
more villages in Porong. One crucial division resulting from the project was 
what happened to the Renokenongo village that was divided into northeastern 
and southwestern regions. The division brought about a new region, namely 
Renomencil (Javanese, meaning “the remote Reno”), located on the southwest 
of the road. It was a settlement of fewer than thirty households and as the 
name suggests that these inhabitants was separated from the main settlement 
where public administrative offices and facilities of the Renokenongo village 
were located, on the other side of the road. The residents of Renomencil were 
closer to other villages, such as Siring and Mindi, which were located on the 
same side of the toll road. Nonetheless, the most intriguing about Renomencil 
is the fact that it was the location where Lapindo drilled the controversial 
natural gas exploration well of Banjar Panji 1 for it has always been linked to 
the mudflow (see 4.4 & 4.5). 
Lapindo obtained the location for the drilling with the help of Renokenongo 
village head (lurah), Mahmudatul Fatchiyah, after failing to find a site in two 
other adjacent villages (Siring and Jatirejo) because the villagers in those 
villages rejected the drilling of a natural gas exploration well in “their backyard” 
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(Batubara and Utomo 2012, 76). In the course of obtaining the land in 
Renomencil, no one from Lapindo directly presented the company’s natural 
gas exploration plan to the villagers. It was depending only on the authority of 
Mahmudatul as Renokenongo’s village head in negotiating with the 
landowners. What is more, even when the company started the drilling, many 
villagers still thought that it was not for a natural gas exploration but chicken 
poultry instead (Batubara and Utomo 2012, 76; Ahmady et al. 2010, 165–166). 
According to my own interviews with former residents of Renomencil, the land 
for the drilling of Banjar Panji 1 well belonged to Mahmudatul’s relatives who 
were living in the main settlement of the village, on the other side of the toll 
road. They rarely cultivated their land in Renomencil because of physical 
boundary of the toll road. It was very logical and practical if the landowners 
would take any offer to make a profit from their unproductive land in 
Renomencil (cf. Batubara and Utomo 2012, 74–79). 
2.5. An unnatural mudflow 
At this point, we can see that ecological projects and “local knowledges” 
shared in Porong have marginalized local people. They are the ones who have 
never won and became the victors in the battle of power over their land. Their 
presence is always subordinate to others from outside who come to occupy 
their land and modify it without considering their need and interest. The series 
of defeats to defend their land had brought them in a more dangerous state 
that they ever imagined from the birth of an unnatural mudflow. 
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The first eruption of hot mud and stinky gas was detected from the middle 
of paddy field in the Siring village, located about only 150-200 meters from the 
Banjar Panji 1 natural gas exploration well, on May 29, 2006. It was less than 
four months after Lapindo began drilling the well (on March 9, 2006). The first 
eruptions were about forty-to-fifty meters high and with a temperature of 70 
degree Celsius. Everyday since about 7,000-to-150,000 meter cubic of mud 
flows out from the earth’s belly. In the beginning of the eruption, for the 
purpose of “to not disturb the public” (agar tidak meresahkan masyarakat) there 
was an internal negotiation within Lapindo’s representatives to decide that the 
published number for the media was only 25,000 meter cubic of mudflow per 
day (Saputra 2006f). In the first three weeks, the mudflow had inundated an 
area of ninety hectares of land and resettlements and evicted more than 2,000 
inhabitants in that area (Saputra 2006c). In only a month, the engulfed area had 
grown larger, up to an area of 145 hectare and forcedly displaced more people 
from their home (Saputra 2006e). By September 2006, the mudflow spread 
over an area of 240 hectare (Normile 2006) and in December 2006 the drowned 
area were doubled, up to 450 hectare, especially after the explosion of an 
underground gas pipeline in the northeastern (on November 22, 2006) 
(McDonald and Widaningrum 2009, 1103). To date the mud flowing from the 
earth’s belly has engulfed at least 15 villages in three districts and led to the 
eviction of thousands of inhabitants. 
Since the eruption, the environmental quality in Porong has been 
degrading significantly. In the course of the 2012 and 2013 fieldwork, for 
instance, I was a witness of how difficult was for the villagers to get clean, 
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consumable water. We can no longer consume the groundwater from the wells 
and it can only be used for bathing, washing, and latrines with side effects 
causing itching of the skin. For cooking, the villagers relied on the supply of 
clean water from outside the region. Every morning and afternoon, people 
waited in line to buy clean water from the nearest water reservoirs, which were 
independently managed by a few people. Twice a day a tanker truck full of 
water catered those reservoirs with clean water taken from the springs of 
Mount Arjuno in Pasuruan. For drinking water, the villagers are consuming 
bottled water or refilled water gallons from a stall in the neighboring villages. 
The difficulty of getting clean water in the community has been a 
supplementary to the increase of society’s vulnerability. 
Some geologists calculated that the area surrounding the mud-volcano has 
been subsiding about 5.5 centimeter per day (Abidin et al. 2009) and as a 
result of the subsidence the area surrounding the main eruption has 
experienced land cracking and building fracturing which I observed during the 
fieldwork. According to a government report released in September 2008, 
there were about ninety eight small mud or flammable gas eruption spots, 
which fifty of them were found wildly active (DRE 2008). In 2011, a team of 
geologists predicts that the mudflow will continue to occur with the same rate 
for the next three decades (Davies et al. 2011). Additionally, according to 
Richard Davies, a professor of petroleum geology at the Durham University, 
closing the main vent, if it had been successful, would lead to another eruption 
elsewhere (personal email communication, July 19, 2012). From numerous 
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talks with victim-informants, the worst scenario they ever imagine is a sudden 
land collapse due to the empty space in the underground. 
The mudflow turns out to be the largest “mud-volcano”19 on earth (Davies et 
al. 2007; Mazzini et al. 2007; Istadi et al. 2012) and the first of its kind to be 
perceived as “disaster.” The mudflow and its potent hazards and risks (land 
subsidence and cracking, land collapse, wild flammable gas bursts, polluted 
groundwater and air) have become destructive environmental forces to the 
local people in Porong and demolishing major public infrastructures in the 
surrounding. One major issue for the central and provincial government is the 
fact that the mudflow disconnected the toll road causing serious economic 
problems in local and nation level for there has been a huge disruption to the 
transportation of goods and people from/to Surabaya and to/from eastern and 
southern regions in East Java and Bali with the absence of the road. The 
expedition enterprises were complaining about spending extra delivery costs 
up to IDR 600,000 (c. USD 70) per container because they had to reroute the 
travel (McMichael 2009, 76). 
Yet, there has been no exact number of the economic losses resulting from 
the disaster, although some institutions have tried to calculate it. The data from 
the National Statistic Bureau (BPS), for instance, showed that Sidoarjo has 
been the regency which suffered the most due to the disaster, marked by a 
significant drop of the regency’s economic growth, from 6.7 percent in 2005 to 
4.6 percent in 2006 (cited in McMichael 2009, 77). At least, ten factories had 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The scientific, geological term of such phenomena is “mud-volcano” (gunung lumpur), but in 
this study I am using the term “mudflow” (luapan lumpur) on the grounds that in the course of 
the fieldwork the former term is not familiar among my interlocutors and informants. 
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stopped their activities causing to more than 1,800 people jobless (Saputra 
2006d; Ahmady et al. 2010) and economic disruption has also detected in 
other regions in East Java, such as Malang, Pasuruan, and Probolinggo, where 
major industries are located. According to the Indonesian Audit Body (BPK), 
the total economic losses of the first year of the mudflow were no less than 30 
trillion rupiah whereas the economic growth would be obstructed for quite 
some years ahead (BPK 2007). 
 
Table 3 Mud-flooded agricultural fields, by May 2007 (in hectare) 
District Village Sugarcane Paddy Others crop Total 
Porong Siring 
Renokenongo 
Jatirejo 
Mindi 
Ketapang 
 
7.79 
5.63 
17.30 
22.25 
67.35 
29.60 
10.00 
 
 
 
 
4.0 
22.25 
75.14 
35.23 
27.30 
4.00 
Tanggulangin Kedungbendo 
Sentul 
 3.50 
25.00 
 3.50 
25.00 
Jabon Pejarakan 
Besuki 
Kedungcangkring 
17.60 
3.00 
12.70 
36.00 
79.00 
27.00 
 53.60 
82.00 
39.70 
Total 64.02 299.70 4.0 367,72 
Source: BPK (2007: 228-229) 
 
Over the first year of the mudflow there was more than two hundred 
hectares of paddy fields and sixty hectares of sugarcane fields swept by the 
mudflow (BPK 2007, 19, 228–229; see Table 3) and more agricultural fields 
become unproductive owing to the immersion of irrigation systems to supply 
other regions. Additionally, the data from the Office of Fisheries and Marine of 
Sidoarjo indicated a significant drop in the fisheries production in three mud-
affected districts (Porong, Tanggulangin, and Jabon), from 7,338.5 tons in 
2007 to 5,467.2 tons in 2008, contributing to a negative 24.81 percent in 
fisheries production growth of the whole regency in 2008 (cited in Fitrianto 
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2012, 171). One cause of this decline is the spilling of mudflow that contains 
hazardous substances into the Madura Strait through the Porong Canal. 
According to some independent studies, the mud consists of heavy metals 
essences that have polluted the groundwater and soil in surrounding the 
mudflow (Plumlee et al. 2008; Juniawan, Rumhayati, and Ismuyanto 2012) and 
therefore the spilling of mudflow has caused to supplementary surface and 
subsurface pollution along the canal and in its estuary (Nusantara 2010). 
The Indonesian Ministry for Environment estimated, by August 2007 the 
total loss was up to 28.3 billion rupiah including infrastructure damage and 
production losses in the provincial level (McMichael 2009, 79). The number can 
be more astounding if there is a calculation to the deprivation in middle- and 
microeconomic sectors in the region. The transportation obstacles have direct 
impact on the leather craft home-industries in the Tanggulangin district marked 
by the declining numbers of visitors to the region, in addition to a rivalry with 
imported products from China. By the end of June 2006, it was recorded that 
at least forty home industries of leathers had to stop their production and in 
just a year only eight industries survived (Batubara and Utomo 2012, 27–28). 
Theoretically, these industries do not only need more time to restore from the 
crisis, but they also need extra time to catch up with the normal progress 
(Cernea 2003). Still, no governmental or non-governmental organization has 
done specific measurements of economic losses in these sectors and 
designed strategies to deal with it. 
Another marginal issue in regards of the impact of the mudflow has been 
the loss of education facilities. The National Development Planning (Bappenas) 
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reported that by the first year the mudflow inundated thirty public schools, 
ranging from elementary to senior level, and two Islamic boarding schools 
(pesantren) in the region (Bappenas 2007). The government has no plan to 
relocate these public schools, meanwhile the organizers of Islamic schools 
used their personal compensation money to independently relocate their 
educational facilities in various places. Currently, other schools in the vicinity of 
the disaster zone are experiencing a crisis of students following the large-scale 
migration of victims to other regions. Apart from the mudflow impact on local 
and national economy, thousands of inhabitants lost their home. These people 
were forcedly displaced by the mudflow and had to find new dwellings and 
rebuild a new life. Thus, if the previous ecological projects (the river, the canal, 
and toll road) lead to the division of some communities, the mudflow scatters 
the people. 
2.6. Scattering community 
To date the mudflow has not come to an end. Nonetheless, the social and 
ecological crisis is now entering a dormant state and the social tension in 
Porong is not as high as in the first five years of the eruption. One of the 
factors is that most victims have already started new lives in their new 
dwellings, although not all of them have fully been compensated. The mudflow 
has resulted in the formation of new social groups in Porong, i.e., the “inside 
map” and “outside map” victims, and the “non-victims.” 
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The “inside map” victims 
The “inside map” victims (korban dalam peta) is meant to name a group of 
victims whose land and houses are included in the map of “impacted area” 
(peta area terdampak) released by the central government on March 22, 2007. 
Members of the group are receiving compensation money from Lapindo 
following the issuance of a presidential regulation (No. 14 of 2007). The amount 
that each victim receives may vary on the grounds that it was calculated based 
on victims’ individual possession of land and buildings. The compensation 
rates are one million rupiah per square meter of dry land (tanah kering), one-
and-half million rupiah per square meter of buildings and 120,000 per square 
meter of wet paddies (sawah basah) as mentioned in Lapindo’s letter on 
December 4, 2006 (see discussion on the victimization and compensation in 
3.4). According to the presidential regulation, Lapindo should pay its obligation 
to the victims in two periods, 20 percent down payment (subsequent to the 
issuance of the regulation in April 2007) and 80 percent of the remaining at 
once in no less than two years after the first payment due. 
To handle the transaction, Lapindo set up a new subsidiary, namely 
Minarak Lapindo Jaya (publicly known as and thenceforth, “Minarak”). The 
establishment of a new company is due to the fact that Lapindo is registered 
as an American-based company and according to the Agrarian Law (No. 5 of 
1960) foreign company is not allowed to purchase and own land in Indonesia. 
Ahead of the second payment deadline, Minarak brought up an alternative 
transaction option by offering the victims to barter their remaining 
compensation money with new houses in Kahuripan Nirvana Village (KNV), a 
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housing managed by PT Mutiara Mashur Sejahtera (MMS). MMS is a real 
estate business under the umbrella of Bakrieland, which is listed as another 
subsidiary of Lapindo’s parent company, the Bakrie & Brothers. Using a claim 
that a legal land and building transaction required certificates of land and 
buildings released by the National Land Body (BPN), Minarak urged victims 
without certificates to accept the barter option. In return, each victim will 
receive a unit of house in KNV with some conditions: if the residual value of the 
compensation that has not been paid is greater than the value of one unit 
house in KNV, the victim would get margin money back; but, if the value is 
smaller than the price of the house, the victim had to pay for the shortfall to 
Minarak or MMS. To accommodate the diverse value of victims’ 
compensation, Minarak offered different types of houses in KNV, with ranging 
price between 36 million and 70 million rupiah per unit. 
Whereas some victims rejected the offer and demanded Lapindo to 
disburse the remaining payment in cash at once, many victims accepted it 
after a long negotiation, which was mediated by a populist East Javanese 
cultural and Islamic religious leader, Emha Ainun Najib (publicly known as “Cak 
Nun”). Consequently, the “inside map” group is split again into two groups: 
those who rejected Minarak’s offer and those who took the offer. The first 
group is called the “cash and carry” group, while the latter the “cash and 
resettlement” group.20 
To deal with the first group, Minarak declared its inability to pay the 
remaining in cash at once and decided to disburse monthly installments of 30 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 These names are originally in English. 
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million rupiah per certificate starting from December 2008. The statement 
changed shortly in February 2009 when the company claimed only capable to 
make payment in monthly installments of 15 million rupiah per certificate. The 
global economic crisis was blamed for such a situation. While most victims 
argued that Lapindo has clearly violated the presidential regulation, they could 
not do anything much about it. They have done public hearings with 
parliament, legal actions to the supreme and constitutional courts, street 
protests and demonstrations, but the government seems blind to their 
conditions. Such a situation raises a serious question of how the role of the 
government in guarantying the compensation payment of disaster victims (cf. 
Sugarman 2007) because it never disciplines Lapindo for disobeying its 
regulation and there has been no bright solution to resolve the postponing of 
compensation payment to the victims. Instead of ensuring the compensation 
payment, the permissiveness of the government has been the evidence of 
Lapindo’s strong position in bargaining its power in the national politics (see 
chapters 4 & 5). And, once again, the victims are at stake. 
The victims of cash and resettlement are facing different problem in 
obtaining certificates of their new properties in KNV. Most victims have yet to 
receive the certificate for their land and houses in KNV. As of April 2014 
Minarak had only released 75 land certificates of 2,151 certificates that should 
be given to the victims (Suprapto and Martudji 2014). In many cases, the 
victims’ motive to accept this option was based more on pragmatic reason for 
they did not want to be enmeshed in a complicated, bureaucratic paperwork 
with either Lapindo/Minarak or the government. Therefore, they took any 
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proposal from Lapindo/Minarak even though it was not cash money but house 
instead. Subsequent to having the house they intended to sell it to someone 
else. One victim’s family said in an interview that they eventually accepted the 
offer to relocate in KNV because they did not want to be kinked in getting the 
compensation. They felt that living in KNV is “too modern” (terlalu modern) and 
with the money from selling the house they planned to buy a house in hamlet 
(rumah kampung), where they could raise livestock (e.g., chickens, goats, or 
cows) and do subsistence farming. It seemed that Minarak suspected such 
motives and forced victims to sign an agreement that allows them to sell the 
house only after one year they moved in. Another efficient strategy that 
Minarak undertakes is postponing the handover of the certificate because the 
victims could not sell the house to a third party without it, but they can sell it 
back to Minarak at a lower price. Relied on the information from various talks 
with activist-interlocutors, there has been a spreading rumor that Minarak had 
to use the certificate of land and houses in KNV as collateral to borrow money 
from bank with which Minarak used to pay the victims of the first group. 
However, it is very difficult to trace the sources of the money that Minarak 
disbursed to the victims. 
The “outside map” victims 
A second victim group consists of those whose land and houses are 
included in the “uninhabitable area” (area tidak layak huni) (released gradually 
in 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2013; see the discussion about the enlargement of 
mudflow disaster zone in 3.5). The group is called the “outside map” victim 
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(korban luar peta) and its members receive compensation money from the 
government instead of Lapindo. Although the government applies the same 
rate for calculating the compensation of these victims, to a certain degree their 
condition is much better than those who are borne by Lapindo. Unlike the 
company that applies a double-standard mechanism to recompense the 
“inside map” victims (by offering alternative option of resettlement to KNV), the 
government purchases the land and buildings of the “outside map” victims 
without questioning the legal status of the assets. Consequently, the payment 
by the government has been more steadily given compared to the payment by 
Lapindo. Whereas many the “cash and carry” victims are still waiting for 
monthly installments from Lapindo, the government has completed to 
indemnify most “outside map” victims. 
The different treatment has evoked social envy of the “inside map” victims 
to the “outside map” victims. In mid-May 2013, for instance, I witnessed a 
quarrel between two male victims, one was an “outside map” victim from 
Besuki village and the other was an “inside map” victim from Renokenongo 
village. At the time, the Renokenongo villager was waiting for Lapindo to 
complete the remaining compensation and the Besuki villager had just 
received the initial down payment of compensation from the government. They 
were arguing loudly and emotionally about two different viewpoints to claim of 
“who is the true victim of this disaster.” According to the Renokenongo 
villager, his counterpart could not be accounted as a true victim by bringing up 
the issue that he was not only losing his belongings but most of his time urging 
Lapindo to disburse the remaining compensation. The Besuki villager 
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confronted that argument by raising the fact that he had been living in 
uncertainty for six years just to get an official status as “a victim.” Without the 
status he could not have the rights to get compensation from what he had 
been losing. The quarrel ended with a mutual understanding that they are 
essentially victims of the government’s indecisiveness in dealing with the 
mudflow and especially Lapindo. To that end, both define themselves as 
victims of human politics rather than an environmental disaster. 
The “non-victims” 
The third social group consists of people who are living in the surrounding 
of disaster zone and I call this group the “non-victims.” Members of this group 
are living in a deteriorating environment without a legal status as “victims.” As 
a consequence, they are not entitled to be recompensed by the government 
and/or Lapindo for living in degraded environment. However, not everybody I 
met wanted to be included as new victims. One reason appeared to be that 
they did not want to leave their village. Some even said that they would rather 
die in their villages than to die not in their homes. Apart from the issue of 
humans’ bonds with their land (Oliver-Smith 2010, chap. 6), I discovered that 
such a reasoning came mostly from the experience of previous victims who 
were facing difficulties to be integrated into new communities. 
Currently, there is a specific term to label the mudflow victims, i.e., wong 
lumpur (Javanese, meaning “mud people”). It has been circulating among the 
people in Porong as a manifestation of the non-victims’ social envy of the 
mudflow victims. They stereotype the victims as “the rich and protester” (orang 
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kaya dan tukang protes) for they had received a lot of money from the 
compensation but still frequently disturbing the society by conducting street 
protests and demonstrations. 21  The stereotyping has led to sociocultural 
problems to the victims’ integration in their new resettlements. I frequently 
received information from my informants concerning the rejection of the non-
victim group to bury a deceased mudflow victim in the public graveyard of the 
new resettlement. Moreover, not every local muezzin desired to lead prayers if 
the deceased was a mudflow victim because they never consider the victim to 
be their responsibility. When such a situation happened the family would call 
the muezzin from their origin village who may have moved to a different village 
or district. They also searched for any cemetery that would accept the funeral. 
Some Besuki villagers were quite lucky that they could still use the remaining 
graveyard in their former, abandoned village to bury their deceased family’s 
member although they may have lived in distant places. 
 
Fig.  2.2 Social formations in Porong following the mudflow hazard (adapted from field notes) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 I am indebted to Lutfi Amiruddin for bringing up the stereotyping. 
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2.7. Maintaining power relations through collective resettlement 
Post-eviction social problems have spawned anxieties in relation to 
maintain power relations among victims. Following Quarantelli, I differ “anxiety” 
from “panic.” Panics, according to him, “occur following crises in which the 
danger is defined as an immediate and potential threat to the bodily self” and 
manifest in “non-social” and “non-rational” behaviors (Quarantelli 1954, 273). 
By “non-social” he means the behavior intended for the sake of the safety of 
the individual him/herself, without a concern in interfering with the others, and 
by “non-rational” is for it is taken spontaneously, immediate or reflex, without 
any consideration that such might harm the actor and/or other people. Within 
the framework, I therefore understand “anxiety” as a psychological state that 
emerges after someone has learnt the inevitable consequences that might 
suffer him/her. In this sense, whereas panic is caused by one’s nescience, 
anxiety is socially constructed through one’s knowledge about what will 
happen to him/her. Hence, unlike panic, anxiety will trigger rational and social 
behaviors, the behaviors that are always related to power struggles. 
In the course and aftermath of the mudflow hazard, the shadow of 
displacement and disintegration has been one source of anxiety among people 
in Porong. To deal with the displacement there are two strategies 
implemented: individual relocation and collective resettlement. In practice, the 
former is less complicated than the latter. It is usually because the support of a 
sufficient social capital of victims’ family or kinship owing to the fact that most 
individual relocations depend on familial factors. These victims tend to move 
into their relatives or a location near their kin. 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
  !100 
Collective resettlement, on the contrary, has been colored by various 
strategies to maintain power relations in a community, which is aimed not only 
to deal with the anxiety of displacement but also the realm of disintegration. 
Apart from the problematic collective resettling initiated and organized by 
Minarak to KNV, I noted some victims also organize such an idea. The role of 
community leaders (tokoh) is required to proceed with such an idea and 
collective resettlement has been a crucial process to probe the endurance of 
social structures of a community, as I will show in two case studies of 
Renokenongo and Besuki villages in the following. 
The Renokenongo case 
The mudflow hazard has positioned Renokenongo villagers into the inside 
map victim group. Although the mudflow began to erupt in late-May 2006, 
most Renokenongo villagers were saved owing to the existence of the toll 
road. It was because the eruption was located on the west side of the road and 
they were living on the other side of the road. Additionally, the government’s 
intention to secure national and provincial economy by protecting the road 
from the mudflow was the main factor for these villagers’ safety. The 
embanking project on the east side of the eruption resulted in the redirecting of 
the mudflow to the western and southern regions instead of flowing to 
Renokenongo main settlement in the east. As a result, while people of other 
villages on the west of the road, such as Siring, Kedungbendo and Jatirejo, 
had evacuated to the Pasar Baru Porong during the first months of the 
eruption, most Renokenongo villagers were still living in their homes with a 
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high level of anxiety. Some early Renokenongo victims from Renomencil, 
Wangkal, and Balongnongo hamlets living in the west side of the road, stayed 
a while in Renokenongo village hall (balai desa) that had been modified as a 
temporary refugee camp. 
As of October 2006 these early mudflow victims received two-year house 
rent aid from Lapindo, so they departed from the refugee camps. However, a 
huge explosion of underground gas pipeline along the toll road (occurred on 
the night of November 22, 2006) caused the collapse of the east 
embankments. The main settlement of Renokenongo and a highly populated 
housing, namely Perumtas (abbreviated from Perumahan Tanggulangin Asri 
Sejahtera) could not escape from the mudflow danger anymore. Most 
inhabitants evacuated to and inhabited the newly emptied Pasar Baru Porong. 
A few days after the explosion (on December 4, 2006), Lapindo announced its 
willingness to purchase land and buildings from the victims and excluded the 
Renokenongo and Perumtas regions. Victims from these regions organized 
themselves into several groups to negotiate with Lapindo and the government 
in order to include them as the “official” victims too. 
The negotiation was a success marked with the release of the map of 
impacted area (on March 22, 2007) and the issuance of a presidential 
regulation (No. 14 of 2007) obligating Lapindo to recompense them as mudflow 
victims. Surprisingly, instead of accepting the regulation, many villagers of 
Renokenongo established and gathered in a new group, namely Pagar 
Rekontrak (abbreviated from Paguyuban Warga Renokenongo Menolak 
Kontrak; literally translated as, “association of Renokenongo villagers against 
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contract [of transaction]”). As the name suggested, the group consisted of 
victims who resisted signing the contract of compensation with Lapindo. The 
group raised two objections: first, Lapindo should pay the compensation at 
once without installments and secondly, Lapindo should also indemnify them 
for immaterial losses apart from the material damages in amount of one billion 
rupiah per family. Lapindo’s response was quite predictable: it ignored them. 
Eventually, starting from September 2008 the group’s members agreed to sign 
the contract with Lapindo and changed the group name to Pagar Rekorlap 
(abbreviated from Paguyuban Warga Renokenongo Korban Lapindo; literally 
translated as, “association of Renokenongo villagers, victims of Lapindo”). In 
due course, the members of the group inhabited the refugee camp of Pasar 
Baru Porong. In mid-2009, some members of the group had received the initial 
payment from Lapindo. Though they have already rented house elsewhere, 
they were still dwelling in the camp and only occasionally visited the house. It 
was meant as a strategy to maintain solidarity among the group’s members 
and to consolidate their plan for collective resettlement.  
Subsequent to the initial payment from Lapindo, the group’s leaders 
collected the money from their members in order to purchase new land for 
their resettlement, with additional money they borrowed from a local 
businessman. After conducting several surveys, they decided to use the 
money to buy an ex-sugarcane field in the village of Kedung Solo. There are 
some considerations why they chose this location. First, the price matched 
with their money. Second, the location is not too far from their previous village. 
Third, it is located near the new artery and toll road. Fourth, it is still in rural 
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area which is why they rejected the relocation to KNV for they saw it as “too 
urban” (terlalu kota). As of June 2009 they began to dwell in the new 
resettlement they name it Renojoyo (Javanese, meaning “the glorious Reno”). 
Renokenongo’s rejection to sign contracts of compensation with Lapindo 
juxtaposes the fact that Lapindo/Minarak precluded victims with insufficient 
land and buildings certificates. At first, one could spontaneously interpret the 
rejection as a strategy to resist Lapindo. But later on I discovered that it was an 
effort to maintain power relations between local leaders (tokoh) and their 
subjects, representing a common patron-client relationship in many Javanese 
societies (B. Anderson 2007). In Renokenongo, community leaders are mainly 
major landowners and similar to other villagers they do not posses a proper 
certificate for their assets. One local leader I met in 2009 claimed that his land 
asset was worth more than five billion rupiah following own calculation of the 
compensation. For he did not possess the certificate of the land, he was very 
anxious that Minarak would not give him anything since the company would 
only compensate victim with certificate and push him to choose the KNV 
option where he will have to live with new people from other villages. Together 
with other local leaders of Renokenongo, he gathered people with similar 
problem of certificate dispossession and maintained the idea of collective 
resettlement as if it is the need of the Renokenongo villagers. He believed that 
by establishing a victim group he would have a more strategic position to 
bargain with Lapindo and the government rather than if he did it all alone. 
The current arrangement of Renojoyo is evidence of how these local 
leaders have been sustaining power relations within the community. The 
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houses of these leaders occupy the main street of the resettlement, whereas 
the houses of ordinary people are located in side streets, behind their leaders. 
Such an emplacement is contrary to the initial agreement in 2009, of which 
some leaders informed me that the land lots (kapling) in the new resettlement 
would be decided by a lottery. However, in the 2010 fieldwork, I discovered 
that some leaders who received a lot of compensation money wanted to take 
more than one land lot in a contiguous ground and therefore the lottery was an 
obstacle for them to fulfill their desires. To deal with this they executed some 
strategies, such as personal lobbying to some villagers to switch lots, luring 
them with some money, and spreading an issue that if the villagers insisting 
with the lottery’s result it will hinder the land titling. 
The Renokenongo case presents collective resettlement as not only a 
strategy to cope with the anxiety of displacement and disintegration of a 
community. It is also aimed to maintain power relations between local leaders 
and their followers in the community since collective resettlement will bring 
also these preexisting relations to the new resettlement.  
The Besuki case 
The will to maintain power relations among the community also appeared 
in collective resettling of the Besuki villagers. Though the same motive of 
maintaining power relations has been coloring the migration, instead of moving 
to a single location Besuki villagers migrated communally into separate 
locations following the preexisting competitions among local leaders in the 
village. 
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The impact of the mudflow first came to the village in August 2006 when it 
swept some paddy fields of the village resulting in a stalled, unproductive land. 
The Besuki villagers can be classified as the “outside map” victims however 
the victimization of the village occurred in two phases owing to the existence 
of the toll road that divided it since 1980s. According to the data from 
autobiographical memories of the villagers, in the area where the road exists, 
there were schools, mosques and houses. The project did not only cause 
those buildings to be demolished, but also separating the village into two 
hamlets: “Besuki Barat” (barat; Indonesian, “west”) and “Besuki Timur” (timur; 
Indonesian, “east”). In practice, the road functioned as both a natural and 
social border, creating physical and psychological distance between two 
different areas of inhabitation—similar to the case of Porong River and Canal. 
Administratively, both regions were still under the same village governance, but 
the existence of the road as a physical border determined social interactions 
between villagers living on each side of it. Although the government had built a 
bridge connecting both areas to enable villagers to cross the toll road, it did 
not work as well as it was supposed to. Consequently, the social lives of those 
living in the Besuki village changed significantly. Some religious routines had to 
be managed differently. The women’s Diba’an,22 for instance, had to stop 
because the participants were too afraid to cross the bridge in the dark. Some 
villagers took the initiative and dismantled the barbed wire fence, which was 
installed between the highway and the settlements, so that they could cross 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Diba’an is a prayer and reading of the Shalawat of the Prophet Muhammad in a group. The 
book read is the Book of Diba’. In the Besuki village, there were three Diba’an groups, one for 
men, one for women, and one for girls. 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
  !106 
directly on the road. This action triggered the construction of concrete walls 
along the road in 1995. The walls were meant so the villagers could not see the 
lights of the neighborhoods across the road. Villagers began using the bridge 
again for a while before they dismantled some parts of the walls to make it 
easier to cross on foot. Motorcyclists used the bridge, but cyclists and 
pedestrians preferred to cross the road itself. 
The toll road was a major factor in determining the victimization of the 
Besuki in two phases. The first phase of victimization occurred in mid-2008 
following the issuance of a president regulation (No. 48 of 2008). The regulation 
only included the region on the west side of the road, the Besuki Barat. The 
decision was triggered by the collapse of the southern embankment resulting 
in the mud flowing to Besuki Barat. At the time, the villagers could not flee to 
the refugee camp in Pasar Baru Porong because it was still occupied by the 
people of Pagar Rekontrak (see Renokenongo case above) and as a 
consequence the villagers had to build impermanent shacks on the 
dysfunctional toll road. As of the government disbursed the evacuation and 
house-rent aids as well as six-month living allowances, these people began to 
search for new dwellings. It happened concurrent with the government’s plan 
to build supplementary mud containers on the southern of the main eruption 
(see chapter 3). 
The 2008 regulation included only villagers of Besuki Barat and therefore 
excluded Besuki Timur villagers from the victimization. Many Besuki Timur 
villagers were very disappointed with this decision because they felt deserted 
to live in a gradually degrading environment on the eastern side of the road. 
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The disappointment was manifested in the establishment of several victim 
groups that were aimed to force the government to include Besuki Timur into 
the disaster zone, but none of these groups lasted long. There were at least 
three different groups: Pagar Betis (abbreviated from Paguyuban Besuki Timur 
Siaga; “society of Besuki Timur alert”), BKL (abbreviated from Besuki Korban 
Lumpur; “mudflow victims of Besuki”), and Tim 7 (or “team of seven,” which 
was the total of remaining neighborhood association (rukun tetangga) in Besuki 
Timur). As of April 2012, in line with the issuance of another presidential 
regulation (No. 37 of 2012), the government announced a new map of 
“uninhabitable area,” which included the area of Besuki Timur in the new 
mudflow disaster zone. The regulation marked a second phase of victimization 
of Besuki villagers and for this reason the government would purchase all land 
and houses in the village and compel the villagers to move to new settlements 
within two years following this decision. 
The victimization of Besuki villagers in two phases has unearthed 
preexisting, latent conflicts between local leaders, the conflicts that were 
followed by the division of villagers into several groups.23 As a result most 
Besuki villagers chose to resettle collectively in separate locations following 
different leaders, respectively. Many villagers argued that the reason they 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Apart from internal conflicts, the Besuki villagers also experienced external conflicts with 
other villages. Among these conflicts was between the Besuki and the Renokenongo occurring 
in July 2006. The conflict was triggered by the government’s plan to build supplementary 
embankments in the northeast in order to secure the toll road. Such an action meant to the 
mudflow would be redirected to the Besuki village instead of the Renokenongo village. 
Obviously, the Besuki villagers demanded the government to build embankments in the south 
too so that the mudflow would not sweep their village. On the contrary, according to the 
Renokenongo villagers, such an embankment would lead the mud flowing to their village. While 
the conflict intensified, the explosion of underground gas pipeline (on November 22, 2006) has 
made the villagers of each village too busy to secure their selves and belongings. 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
  !108 
chose to move into the new location was because they were following “the 
words of the leaders” (kata para tokoh). One popular leader, who was the chief 
of pesantren Darul Ulum in Besuki Barat, managed independent relocation of 
his educational facility to Panggreh village, Jabon district, Sidoarjo, which was 
followed by a large group of Besuki villagers. Another small group of villagers 
resettled in a different location tailing one religious leader who moved to Dukuh 
Sari village in the same district with the previous group. The tendency to jointly 
resettle in these two villages also happens to Besuki Timur villagers because 
they wanted to live in a neighborhood where they still can meet up with their 
old neighbors. I discovered one local leader organized the resettling of about 
sixty families of Besuki Barat onto the Ngering village, Gempol, Pasuruan, but 
he did not move together with them to reside in that place. 
The Besuki case shows a different state from the Renokenongo case. 
Whereas in the Renokenongo case local leaders (para tokoh) united to maintain 
the idea of collective resettling and managed to actualize it, local leaders of 
Besuki were competing with each other in gathering villagers who were willing 
to follow each of them onto new locations, respectively. The disintegration of 
the village stems from the conflicts among their local leaders. However, like the 
Renokenongo case, the Besuki case also proves a tendency of the idea of 
collective resettlement is used as an effective strategy to maintain power 
relations between local leaders and their subjects. This does not only mean 
that these leaders aspire to prolong their dominance over their followers but 
also that many villagers felt safe and secure when they stick with some 
persons who could provide them certainty. Collective resettlement is therefore 
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not only a strategy of victims to cope with the anxiety of displacement and 
society’s disintegration, but also a mean to maintain power relations within 
them. 
2.8. Porong, a space for living and a living space 
In the course of introducing the space of this study’s fieldwork, the chapter 
explores historical, social, and cultural contexts that have been shaping the 
people and environment in the Porong region. Calling from political ecological 
perspective, it examines Porong as a space of power contestation to provide 
explanations of how the local people’s interrelation with other people and their 
environment. Porong is not only a place for living, but also a living space and 
as the chapter shows it has been a space in which humans perform various 
ecological modifications resulting in the increase of power relations, especially 
between local people and outliers. 
The chapter argues that “Porong” is more than just an administrative area 
of a district, it is rather a spatial concept of a region initiated and created by 
humans following the damming of the Brantas River, the largest river in east 
Java, in pre-Majapahit Java. Since that time, there have been major ecological 
projects in the region not only resulting in the alteration of physical 
environment but also shaping the culture of the people living within it. From the 
colonial to post-colonial era, the spatial alteration of the region has been 
frequently associated with a collusive relationship between the government 
apparatuses and corporations (e.g., sugar factories, large industries, mining 
companies) to facilitate them in performing economic activities in Porong. Such 
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a relationship has been marginalizing the local people and subordinating them 
to other people’s interests who occupy and modify their environments. The 
marginalization of local people is also manifested in so-called “local 
knowledges” being shared and circulating in Porong as if they are the ones 
who never win in the battle of power over their land. 
The chapter chronicles the formation of a stalled space of “Renomencil” 
where Lapindo eventually drilled the controversial Banjar Panji 1 well, which 
has been linked to the mudflow owing to the fact that the first eruption was 
detected just a few meters from it. Following Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, the 
mudflow can be categorized as an environmental hazard (Oliver-Smith and 
Hoffman 2002). But since it erupts in densely inhabited region, the mudflow 
has generated a major disaster by evicting the local inhabitants, disrupting 
backbone transportation infrastructures of the province, and shaking the 
nation’s politics and economy. The mudflow inherent risks and hazards have 
stimulated social and ecological crises and to a degree have triggered some 
efforts to maintain preexisting power relations within the local communities. 
As the following chapters will discuss, the mudflow hazard has become a 
critical environmental discourse of “disaster” in relation to different political 
interests of different actors. The subsequent chapter attempts to show how the 
enlargement of the mud-affected area resulting from a combination of the 
unstoppable mudflow eruption and risky mitigatory actions performed. It is to 
address the first actor of the Lapindo case discussed in this study, i.e., the 
government. 
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Map 2 Map of Disaster Zone (Courtesy of Anton Novenanto & Imron Fauzi, 2014) !
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Chapter 3  | Risky Mitigation 
The ecological crisis involves a systematic violation of basic human rights, a 
crisis of basic rights whose long-term effect in weakening society can 
scarcely be underestimated. For dangers are being produced by industry, 
externalized by economics, individualized by the legal system, legitimized 
by the natural sciences, and made to appear harmless by politics. (Beck 
1996, 18, emphasis original) 
3.1. Under the banner of protests 
A few weeks ahead of the seventh-year anniversary of the mudflow 
eruption (on May 29, 2013), a group of victims built shacks on the top of the 
western embankment and overnighted there. It was part of their efforts 
demanding the remaining compensation from Lapindo. In addition to such 
efforts, they hanged three huge banners on the outer side of the embankment 
wall facing the Porong highway so that many people could read what is written 
on them (Fig.  3.1). The first banner (above) reads: “Why is the outside map 
victims have been fully compensated, while we, the outside map victims, have 
not been paid off after seven years!”24 The second banner (below-left) reads: 
“This land has not been paid [and therefore] BPLS is not allowed to work in 
here!” 25  The third banner reads: “We call for the government to revise 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 “Kenapa di luar PAT [peta area terdampak] sudah dibayar sedangkan kami yang di PAT 
sudah 7 tahun belum dibayar!” 
25 “Tanah ini belum dibayar, BPLS dilarang bekerja di sini!” 
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Presidential Regulation No. 14 (of 2007) [so that] the outside map victims shall 
be paid by the government, too!”26 
Each of those banners raises different issues in relation to recent 
conditions of the victims. The first banner brings about the issue of different 
treatments between the outside map and inside map victims in regard to the 
mechanism of compensation payment (see 2.6 & 3.7). It also shows that, sadly, 
up to seven years of the mudflow eruption, Lapindo has not yet to recompense 
all the “inside map” victims. This makes the second banner seems 
understandable as the reason why victims prohibit BPLS performing mitigatory 
countermeasures on the uncompensated area. It is due to those victims are 
considering that they still own the land and for this very reason no party may 
perform any activities on the land without consent of the landowner. In the 
third banner, the victims offer the best solution to solve such problems: the 
government should take over Lapindo’s responsibility to recompense these 
victims. 
One could easily see the structure of the statements on the banners in the 
following order: first banner tells about the root problem (i.e., Lapindo has not 
yet to pay off compensation of victims), the second contains the consequence 
if the problem has not been resolved (i.e., the victims prohibit BPLS to work 
mitigating the mudflow), and the third proposes a solution to resolve the 
problem (i.e., the government must take over Lapindo’s obligation to pay the 
remaining compensation). Above all, these banners are proving one fact: there 
is a fundamental problem inherent within the disaster politics. The unsettled !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 “Kami minta pemerintah merubah Perpres 14, korban lumpur yang di PAT juga harus dibayar 
oleh pemerintah!” 
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compensation of victims is perhaps the most publicly well known for the media 
have frequently heralded it. However, as the chapter will show, it is just among 
other complications generated by the disaster politics. 
 
 
Fig.  3.1 Protest banners on the embankment wall (Photo courtesy of Lutfi Amiruddin, 2013) 
 
The chapter is grounded mainly on a critical discourse analysis of 
mitigation policies regarding the mudflow hazard, with some additional 
ethnographic data from the fieldwork in Porong. It begins with a review 
analysis of preexisting structures underlying the government politics in dealing 
with the hazard by chronicling its responses and paradigmatic transition. 
Subsequently, focusing on the consequences of mitigatory actions, it 
demonstrates how the mudflow mitigation, like many other environmental-
related projects, consists of unintended dangers and threats that may generate 
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more social and ecological crises apart from the mudflow itself. Throughout the 
chapter, I argue that instead of mitigating the mudflow’s impacts the 
government has been one key actor to make the disaster even be more 
systematic. 
3.2. Disaster, moral duty, and policy analysis 
Whereas the previous chapter explores a brief political ecology history of 
the Porong region as a highly contested landscape prior to the birth of a 
mudflow (on May 29, 2006), this chapter aims to focus more on the 
politicization of the region in the aftermath. It aims to unravel fundamental 
problems through critical examinations of the disaster politics of the 
government. Relying on a framework to consider disaster as an event/process, 
it is intended to explore how power is exercised in the course and aftermath of 
disaster mitigation policymaking. 
The investigation of the role of the government dealing with disaster is 
based on an assumption that the government is supposed to be a political 
institution that is responsible for balancing social and ecological crises in the 
aftermath of a disaster (Zack 2009; Rozario 2007). It is the government’s duty 
as a modern political institution to develop prevention systems and strategies 
for impending environmental hazards (both natural and technological) and to 
make sure that a disaster, once it had happened, will not grow larger and 
broader to suffer more people in the country (Dynes 2000; Huet 2012; Rozario 
2007). Environmental hazards are frequently seen as negative, unwanted, 
destructive events that may interrupt national economy and many people 
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expected the active role of the government to deal with the abnormality that 
follows them as soon as possible (Faure 2007; Sugarman 2007; Zack 2009). 
Accordingly, some hazard-prone countries have been developing prevention 
systems and strategies to increase their resiliencies towards environmental 
hazards for such would not turn into disasters (J. W. Anderson 1968; McCabe 
2002; Bankoff 2003) since the government has the authority to publicly define 
an event as a “disaster” or not  (Rozario 2007; J. W. Anderson 1968; Button 
2010). Statements from governmental officials have always been used as the 
main reference for developing general knowledge about a disaster (Button 
2010; Sood, Stockdale, and Rogers 1987) and therefore the government plays 
a key role in the public discourse about disaster. 
I shall argue that the relation between humans and their environment in the 
wake of a disaster is not just one-way (how the hazardous environment has the 
power to affect humans), but two-way (how both parties interrelate with one 
another). It is not only about how human agents adapt to the hazard, but also 
about how they have been trying hard to modify it. The purpose has been to 
reduce risks and potential threats, or, at least, so that the repercussions could 
be suppressed. However, every environmental-related project contains “risks” 
that may trigger and raise more social and ecological problems (Beck 1992; 
1996; Bryant 1998). Accordingly, disaster politics has eventually contributed to 
the escalation of the disaster and to a degree environmental hazards are 
anthropogenic. 
Some scholars have already analyzed the role of the government in the 
Lapindo case. Muhtada, for instance, argued that the disaster politics could 
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not solve the social problems due to its partiality and the economic, social, and 
ethical complexities of the disaster itself (Muhtada 2008). Fitrianto took a 
different departure arguing that most complications of the Lapindo case stem 
from a wide gap between the mitigation policy and the actual need of the 
victims (Fitrianto 2011). As a way out from these problems, he proposed the 
idea that if the government should have involved community members, 
especially disaster victims, in the policymaking the gap would not be too 
extreme. A recent study by Putro & Yonekura demonstrates that the increasing 
human insecurities among victims as a result of the disaster politics made by 
the government (Putro and Yonekura 2014). Nonetheless, instead of giving a 
clear explanation of the core problem of the disaster politics, these prior 
studies raise more questions: Why is there partiality in the disaster politics? 
Why is there a gap between the mitigation policy and the actual needs of the 
victims? What has the government done to increase the society’s vulnerability 
instead of its resilience? In this chapter, I shall condense those questions to 
dive into a more substantive concern: in which ways the Indonesian 
government has been allowing such complications to persist and endure? And, 
why the government chose to do so? 
The chapter focuses mainly on policies produced by the government in 
dealing with the problems of the mudflow and the side effects of such policies 
on the society and ecology in Porong and beyond by considering a classic 
issue in policy studies: the alienation of citizens in the policymaking process 
and the expanding coverage of policy from time to time (cf. Shore and Wright 
1997). For policy is mainly outlined in language, it parallels Foucault’s concept 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
  !118 
of “discourse” Foucault designates discourse in three different levels for it can 
be: any articulated statements; a group of statements, which are 
interconnected in a same web of meaning and therefore it may have conflicted 
with other grouped statements; and, a “regulated practice” to articulate 
particular statements in particular fields (Foucault 1972, 80). An understanding 
of discourse as regulated practice has been the most distinctive in Foucauldian 
theory of discourse for it brings the concept of power into an analysis of 
discourse. Indeed, Foucault considers discourse less as oral communication 
than as knowledge transmitting power and producing power relations 
(Foucault 1978, 101). 
Following this perspective, I shall focus on a discourse analysis of policy 
by addressing it simultaneously as: a locus of struggles, a vehicle of power, 
and a political practice. As a locus of struggles, policy is seen as a group of 
statements that stems from a series of discursive practices of selecting, 
adjusting or discounting particular knowledge in the policymaking and 
implementation. In regard to policy as a vehicle of power, one can examine it in 
the context of its function in creating (and maintaining) one’s interest and 
identity as well as erasing (and ignoring) others’. An examination of policy’s 
power effects is needed for it determines rules and regulations applied to one 
population yet inapplicable to other populations. Lastly, policy is also a political 
practice for it is needed as a legal basis to concrete ideas into realities and 
without it the government has no authority to perform a development project, 
including the one that will be discussed in the chapter, i.e., disaster mitigation. 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
     119 
3.3. A political disaster 
The mudflow that is happening in Porong, says Jim Schiller, is an 
“unnatural disaster” because it has released “a plethora of political issues” in 
Indonesia (Schiller 2008). And since many people have frequently linked the 
mudflow to Lapindo’s nonprocedural drilling of a natural gas exploration well, 
an analysis of the mudflow politics should begin with a description of the 
political economy contexts of oil and natural gas industries in Indonesia and 
especially in east Java. 
Oil and natural gas industry 
A chain of political events in Indonesia (the 1997 economic crisis, the 
resignation of Soeharto in May 1998, and the beginning of the Reformasi era) 
has brought major changes in many sectors in the country, including the oil 
and natural gas industries. The Indonesian government was in a very difficult 
state to revise some key regulations in accordance with guidelines provided by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008, 
60). One essential adjustment was the privatization of several state-owned 
companies, including Pertamina (Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas 
Bumi Negara, State-Owned Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company). 
The former law of Oil and Natural Gas Industry (UU No. 8 of 1971) 
indicated the establishment of Pertamina to control every oil and natural gas 
mining activity in the country. It marked the beginning of the domination of 
Pertamina and therefore the government in the sector for almost fifty years. 
Over those years, private mining companies had to have a working contract 
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(kontrak karya) with Pertamina as government’s representation before they 
could conduct their business in Indonesia. In 2001, the domination ended with 
the issuance of a new law of Oil and Natural Gas (UU No. 22 of 2001), of which 
also signs the beginning of a free market competition of oil and natural gas 
mining industries in Indonesia. Pertamina is, then, posited as just another 
company and has to compete with other domestic and international private 
companies since the government established a new body, BP Migas (Badan 
Pelaksana Minyak dan Gas Bumi, Control Board of Oil and Gas Mining 
Activities), to authorize mining permits of those companies without having a 
contract with Pertamina. Recently, in November 2012, the Constitutional Court 
released a verdict of BP Migas to be unconstitutional with the country’s 
constitution (UUD 1945) and therefore it should be dissolved. In response to 
the decision, BP Migas is replaced by a new agency, SKK Migas (Special Task 
Force for Upstream Oil and Natural Gas Activities). 
East Java is the location of, at least, three large exploration blocks of oil 
and natural gas: Cepu Block (of which part is also located in the Central Java 
province), Brantas Block, and Kangean Block. These blocks are operated by 
several domestic and foreign oil and mining companies, respectively. By 2007, 
there were at least twenty-five mining companies operating in the province, 
including Lapindo Brantas in Brantas Block, Exxon Mobile, and Pertamina in 
Cepu Block, and Energi Mega Persada and Petronas in Kangean Block 
(Ahmady et al. 2010, 170–171). Among other exploration and exploitation wells 
in those blocks, the Banjar Panji 1 well in Brantas Block operated by Lapindo 
Brantas has been the most controversial on the ground that the first mudflow 
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eruption was detected adjacent to it. This fact has opened a possibility of 
public opinion of the drilling triggering mudflow. 
Lapindo’s political economy27 
Lapindo Brantas (or Lapindo) is one subsidiary of a family conglomerate in 
Indonesia, the Bakrie family. Aburizal Bakrie, the leading figure of the family, 
has successfully managed to save the family business from the 1997 financial 
crisis by his active role in the Golkar Party (Partai Golkar). It was the ruling party 
of the New Order and therefore the family has benefited from receiving 
financial subsidizes from the government (Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 
2008, 61). 
To many people, the government has been seen to protect and shield 
Lapindo as the culprit of the mudflow incident owing to the complex 
relationship between Aburizal and the former president Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono. Back in the 2004 election, Yudhoyono’s political party, the 
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), was still a new and small party with less 
than ten percent of the seats in parliament. To win the 2004 presidential 
election, Yudhoyono had to run with Jusuf Kalla from Golkar as his vice 
president’s candidate. At the time, the Golkar Party was the winner of the 2004 
election and the majority party in the parliament, with 128 of 550 seats. In 
regard to such achievements, it was the dominating party in national politics at 
the time. Even though Jusuf Kalla was a cadre of the Golkar party, his running 
with Yudhoyono was first seen not as an official representative of the party. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 The section only provides a brief description of the political economy of Lapindo Brantas in 
Indonesia’s national politics. I will elaborate this issue in 4.3. 
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The party was promoting another ex-military general Wiranto as presidential 
candidate in the 2004 election. He run with Salahuddin Wahid, one leading 
figure of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama, the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia) 
and the brother of former president Abdurrahman Wahid (publicly known as 
“Gus Dur”), as the vice-presidential candidate. The couple lost in the first round 
of the election (on July 5, 2004) and thenceforth the party’s support was given 
entirely to Jusuf Kalla. 28 In the second round of the election (on September 20, 
2004), the couple Yudhoyono-Kalla defeated their only competitor from PDI-P 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party for 
Struggle): Megawati Soekarnoputri, former president and the daughter of 
Indonesia’s proclamator and first president Sukarno, and Hasyim Muzadi, who 
was at the time the chairperson of NU. 
With the support from the coalition of many political parties, especially 
from the Golkar Party, Yudhoyono won the presidential election in 2004 and in 
return he appointed some cadres of the party to be ministers in the cabinet 
and this was how Aburizal could become a minister. In the cabinet formed in 
October 2004, Yudhoyono designated Aburizal as the Coordinating Minister for 
Economic Affairs. In late 2005, Aburizal was redesignated as the Coordinating 
Minister of Public’s Welfare (Menteri Koordinator Kesejahteraan Rakyat), of 
which position lasted until 2009. Therefore, at the time of the first mud eruption 
(on May 29, 2006), Aburizal was acting as an active minister in the cabinet. In 
his second term (2009-2014), Yudhoyono did not reappoint Aburizal as one of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Following the winning of the presidential election, the Golkar Party appointed Jusuf Kalla to 
be its chairperson (2004-2009). In the 2009 presidential election, Jusuf Kalla run for president 
with Wiranto as vice-president candidate from the Golkar Party. Unfortunately, the couple got 
the fewest votes, with less than thirteen percent of the total votes. 
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the ministers in the cabinet. It was due to Aburizal was elected as the 
chairperson of Golkar Party in October 2009.  
It seems that Aburizal’s contribution to Yudhoyono’s presidencies was not 
merely just political (e.g., mobilizing members and voters of the Golkar Party) 
but also economical (e.g., funding the president’s campaigns) (Schiller, Lucas, 
and Sulistiyanto 2008, 55). If this is true, the government was in a serious 
conflict of interests regarding its disaster politics in Porong. Needless to say 
that Aburizal has a strong motive to prevent his company and family suffering 
from collateral impacts of the mudflow by pushing the government to declare 
the incident as a natural disaster and putting the blame on a major earthquake 
(on May 27, 2006). This definition implies that the government has to take over 
responsibilities rather than Lapindo (Batubara 2013). However, the Lapindo 
case has tarnished the image of the government as well as the Bakries 
(Kriyantono 2012). 
3.4. Governmental responses  
Timnas (National Team) 
In the beginning of the mud eruption, the local government of Sidoarjo, 
with the help of the provincial government of East Java, established a voluntary 
emergency task force, which only lasted for some weeks as the eruption 
become unstoppable. As the mudflow was approaching and threatening the 
toll road, former regent of Sidoarjo Win Hendrarso called for help from the 
central government to take over the situation (Saputra 2006b). It was on the 
day after the road was declared to be totally closed due to the mudflow (on 
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June 14, 2006), the central government began to involve in handling the 
incident, marked by the establishment of a special team for investigating the 
incident (Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008, 65). The team was established 
and supervised by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources designating 
Rudi Rubiandini from the Department of Petroleum Engineering at the Institute 
of Technology, Bandung (ITB) led the investigation. In early September 2006, 
the team declared that the eruption was due to Lapindo’s negligence of not 
installing a safety casing in the course of drilling the Banjar Panji 1 well (Tim 
Walhi 2008, 2). In other words, representing the viewpoint of the government 
the team declared that the eruption was due to a technological accident. 
Following the disclosure of the result, on September 8, 2006 president 
Yudhoyono issued a presidential decree (No. 13 of 2006) concerning the 
formation of Tim Nasional Penanggulangan Lumpur Panas di Sidoarjo (National 
Mitigation Team of the Mudflow in Sidoarjo; publicly known as and henceforth, 
“Timnas”). The decree invited criticism, especially from victims, since 
presidential decree (keputusan presiden, Keppres) is not listed in Indonesian 
legislation structure.29 A presidential decree is issued only to address special 
circumstances that require immediate governmental responses yet a proper 
regulating law does not exist. Therefore, according to many, a presidential 
decree would not be legit enough to address and resolve the problems of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The structure of Indonesian law system is (from higher to lower levels): the 1945 Constitution 
(UUD 1945), laws/acts (undang-undang, UU), government regulations in lieu of law/act 
(peraturan pemerintah pengganti undang-undang, Perppu), (central) government regulations 
(peraturan pemerintah, PP), presidential regulations (peraturan presiden, Perpres), provincial 
regulations (peraturan provinsi, Perda Provinsi) and municipal/regency regulations (peraturan 
kabupaten/kota, Perda Kabupaten/Kota). 
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mudflow. All in all the decree was the first mitigation policy issued by the 
Central Government in dealing with the mudflow hazard. 
The decree was constructed with regard to the conclusion of the 
investigation team, that the eruption was an industrial accident (Lapindo’s 
negligent and reckless drilling). This can be detected by looking at the decree’s 
underlying regulations, such as, Oil and Natural Gas Act (No. 22 of 2001), 
Government Regulation concerning the Managing and Controlling Safety in 
Mining Sector (No. 19 of 1973), Government Regulation concerning the Safety 
in Oil and Natural Gas Refining and Processing (No. 11 of 1979) and 
Government Regulation concerning the Upstream Oil and Natural Gas Activity 
(No. 34 of 2005). By seeing such a composition, it seems to me that Timnas 
was not established and working under an agenda of disaster management but 
rather within a context of handling a “mining industry accident.” It is also 
confirmed by the fact that the team was working under the supervision of the 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources in carrying out three main tasks: 
closing the eruption, supervising surface management of the mudflow and 
handling the social problems. 
In the decree, the president designated some governmental officials, 
mostly from the national level, as Timnas’s members. The list however only 
mentioned the positions without individual names. It seems to me, it was 
meant to ease the formation of the team. The organization of Timnas consisted 
of two main parts: steering team (tim pengarah) and executive team (tim 
pelaksana). Acting as the chair of the former team was the Minister of Energy 
and Mineral Resources and the members were the Minister of Public Work, the 
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Minister of Marine and Fisheries, the State Minister of Environment, the 
Governor of East Java, the Commander of East Java Regional Military 
Command (Pangdam Brawijaya), and the Chief of East Java Police Department 
(Kapolda). Appointed as the head of the executive team was the Head of 
Research and Development Body at the Ministry of Public Work and the 
members were the General Director of Oil and Natural Gas at the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, the Deputy Head of the Control Board of Oil 
and Gas Mining Activities, the General Director of Highways at the Ministry of 
Public Work, the Deputy Minister of Environment, the Head of Research Body 
for Marine and Fisheries at the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries, the 
Commander of Combat Units at the East Java Military Command, the Regent 
of Sidoarjo and, last but not least, the General Manager of Lapindo Brantas. 
The fact that Lapindo’s general manager as a member of Timnas raises an 
issue of Timnas’s independency as a governmental agency conducting the 
mudflow mitigation (Tim Walhi 2008; Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008). It 
is also mentioned that the formation of Timnas would not replace the foregoing 
mitigation that had been performed by Lapindo (art. 5). It also indicated the 
obligation of Lapindo to cover all expenditures (administrative costs and 
technical actions) of Timnas (art. 6) which made the dependency of the Timnas 
on Lapindo stronger. Concluding from these facts, Timnas thus the 
government were never in power of the disaster politics whereas Lapindo had 
a full authority by controlling the flow of funds to perform the countermeasures. 
This is a fundamental issue, especially in terminating the eruption and mudflow 
surface management, which will be discussed later on. 
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The decree mentioned the Timnas would only be working for six months 
(art. 7). It seems that the government (and everyone else) were expecting the 
eruption could be terminated immediately but as time went by the eruption had 
become even more massive and uncontrollable. On March 8, 2007, another 
presidential decree (No. 5 of 2007) was issued. It concerned with the 
prolonging tenure of Timnas for another month before a new body replaced it. 
Although Timnas only worked for seven months, it has placed core foundations 
for the disaster politics of the mudflow that remains until now. 
BPLS 
Timnas ended after the issuance of a presidential regulation (No. 14 of 
2007) concerning the formation of Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo 
(Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency; henceforth, “BPLS”) on April 8. To date 
BPLS is the only governmental agency that is responsible for the mitigation of 
the mudflow hazard. It is also mentioned that the executive body of BPLS 
obliges to send its report to the president (art. 1 par. 3), yet the president is not 
directly responsible for the body’s actions but the steering committee instead 
(art. 3 par. 1). 
Built as an interdepartmental body, BPLS shows the complexity in the 
policymaking and disaster politics (cf. Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008, 
65–66). BPLS works as a governmental body at the national level and therefore 
in conducting its actions it sometimes ignores the existence of local 
governmental organizations, both at the provincial and regency levels 
(Muhtada 2008; Fitrianto 2011). Above all, the establishment of BPLS has 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
  !128 
posited the mudflow in Porong, Sidoarjo to be special in comparison with other 
environmental disasters in the country. It is important to note that at the time 
the regulation was issued the Disaster Mitigation Act (No. 4 of 2007) had not 
yet been signed. Two weeks after the regulation issued the parliament 
approved the act. This fact explains why BPLS has been working and 
operating separately from the newly formed mitigation agencies, such as, 
Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Disaster Mitigation 
Agency; “BNPB”) at the national level and Badan Penanggulangan Bencana 
Daerah (Regional Disaster Mitigation Agency; “BPBD”) at the provincial level, in 
regards to the act. 
The formation of BPLS has marked out three major points of the mudflow 
disaster politics, which can be seen by looking at the content of the regulation 
thoroughly. First and foremost, it indicates the sharing of responsibility 
between the government and Lapindo about “who should perform and finance 
what” in dealing with physical and social repercussions of the mudflow. A 
second point, it is the beginning of the official “victimization” because it 
specifies who is victim and who is not. Finally, the regulation has become a 
legal basis for the compensation of disaster victims and the mechanism 
applied to recompense them, in spite of it contravenes with other preexisting 
regulations (something that I will discuss in 3.7). 
Generally speaking, there is no difference between the tasks of BPLS and 
Timnas: closing the eruption, managing the mudflow surface management and 
handling the social problems (art. 1 par. 2). However, the replacement of 
Timnas by BPLS was not only marking the substitution of the mudflow 
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mitigation agency but also denoting the paradigm shift of the disaster politics. 
The Oil and Natural Gas Act (No. 22 of 2001) was still included as one legal 
basis, yet the other underlying policies were replaced with mining-unrelated 
regulations, such as Spatial Management Act (No. 24 of 1992), Environmental 
Management Act (No. 23 of 1997), and Decentralization/Local Governance Act 
(No. 8 of 2005). By looking at the substituting of these underlying policies, the 
mitigation paradigm of BPLS is not grounded on “mining industrial accident” 
but rather “spatial management,” despite BPLS’s task is similar to Timnas’s. 
The shifting logic is also confirmed by looking at the organizing of BPLS. 
Similar to Timnas, BPLS is divided into two main parts: steering committee 
(dewan pengarah) and executive body (badan pelaksana), however acting as 
the chair of the steering committee is the Minister of Public Work and as the 
deputy chair is the Minister of Social Affairs. The Minister of Energy and 
Mineral Resources, who had led the steering team of Timnas, sits as a regular 
member of this new committee, which suggests that there has been a transfer 
of responsibility from the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources to the 
Ministry of Public Work concerning the mudflow mitigation. This transfer 
coheres with the shifting paradigm from “mining industry accident,” which is 
the responsibility of the former, to “spatial management,” which is the main 
concern of the latter. 
The organization of BPLS steering committee is made to be fatter than 
Timnas’s. The president appointed more members to the committee (e.g., the 
Minister of Finance, the Minister for Internal Affairs, the Minister of 
Transportation, the State Minister of National Development Planning, the Head 
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of National Land Agency and the Regent of Sidoarjo) in addition to the 
previously designated members of Timnas (e.g., the Minister of Marine and 
Fisheries, the State Minister of Environment, the Governor of East Java, the 
Commander of East Java Regional Military Command and the Chief of East 
Java Police Department). So, there are now fourteen members of BPLS 
steering committee, whereas Timnas steering team consisted of only seven 
members. Again, no individual name is mentioned, they are all referring to 
particular positions in governmental bodies. But, Lapindo’s representative is no 
more. The composition of the steering team of BPLS marks the extension and 
therefore the complexity of the disaster politics. 
According to the regulation, to perform the mitigation BPLS relies on an 
executive body, which is similar to Timnas but more concrete in the case of its 
members’ designation. Apart from head, deputy head, and secretary, there are 
also three divisions in the body (operational, social and infrastructure divisions) 
(art. 5). The designation of executive body of BPLS is in evidence with the 
issuance of a supplementary presidential decree (No. 31/M of 2007), issued on 
the same day of the BPLS regulation. It mentions individual names to be 
designated as the body’s members: Sunarso (Head), Hardi Prasetyo (Deputy 
Head), Adi Sarwoko (Secretary), Mochamad Soffian Hadi Djojopranoto (Deputy 
of Operational), Sutjahjono Soejitno (Deputy of Social) and Karyadi (Deputy of 
Infrastructure). According to a study, the appointment of Sunarso as the Head 
of BPLS’s executive body has raised some critics not only because he is a 
retired military general but also at the time he was Aburizal’s expert staff at the 
office of Coordinating Minister for Public’s Welfare (Noeswantari 2009, 53–55). 
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Sunarso’s designation in BPLS can be seen as both the intrusion of military 
leadership model and the intervention of Aburizal’s, and therefore Lapindo’s, 
interests in the disaster politics. Additionally, according to my own inquiries, 
the other members of BPLS’s executive body are mainly government officials. 
Hardi Prasetyo was an expert staff at the Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources; Adi Sarwoko was an expert staff for inter-departmental relation at 
the Ministry of Public’s Works; Soffian Hadi was a senior member of the 
Indonesian Geologist Association; Sutjahjono Soetjipto was the assistant for 
economic and development at the Secretary of the Provincial Government of 
East Java; and, Karyadi was the Director of the Eastern Indonesia Region at 
the Ministry of Public’s Works. The appointment of these particular persons 
signs the implanting of governmental bureaucratic culture in BPLS to perform 
the mudflow mitigation. 
Another critical issue of the regulation concerns with sharing responsibility 
between the government and Lapindo in implementing and financing the 
mitigation. The regulation compels Lapindo to be responsible for financing the 
eruption termination (art. 9c), building mud embankment and spilling the 
mudflow through the Porong River/Canal (art. 15 par. 5). It also indicates 
Lapindo to be responsible in handling social problems by purchasing the 
inundated land and buildings “inside” the impacted area map (dated on March 
22, 2007) (art. 15 par. 1). In addition to such a mechanism, Lapindo should pay 
the compensation in two periods: 20 percent down payment and the remaining 
80 percent at once within two years after the first payment due (art. 15 par. 2). 
Furthermore, it specifies the obligation of the central government to handle 
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future social problems “outside” the aforementioned map (art. 15 par. 3). The 
division of responsibilities marks differences in the treatment of disaster 
victims receiving compensation and generates the emergence of new social 
groups in Porong (the “inside map” and “outside map” victims, see 2.6). In 
addition to the victimization and compensation of victims, the regulation 
defines the government’s responsibility to allocate the state budget (APBN) to 
fund secretarial expenditures of BPLS (art. 14 par. 1), remunerations of the 
members of the executive body of BPLS (art. 14 par. 2), and the relocation of 
abandoned public infrastructures (art. 15 par. 6). In regard to the remuneration, 
there is another presidential regulation (No. 13 of 2008), issued on February 26, 
2008, which mentions the rights of remuneration and facility of the BPLS’s 
executive body members as equal to a public official of Echelon I, or one level 
below a minister position. 
3.5. Amending policy, altering disaster politics 
For the mud eruption has become unstoppable and the mudflow has been 
gradually running into extensive areas leading to the enlargement of mud-
affected region, the government has done several amendments to the initial 
presidential regulation of BPLS (No. 14 of 2007). By the time of writing of this 
study (in November 2014), the regulation has been revised five times through 
the issuance of presidential regulations on July 17, 2008 (No. 48 of 2008), on 
September 23, 2009 (No. 40 of 2009), on September 27, 2011 (No. 68 of 2011), 
on April 5, 2012 (No. 37 of 2012), and on May 8, 2013 (No. 33 of 2013) (see 
Table 4). The most noticeable issue in each amendment concerns with the 
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enlargement of disaster zone and therefore the augmentation of the “official” 
disaster victims. However, according to my critical readings to those 
amendments, I discovered other fundamental issues embedded in the 
amending regulations. 
 
Table 4 Mudflow Disaster Policies 
Date of 
issuance Disaster Policy Main substance(s) 
September, 
8, 2006 
 
Presidential Decree No. 
13 of 2006 
! The establishment of Timnas 
! The mitigatory tasks: closing the 
eruption, mudflow surface management, 
and social issues 
! “Mining industry accident” paradigm 
March 8, 
2007 
Presidential Decree No. 
5 of 2007 
! The extension of Timnas’ tenure 
April 8, 
2007 
 
Presidential Regulation 
No. 14 of 2007 
! The establishment of BPLS 
! Sharing responsibility between Lapindo 
and the government to handle the 
mudflow social and physical impacts 
! Compensation of victims mechanism 
! “Impacted area” map (March 22, 2007) 
! “Spatial management” paradigm 
February 
26, 2008 
Presidential Regulation 
No. 13 of 2008 
! Remuneration and facility of the 
members of BPLS’s executive team 
July 17, 
2008 
 
Presidential Regulation 
No. 48 of 2008 
! The enlargement of disaster zone in three 
villages (Besuki, Pejarakan and 
Kedungcangkring) 
! “State treasury management” paradigm 
September 
23, 2009 
 
 
Presidential Regulation 
No. 40 of 2009 
! The enlargement of disaster zone 
! The exclusion of some Lapindo’s 
responsibilities in mudflow mitigation 
! The using of “uninhabitable area”, 
instead of “impacted area” map 
September 
27, 2011 
Presidential Regulation 
No. 68 of 2011 
! BPLS to become a permanent 
governmental body 
! The establishment of an integrated team, 
surveying for more uninhabitable areas 
April 5, 
2012 
Presidential Regulation 
No. 37 of 2012 
! The enlargement of disaster zone in eight 
villages 
May 8, 
2013 
Presidential Regulation 
No. 33 of 2013 
! Enlargement of disaster zone in one 
village 
! Compensation of religious facilities 
 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
  !134 
Shifting responsibilities 
One fundamental issue of the amending regulations has been the gradual 
reduction of Lapindo’s responsibilities in performing the mitigation, which can 
be traced by looking at the eliminations of the company’s name in several 
articles of the regulations. One example is the alteration of BPLS’s Operational 
Division’s duty “to control the mud eruption conducted by Lapindo Brantas” 
(Presidential Regulation No. 14 of 2007, art. 9[c]). In 2009, the phrase 
“conducted by Lapindo Brantas” is deleted (Presidential Regulation No. 40 of 
2009), which corresponds to the government’s decision of giving up to close 
the mudflow eruption in late-2008. Another example is the obliteration of a 
whole paragraph, which was originally written in the initial regulation as, 
The cost to handle the mudflow, including in it the maintenance of the main 
embankments until the Porong River, is charged on Lapindo. (Presidential 
Regulation No. 14 of 2007, art. 15 par. 5) 
An entirely new paragraph replacing it says: 
The cost of mitigatory actions undertaken by the executive body of BPLS 
to protect the society and the infrastructure is charged to the state budget. 
(Presidential Regulation No. 40 of 2009, art. 15 par. 7) 
 
As a result, along with the second revision issued (on September 23, 2009) 
Lapindo has no longer burdened to finance and perform mudflow mitigation for 
such responsibilities have been taken over by the government. The company 
is, however, still responsible for purchasing land and buildings of the “inside 
map” victims as a compensation mechanism of social problems. 
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Shifting paradigm 
Although the exclusion of Lapindo from the long-term mudflow mitigation 
has prompted critics from publics for there has been a circulating public 
opinion arguing that the government should not take over Lapindo’s obligation 
to finance the mitigation and allocate the state’s budget for such a purpose, a 
more fundamental problem with the amendments has been the alteration of the 
disaster politics paradigm. It can be traced by looking at the replacement of 
each amendment’s legal bases. As discussed in previous section, the initial 
regulation (No. 14 of 2007) marks the first paradigm shift from “mining accident 
management” to “spatial management.” The first amendment (Presidential 
Regulation No. 48 of 2008) marks a subsequent paradigm shift, this time it was 
to “State’s treasury management.” The shift can be traced by looking at the 
underlying regulations of the 2008 amendment, such as State Finance Act (No. 
17 of 2003), State Treasury Act (No. 1 of 2004), State Budget Act of 2008 (No. 
16 of 2008), and Government Regulation concerning the Management of State 
Property (No. 38 of 2008). 
The using of the State Budget Acts has become more dominant in ensuing 
amendments because the amending regulations were meant to assure the 
compensation of the “outside map” victims with such sources. Concurrently, 
the status of the purchased land (either by Lapindo or by the government) 
automatically changes to the “property of the State” (barang milik negara) and 
BPLS is assigned to manage the land (Presidential Regulation No. 48 of 2008, 
art. 15c). Thus, following the issuance of the 2008 regulation the paradigm of 
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“State’s treasury management” has been central for BPLS to perform the 
current mudflow mitigation. 
In line with the paradigm shift, some mitigation priorities are subject to 
alteration. At first, the mitigation priority performed by Timnas (from September 
2006 to April 2007) was focusing on how to “keep the mud away from the 
people” (Karyadi, Soegiarto, and Harnanto 2012, 5). It was the guidance for the 
mitigation team to execute the closing of the eruption—which was considered 
to fail by the end of 2006—and the spilling of the mudflow to the Madura Strait 
through the Porong River/Canal. After failing to close the eruption, the 
mitigation priority was shifted to “keep the people away from mud” which was 
the main focus of the early BPLS, from April 2007 to September 2009. The key 
mitigatory action was how to move the local people from inhabiting dangerous 
area surrounding the main vent, which was also the beginning of the 
victimization and compensation of victims. During the aforementioned period, 
the president issued a regulation (No. 14 of 2007) concerning the determination 
of the mudflow disaster zone and two more regulations (No. 48 of 2008 and 
No. 40 of 2009) concerning the extension of that zone. These regulations set 
up the purchasing of land and buildings located in the zone and therefore 
legalized the eviction of the inhabitants. In reality, the strategy of purchasing 
land (and buildings) has brought about a serious financial issue for the 
government. Apart from allocating money to purchase the land, the 
government must allot the budget to finance the relocation of some vital public 
infrastructures, such as toll road, highway, and the railway. Accordingly, from 
2008 to 2013, the government has distributed around USD 435.2 million for 
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recompensing the outside map victims and another USD 414.9 million for 
relocating the infrastructure and handling the mudflow (Putro and Yonekura 
2014, 35). Subsequent to the issuance of the 2009 regulation, the mitigation 
priority was again shifted to “living in harmony with mud.” Between 2009 and 
2012 there were no enlargement of disaster zone until the issuance of the 2012 
regulation (April 2012), in which additional uninhabitable areas map were 
eventually mentioned in the regulation. 
However, extending the disaster zone is not a current priority of the 
government. BPLS is focusing more on the development of the mudflow into a 
geologic tourism attraction, learning from other mudflows in central Java and in 
Azerbaijan. Since the mudflow disaster zone has become State’s treasury, 
BPLS holds a full authority to manage the area. In addition to the plan, BPLS 
has been intensively improving and developing a new island, officially named 
Sarinah. The island is generated from mud sedimentation at the estuary of the 
Porong Canal and BPLS is prospecting it to be a tourist attraction of Sidoarjo 
as a package with the artificial mud lake (Karyadi, Soegiarto, and Harnanto 
2012, 155–163). Likewise, the government is funding several on-going 
researches to explore practical and economic utilities of the mud. Nonetheless, 
the idea of making the disaster zone as a tourist site has already existed 
beforehand, which came from private sectors and disaster victims themselves. 
In the 2009 fieldwork, for instance, I found some banners indicating such an 
idea (Fig.  3.2). 
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Fig.  3.2 Lapindo mudflow tourism (Photo courtesy of Anton Novenanto, 2009) !
BPLS as a permanent body 
Subsequent to the issuance of the 2001 regulation, BPLS has become a 
permanent governmental agency within the structure of the Central 
Government. Also in the regulation, there is a supplementary paragraph 
concerning the tenure of BPLS’s executive body, which was not mentioned in 
the initial 2007 regulation. In 2011, it is mentioned that the tenure is five years 
and can only be renewed for another period (Presidential Regulation No. 68 of 
2011, art. 17 par 3). Additionally, the status of civil servants (PNS) in BPLS’s 
executive body was changed from “conjunctive” (diperbantukan) (Presidential 
Regulation No. 14 of 2007, art. 16 par. 2) to “employed” (dipekerjakan) 
(Presidential Regulation No. 68 of 2011, art. 16 par 2). By “conjunctive” means 
that the civil servants are assigned for an external duty from their origin 
institution and the salary is coming from the new institution. By “employed” 
means that they are assigned for an external duty from their origin institution 
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but the salary is coming from the origin institution instead of coming from the 
new institution. By 2013, BPLS employs 249 people, including 17 active civil 
servants and 39 retired civil servants (Putro and Yonekura 2014, 35). 
3.6. Handling the slippery mud 
In previous sections, I have pointed out some key responses and major 
changes within the mitigation policy of the mudflow. The section addresses 
three mitigatory actions performed by the government: the closing of the 
eruption, the mudflow surface management, and the handling of social 
problems. It is intended to describe the structures shaping the mitigation, the 
risks embedded within it, and the social and ecological consequences of such. 
Closing the eruption 
To close the eruption there were at least one technique that had been 
implemented: the relief wells.30 To implement the technique, in July 2006, 
Lapindo brought a consultant from Houston, Texas, William Abel, to lead the 
drilling of two relief wells aiming to intercept the original borehole and pump in 
high-density drilling mud to plug the leak. In an interview conducted in 
September 2006, Abel was very sure that the technique would be a success, 
as he claimed, “There has never been one blowout in the history of drilling that 
was too tough to fix” (as quoted in Normile 2006). Sadly, he was wrong; the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Lapindo in-house geologists argued that before implementing the relief wells, the company 
had conducted two other methods: “snubbing unit” (re-entering to the Banjar Panji 1 well) and 
“sidetracking well” (drilling another hole to intersect with the Banjar Panji 1 well) (Istadi et al. 
2009). But, according to Rubiandini, these two techniques should be understood as one 
package with the relief wells because prior to the implementation of the relief well one has to 
gain enough data by performing the snubbing unit and the sidetracking well. Without sufficient 
data from the techniques the relief wells could not be implemented (Rubiandini 2007). 
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method was failed. On December 13, 2006, Timnas eventually stopped it as for 
the land was shaking trembling the foundation rigs and this was valued as 
endangering the life of the crew. 
According to head of Timnas’s executive team Basuki Hadimuljono, the 
failure was due to a combination of massive flow of hot mud and instability of 
the ground in the surrounding of the site (Hadimuljono 2007, 63–65). On the 
contrary, Rudi Rubiandini, leader of the investigation team, disagrees with such 
a conclusion and raises a different opinion about the failure of the technique. In 
an interview in August 2009, he claims that Lapindo sabotaged the 
implementation of the relief wells and argues that the technique was failed not 
merely because technical difficulties in the field but also financial, 
administrative obstacles from the company’s executives (Mudhoffir 2013, 26). 
At the time, Lapindo was financing alone all expenses of the initial mitigatory 
action, as regulated in the 2006 presidential decree, and therefore every action 
was depended on the decision of the company’s executives (Mudhoffir 2013, 
26–27). In this context, the technical team performing the relief wells had to 
wait for budget approval from Lapindo before it could perform any mitigatory 
measurement (cf. Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008, 64–65). 
According to various talks with many activist-interlocutors, by the time the 
relief wells implemented the police was in the process of investigating and 
searching for evidence that could bring the case into a criminal trial. Obviously, 
the company did not want the incident developed into a criminal case owing to 
the legal and political consequences. If and when the court sentenced Lapindo 
to be “guilty,” it would receive not only bad image but also questions for its 
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credibility as professional mining company.31 Such consequences come with 
the company’s obligation to pay for victims’ compensation and ecological 
rehabilitation of the damage resulting from the mudflow as well as the 
revocation of the company’s license. In regard to those consequences, the 
success to close the eruption with any technique, including the relief wells, 
would be very irritating for Lapindo. If the technique had successfully closed 
the eruption, it would be a solid proof that the mudflow is connected to 
Lapindo’s drilling. Intriguingly, Lapindo has been frequently repeating the 
failure of the relief wells to close the eruption as one key statement to develop 
an argument to blame a major earthquake for triggering the mudflow and 
therefore no technology could shut it off (see 4.5). 
The mudflow has attracted many people to propose “scientific” as well as 
“traditional” methods to close the eruption. In February 2007, a team from the 
Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences of the Bandung Technological 
Institute (FMIPA, ITB) proposed a different method to minimalize the eruption 
rate by dropping high-density concrete balls (HDCBs) into the main vent. The 
balls, twenty-to-forty centimeters in diameter and eighteen-to-eighty kilograms 
in weight, were roped together with steel cables. However, the effort was 
abandoned because Timnas concluded that the technique did not help much, 
even for slowing down the eruption (Hadimuljono 2007, 65–75). In addition to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 On October 30, 2006, the police investigator submitted the file of Lapindo case to public 
prosecutors at the East Java High Court, Pengadilan Tinggi Jawa Timur. The file was rejected 
on November 16, 2006 because the prosecutor argued the police should find more evidence. 
On February 16, 2007, the case was resubmitted but it was rejected again on February 28, 
2007. Since then there had been no progress about the criminal investigation to the case. 
Unexpectedly, on August 7, 2009, the new designated Chief of East Java Police Department 
issued an instruction letter of termination of investigation over Lapindo case and it is now iced 
and never logged as a criminal case in any court. (Kurniawan 2012, 127–131) 
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the aforementioned scientific methods, some traditional approaches were also 
implemented in order to close the mudflow. In September 2006, for instance, 
there has been a number of orang pintar (literally means “smart people,” but in 
this context it refers to “the paranormal”) signed up for a contest of closing the 
eruption with various, yet mystical methods. It was the late village head of 
Kedungbendo (one of many inundated villages) Hasan who held the contest 
and offered a reward in the form of an eighty-million-rupiah-worth house for 
anyone who could stop the eruption (Saputra 2006g). Thirty-five participants 
from many cities in Java and other islands in Indonesia (such as Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, and Flores) partaken the contest and implemented numerous 
methods. The most common was throwing several objects, such as dead 
and/or live animals (goats, chickens, cows, gooses, etc.) or other essences 
(rice, sand, salt, etc.), to the center of the eruption. According to BPLS’s guest 
book, until July 2007 there were at least 120 rituals have been performed in 
order to terminate the eruption (Prasetyo 2009), but none have succeeded and 
the mudflow continues. 
In September 2008, the Indonesian government eventually declared to give 
up for closing the eruption and began to prioritize to handle the social 
problems (GSA 2008). Additionally, according to the same report, by the time 
there were detected at least fifty flammable gas eruption spots (DRE 2008). 
Moreover, according to Richard Davies, a professor of petroleum geology at 
the Durham University, closing the main vent, if it had been successful, would 
lead to another eruption elsewhere (personal communication, July 19, 2012). In 
2011, a team of geologists predicts that the eruption will continue with the 
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same amount for the next three decades (Davies et al. 2011), which means the 
current state is not yet half from what may happen. 
Flowing into the distance 
Apart from the closing of the eruption, the mudflow surface management 
has been one risky operation. The aim of such operation has been to keep the 
mud from overflowing to broader area that may lead to subsequent physical 
and social complications. Following the results of the cabinet meeting on 
September 27, 2006, Timnas began to supervise the implementation of two 
mitigatory actions for the surface management: the construction of 
embankments encircling the main eruption to hold the mudflow and the spilling 
of the mud to the Madura Strait through the Porong River/Canal (Hadimuljono 
2007, 102). Currently, BPLS continues these actions by maintaining the 
embankments, which consist of three embedded problems: first, whose land 
should be sacrificed for building the dyke; second, who should technically do 
it; and third, from where the materials for the dyke can be supplied. In the 
following paragraphs, the last two problems will be addressed, while the first 
will be discussed afterwards. 
Since the beginning, the embanking project has been focusing on the 
construction and maintenance of three artificial mud containers: the southern 
(or the main container); the middle container, accommodating the mudflow 
runoff from the main container; and the northern container, functioning as the 
last backup of the runoff (Karyadi, Soegiarto, and Harnanto 2012, 34–35, 44). 
Before Timnas, the party to be responsible for the embanking project was the 
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military force from the Regional Military Command of East Java (Kodam 
Brawijaya) with the money from Lapindo. Along with the establishment of 
Timnas in September 2006, Lapindo was still the party to be responsible for 
the project and this continued until 2009. Over the period, Lapindo had been 
very easy to distribute the project to its subcontractors. In an interview 
conducted in December 2009, the Public Relation Officer of BPLS, Zulkarnaen, 
admitted that BPLS did not have any information about financial status of the 
embankment project because it was kept in “Lapindo’s kitchen” (Batubara and 
Utomo 2012). As of the obligation of Lapindo to finance the disaster mitigation 
ended following the issuance of the 2009 regulation, there has been an 
increase in BPLS’s budget allocation for handling the mudflow, from USD 48.2 
million (in 2009) to USD 78.2 million (in 2010) (see Putro and Yonekura 2014, 
35). According to the data gathered by some Posko’s activists, there are three 
major state-owned companies (BUMN) in construction sector, such as PT Adhi 
Karya, PT Abhipraya Brantas, and PT Wijaya Karya, involve in the maintenance 
of the embankment. In addition to them, there were also middle-sized private 
companies, such as PT Wirabumi Amarta, PT Brantas Hilir, PT Hutama Karya, 
PT Anugerah, and PT Agung Subur, which had participated in the project. 
While public’s attention is concentrating on the embanking project around 
the disaster zone, almost none problematizes the origin of all materials and the 
ecological impact from the project. The locals call the materials as sirtu, 
abbreviated from pasir (sand) and batu (stones); the technical term is 
macadam, the mixture of small- and middle-sized stones and sand to layer the 
road foundation. According to BPLS’s crews, the materials are obtained from 
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several spots of “borrow area” beyond the Sidoarjo regency, such as the 
Mojokerto and Pasuruan regencies (Karyadi, Soegiarto, and Harnanto 2012, 
45–46). In the course of the 2012 fieldwork, I had a change to visit one borrow 
area in Ngoro district, Mojokerto after tailing one macadam truck from the 
embankment. As I explored the area, I discovered one hill was almost flatted to 
the ground due to the excavation of the materials. According to a local I met, 
the location is a military ground but several military officers have been 
commercializing it by selling sirtu for building materials. The excavation has 
become increasingly massive following the mudflow hazard. Accordingly, the 
involvement of military officers in the embanking projects has been detected 
since the beginning of the project. The existence of the military is not only 
involved in constructing the first embankments but also guarding the borrow 
area in the Rembang district, Pasuruan with armed soldiers. 
Over the time, the embankments have become a new threat for the people 
living around it for some parts of it frequently broke down. On September 15, 
2006, for example, the southernmost dyke wall collapsed and the mud 
overflowed to the area of four villages (Mindi, Pejarakan, Kedungcangkring, 
and Besuki) (Hadimuljono 2007, 93–96). Among others, the incident resulted in 
the flooding of residential area of more than three hundred inhabitants in the 
Besuki village and more than twenty hectares of paddy fields in the village. The 
embankment was broken because it could no longer accommodate the 
mudflow. In the meantime, Lapindo could not build new embankment on the 
village because the villagers refused to leave their homes. 
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In the eye of the government (and Lapindo), villagers’ resistance has been 
a major issue for the embanking project. For instance, in the first half of 2007, 
there was a resistance from Siring villagers, who rejected the embanking 
project on the western region. The resistance was triggered by the uncertainty 
of the victimization and compensation of these villagers. However, following 
the issuing of the 2007 regulation the resistance calmed down and the 
embankment project in that area could begin in August 2007 (Karyadi, 
Soegiarto, and Harnanto 2012, 56–57). Another resistance came from the 
villagers of Pejarakan and Kedungcangkring occurred between 2007 and 2008 
when BPLS was planning to enlarge the mud spillway on both villages to 
facilitate the disposal of the mud through the Porong River/Canal. However 
subsequent to the issuing of the 2008 regulation indicating the purchasing of 
the area of three villages (Besuki, Kedungcangkring, and Pejarakan) the 
resistance gradually abated. 
Currently, there is still one remaining resistance coming from villagers of 
Glagaharum, located on the east of the main eruption. These villagers have 
been refusing the embankment project on their land because Lapindo has not 
yet purchased it, even though it was included in the impacted area map of 
March 22, 2007. The refusal has led the mudflow to run unstoppable to the 
Ketapang River eastward which has brought about new problems for villagers 
who use the river for irrigation. Villagers living in the eastern of the main 
eruption grouped together in Korban Lapindo Menggugat (Lapindo’s victims 
suing, or KLM) and facilitated by a Jakarta-based NGO Urban Poor 
Consortium (UPC) have frequently reminded BPLS about this issue. They argue 
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that, according to the presidential regulation, BPLS should only spill the 
mudflow to the Porong River/Canal and not to other rivers/canals, especially 
the Ketapang River. However, according to a representative of the group, 
BPLS is actually aware of the situation but since there is still an unresolved 
problem between the Glagaharum villagers and Lapindo, it cannot do much 
about it. This problem should be resolved before BPLS could begin the 
embankment project on that area (personal communication, Gugun 
Muhammad from KLM-UPC, June 6, 2013). 
While there is a possibility of natural forces (such as heavy rain, land 
cracks and subsidence) breaking down the embankments, most threat came 
from technological or human factors. The worst embankment incident was 
perhaps the one happening in the evening of November 22, 2006. That night 
the northeastern embankment broke down as a result of a massive explosion 
of an underground main gas pipeline buried under the embankment. The 28-
inch-pipe cracked and blew out because it could not tolerate the weight of the 
wall, the heat generated by the mud, and land subsidence. Fourteen technical 
staff of Timnas and military officers died following that accident. Additionally, 
the mud-affected area multiplied to the northern and northeastern, including 
the highly populated housings of PerumTAS and the main neighborhood of the 
Renokenongo village (see 2.6). 
Another strategy of mudflow surface management has been to spill the 
mudflow to the Madura Strait through the Porong River/Canal with seven units 
of giant pumps Timnas brought from Jakarta and Batam to syphon 25,000 
cubic meter of mud per day (Hadimuljono 2007, 102–106). Yet, the main 
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problem with the pumps was the fact that the mud was not liquid enough to be 
pumped out. To resolve the problem Timnas built a small canal functioned as 
mud spillway connecting the southernmost embankment directly to the 
river/canal. However, the mud viscosity is still very high and it is very difficult to 
spill the mud without mixing it first with water. In the meantime, the mud 
contains chemical essences corroding the pumps and pipes. To solve the 
problem, BPLS planned to enlarge the spillway but it had to postpone the plan 
after the resistance of Kedungcangkring and Pejarakan villagers (see above). 
Yet the social tension abated following the government’s decision to purchase 
land and buildings in that area, the surface management was still depended 
financially on Lapindo. As a result, some administrative obstacles in the course 
of technical countermeasures occurred since BPLS had to wait for budget 
approval from Lapindo before it could execute the plan (Karyadi, Soegiarto, 
and Harnanto 2012, 106). The handover of Lapindo’s responsibility financing 
the mudflow mitigation to BPLS following the issuance of the 2009 regulation 
makes BPLS more independent in performing the mud spilling. 
As already discussed in 2.5, the mud spilling to the Madura Strait through 
the Porong River/Canal has led to the decrease of fisheries production in three 
districts (Porong, Tanggulangin, and Jabon) in Sidoarjo, from 7,338.5 tons (in 
2007) to 5,467.2 tons (in 2008). Intriguingly, the government claims that the 
mud contains no toxic substance and therefore the spilling out of the mud 
through the river/canal, and other small rivers and canals nearby continues. 
Contradictory to this official statement, some independent studies discovered 
that the mud consists of heavy metal essences causing to rapid environmental 
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degradation surrounding the area (Putri and Yudhastuti 2013; Nusantara 2010; 
Juniawan, Rumhayati, and Ismuyanto 2012; Nurdiani, Firdaus, and Prihanto 
2012; Pohl 2007). These substances have led to the surface and subsurface 
pollution in the disaster zone surrounding and along the Porong River/Canal 
until the Madura Strait. Thus, instead of mitigating the mudflow physical 
threats, the mudflow surface management has resulted in the growing of mud-
affected area since more ecological risks have been detected in the area 
beyond the official disaster zone indicated in the presidential regulations. 
Satirically, in the course of the fieldwork, I frequently met many victims referred 
the “P” in BPLS as to penanggulan (meaning, “embanking”) instead of 
penanggulangan (meaning, “mitigation”) for the agency could only embank the 
mudflow without any success in mitigating (or stopping) the eruption. 
Mapping the victims 
Cartography has been the main instrument of victimizing in the course of 
the mudflow hazard. Instead of just a figure, a map is an exercise of power 
owing to social and political consequences embedded in the knowledge it 
produces (Crampton 2001; Elden and Crampton 2007). The map has resulted 
in the changing of governance of a particular region and everything on it. In the 
Lapindo case, drawing a map means determining which region shall be 
included in and which shall be excluded in the disaster zone. Maps are, then, 
tools of victimization because when the region is included in the disaster zone 
its inhabitants will be attributed with a new identity and bonded to specific 
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rules and regulations concerning the compensation they would get as “disaster 
victims.” 
Using maps as instruments of victimization is indeed very problematic for it 
only considers two variables—landlessness and homelessness—to calculate 
the compensation. Yet, according to a study, the compensation price for the 
mudflow victims came from a very spontaneously calculation of the former vice 
regent of Sidoarjo, Saiful Ilah, in September 2006 (Karib 2012). The context at 
the time was the government needed a piece of land in Jatirejo village for the 
embankment on the west of the main eruption. The embankment was aimed to 
hold the mud from overflowing to the railway and the Porong highway. Saiful, 
escorted by some military officers, invited twelve Jatirejo’s villagers to a 
meeting and persuaded them to sell their land and houses. He offered one 
million rupiah per meter square land and one-and-half million rupiah per meter 
square buildings. The land price offered was way beyond the “normal” price of 
land before the mudflow attacked, which was, according to my interview with 
some victims in the course of the fieldwork, ranging from 75,000 to 150,000 
rupiah per meter square land. Additionally, Saiful argued that the price was 
above the basis amount of compensation of disaster victims in Indonesia. The 
villagers, who were under psychological and physical pressures, did not have 
other option but to accept it. The information about the price circulated rapidly 
among other victims who were at that time also demanding Lapindo to 
recompense their losses but there was no certainty about the mechanism and 
the price. Later on, the compensation mechanism and price offered by Saiful 
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has become legally binding for all mudflow victims following the issuance of 
the 2007 regulation. 
Apart from that option there were actually two other alternatives: 
“recovery” and “collective relocation” (Batubara and Utomo 2010, 51–52). 
However, it is impossible to implement the former option because cleaning up 
the whole region that has been swept out by the mudflow is out of the 
question. On the contrary, according to many experts, collective relocation is 
the best choice for the victims (Rachmawati, Deguchi, and Yoshitake 2011; 
Fariza et al. 2011). Nevertheless, it was uneasy to implement communal 
relocation in immediately because finding a new land as large as the engulfed 
area, not to mention the quality, was very difficult to do in a very limited time. 
Lapindo at the same time was also offering to relocate the victims to Kasiba, 
referring to Kawasan Sidoarjo Baru (the New Sidoarjo area)—which turned out 
that the area was a modern housing of Kahuripan Nirvana Village (KNV)—, 
whereas most victims understood it as kawasan siap bangun (ready-built area) 
in rural areas. 
The victims were grouped in accord with these two different options. There 
was the “cash and resettlement” option, which means the mechanism of 
Lapindo paying the victims with some cash and provide them new 
resettlements. On the other, there was the “cash and carry” option, which 
means Lapindo should only compensate victims with cash money and the 
decision to search for new dwellings was fully on the hand of the victims.32 To 
resolve the conflict, in September 2006 there was a poll conducted within !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 These options are the root for the upcoming name of victim groups (see 2.6). 
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victims who were living in a refugee camp in Pasar Baru Porong (New Porong 
Market). It was not sure who initiated the poll since there are two versions 
about this issue. On the one hand, some informants said that Lapindo 
conducted the poll, but on the other hand there were other informants who 
claimed that the poll was an independent, conducted by some village leaders. 
Despite this conflicting information, what really matters for now is the fact that 
the poll’s result determines the mechanism implemented for the compensation 
of victims. The result showed that the majority (77 percent) of victims voted the 
“cash and carry” option and based on that they demanded Timnas to urge 
Lapindo to pay for the submerged land and buildings (Batubara and Utomo 
2010, 54). 
The request for immediate implementation of the “cash and carry” option 
was getting more intense after the gas pipeline incident on November 22, 2006 
owing to more people experienced the mudflow’s direct impact. On November 
27, 2006, there was a huge meeting between Timnas and the representatives 
from four villages (e.g., Siring, Jatirejo, Renokenongo, and Kedungbendo) 
facilitated by the Regent of Sidoarjo. The meeting resulted in three points: 1) 
the victims wanted the compensation with “cash and carry” mechanism, 2) the 
victims demanded a written statement from Lapindo to overcome 
socioeconomic problems resulted by the mudflow and 3) Lapindo should buy 
land and buildings from the victims with following prices: one million rupiah per 
meter square dry land (tanah kering), one-and-half million rupiah per meter 
square buildings, and 120,000 rupiah per meter square wet paddies (sawah). 
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Based on the meeting’s results, the head of Timnas’s executive team, Basuki 
Hadimuljono, issued a letter to Lapindo concerning these demands. 
At the time, the villagers requested Lapindo to pay the compensation 
money all at once and, according to a calculation, it was predicted that 
Lapindo should have cash money up to 3.5 trillion rupiah to compensate all 
victims (Hadimuljono 2007, 178). Obviously, Lapindo was not in the position to 
accept the option and tried to convince some victims that collective resettling 
to KNV was the most reasonable option. However, the urge for implementing 
the “cash and carry” option kept on rolling and, eventually, on December 4, 
2006, Lapindo issued a letter to Timnas declaring its willingness to accept cash 
and carry option based on the company’s “social solicitude and moral 
responsibility” (kepedulian sosial dan tanggung jawab moral). The letter also 
mentions the payment in two periods: twenty percent as down payment and 
eighty percent of the remaining at once before two years from the first payment 
due. Aside from agreeing to the cash payment, Lapindo mentioned its intention 
to provide victims with new resettlement for those who still wanted the 
relocation option to KNV. 
The letter came with an attachment of a map indicating the area that it 
would recompense. Although released by Lapindo, the map was signed by 
Basuki Hadimuljono, the head of Timnas executive team, marking the 
government’s approval of the map. The map, however, excluded the area that 
was swept out following the November 22 incident. The inhabitants of this new 
engulfed area were also demanding Lapindo and/or the government to include 
their land and buildings in the map and to victimize them so that they were 
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eligible too for the compensation (see 2.6). In line with this demand, many 
victims criticized Lapindo’s letter for it was not enough to legally bind the 
company with an obligation to compensate them. In their viewpoint, the 
government should issue a regulation obligating Lapindo to pay the 
compensation. Within such contexts, president Yudhoyono issued a 
presidential regulation (No. 14 of 2007) legalizing some points indicated in 
Lapindo’s letter. Simultaneously, it announces the first official map of 
mudflow’s impacted area within which the new engulfed area following the 
November 22 incident is included. 
For the eruption has become unstoppable and the effort to close it 
stopped, the disaster zone has been gradually extending. A year after the 
issuance of the 2007 regulation, the government announced another map of 
supplementary mud-impacted area consisting of three new villages (Besuki, 
Pejarakan and Kedungcangkring) and indicated the purchasing of land and 
buildings on this area with the state budget (Presidential Regulation No. 48 of 
2008, art. 15b, par. 1). In 2009, the government released another map and this 
time it was named the map of “uninhabitable area” (area tak layak huni) 
consisting of nine neighborhood associations (rukun tetangga) in three villages 
(Siring, Jatirejo, and Mindi) (Presidential Regulation No. 40 of 2009, art. 15b, 
par. 1a). In 2011, the government designated the purchasing of more land and 
buildings on the area with the state budget (Presidential Regulation No. 68 of 
2011, art. 15b, par. 2) and did not announce another enlargement of disaster 
zone but rather the formation of an integrated team (tim terpadu) to estimate 
the growth of the uninhabitable area surrounding the mudflow (art. 15b par. 
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1b). Based on the findings of the team, in April 2012, another map of 
“uninhabitable area” consisting of eight villages (Besuki, Mindi, Pamotan, 
Gedang, Ketapang, Gempolsari, Kalitengah and Wunut) was released along 
with the issuance of the 2012 regulation. The government will purchase the 
land and buildings in the area (art. 15b par 6a) and in 2013 one more village, 
the Porong village, is added into the disaster zone. 
Most of my victim-informants saw the issuance of presidential regulations 
as a good sign from the government in dealing with their situation because 
they function as legal bases to ensure the disaster victims will receive 
compensation for their losses and sufferings. However, as the following section 
will show, instead of resolving problems, the mitigation policy has created 
nothing but more complications since it reduces the social and ecological 
repercussions of the mudflow into economic term and mechanism. 
3.7. Some covert, enduring issues 
In many public meetings and discussions concerning the Lapindo case, I 
noted one repetitive but intriguing question: “How is the current condition of 
the victims?” The answer for it tends to lead the discussion to whether the 
victims had been fully compensated or they had not. It seems to many people 
that subsequent to the full payment of the compensation victims’ problems will 
end too marking the simplification of the handling of social and ecological 
crises resulting from the mudflow. However, the unsettled compensation has 
become the most publicly known for the media frequently raise it to the 
surface. Combining critical readings into mudflow mitigation policies and 
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numerous talks with victim-informants, I discovered that the policies consist of 
some covert issues regarding other regulating laws in the country. 
Different treatment 
One remaining problem, that I have already described both at the outset of 
the chapter and in the previous chapter, is the different treatments of the 
inside- and outside-map victims, which is the result of the shared responsibility 
between the government and Lapindo to recompense victims according to the 
2007 regulation where Lapindo is responsible for the compensation of the 
inside map victims, while the government is liable for the outside map victims 
(art. 15 par. 1 & 3). 
Theoretically, following Sugarman, in an environmental disaster situation 
the government is not only eligible to determine who shall (and who shall not) 
get compensation, but also to facilitate and assure disaster victims’ 
compensation payment (Sugarman 2007, 13–14). Even more, it should 
guarantee that the compensation does not become another problem for the 
victims to rehabilitate from disaster (Posner 2003 in Faure 2007, 341–342) and 
as such it is bonded to an ethical responsibility to protect its citizens from a 
catastrophe instead of becoming the source (Zack 2009). However, this is not 
the case in the course of the Lapindo mudflow disaster. According to the data 
from BPLS, by the end of 2013, Lapindo has completed to pay nearly eighty 
percent of its total obligation of compensation. This actually contravenes the 
2007 regulation, which ordered Lapindo to complete the compensation 
payment no later than two years after victims signed the contract. Knowing 
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this, the government maintains a very naïve idea arguing that it is not 
responsible for these victims because such is Lapindo’s obligation. Apart from 
the fact that Lapindo has been postponing the compensation payment to the 
victims of the cash and carry group, the government has been blind to see 
what happens to the victims of the cash and resettlement group of which 
option was not mentioned in any regulations. As a result, the government has 
been ignoring the inside map victims’ problems in getting compensation from 
Lapindo in spite of the fact that its policy has made unequal power relations 
between these victims and Lapindo in existence. 
From “compensation” to “transaction,” from “humans” to “files” 
Another fundamental issue relates to the issue of ownership within the 
compensation mechanism. For many victims, one paramount problem with the 
mitigation policy is the use of a specific legal term for getting compensation, 
that is, jual beli (literarily means, “buying and selling”). The term has replaced a 
previous term of ganti rugi (literary means, “compensation for the loss”) 
proposed by victims. First and foremost, whereas jual beli meant for all the 
victims—without seeing their possessions—, ganti rugi is eligible only for them 
whose names are mentioned in the certificate of land and building—even if, 
these people lived in another region. 
Secondly, the idea of ganti rugi was likely to be understood as Lapindo 
indemnified victims without any change of the status of ownership, especially 
of land. This was meant that the victims would still have the possession of the 
land and buildings although the mud has already buried them. The idea of jual-
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beli, on the contrary, refers to a pure business transaction: Lapindo purchases 
land and buildings from victims and therefore the victims will hand over their 
ownership of these assets to Lapindo. Following the idea, Lapindo is 
transacting victims’ properties with money (and other material forms, such as 
house units in KNV) and the victims must transfer the ownership of the 
purchased assets to Lapindo in return. Thus, instead of being understood as a 
replacement for the losses, the mechanism regulated in the presidential 
regulation refers to a transfer of ownership or economic transaction (cf. Kirsch 
2001). Although the medium is the same, i.e., money or other objects, the 
essence of transaction is never the same with compensation. Compensation is 
meant for punishment of the wrongdoers to rectify the victims of their actions 
(Fletcher 1981).  
Thirdly, the use of ownership to determine the compensation value has 
reduced “humans” (i.e., victims) to “files” (i.e., certificates of land and 
buildings). Until now, neither the government nor Lapindo has known the exact 
number of the mudflow victims for the compensation is accounted in 
accordance to the submitted files without calculating how many people would 
receive it. As a result, compensation money only represent the exchange value 
of victims’ land and buildings and therefore does not illustrate how many 
victims—individuals or households—because it is very possible for one victim 
to submit more than one file and for others to not have any legal proof of their 
possession. 
One sociocultural problem following land transaction is the uprooting and 
depriving of people from their land that complies with something that Oliver-
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Smith calls “disasters of development,” the process of destructing the society 
in the name of progress (Oliver-Smith 2010). The victimization has become 
another power exercises as it comes with the eviction of those victims from 
their homes and the expropriation of their land. In theory, there should be other 
multiple variables to be considered in compensating victims of displacement 
beyond just material factors (land and houses possessions) (Cernea 2003; 
Oliver-Smith 2010). For the mismanagement of rehabilitation of displaced 
community could cumulatively and structurally result in decapitalization of the 
society’s asset of production, impoverishment of the poor and might lead to 
the creation of “new poverty” (Cernea 2003, 39–40). This idea suggests that 
the compensation of victims of forced displacement should be enough not only 
to redeem their economic losses but also to facilitate them in recovering from 
the crises. 
However, in the course and aftermath of forced displacement following the 
mudflow, the government only accounts material factors (e.g., land and 
building possessions) to determine the compensation of victims and therefore 
excludes other sociocultural aspects. Furthermore the mitigation policy has 
been generalizing the compensation rate without considering social, cultural, 
and economic values of each land and building. This means the exchange 
value of a productive land is the same with a barren one; a commercial building 
(such as a store or a warehouse) has similar price to a stalled house; a new 
house costs the same as an old house (regardless the diverse quality and 
historical value of each building). One intriguing fact with the compensation 
price is the calculation of productive wet paddies (sawah basah), which was 
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accounted 120,000 rupiah per square meter, far below the price of a house 
yard (i.e., one million rupiah per square meter). As discussed above, the former 
vice regent of Sidoarjo decided the price for buildings and land (house yards) 
of twelve Jatirejo villagers but did not mention any price for paddy fields. The 
price for paddies was suggested later, in the November 27 meeting. This fact 
suggests that key negotiators in bargaining land price for compensation were 
not farmers, or even if they were involved in the negotiation their role was very 
small. 
Putting on a gender perspective, the problem of “who gets the 
compensation and how much” has become more problematic. In the Javanese 
culture, the ownership of land and buildings is more likely to be inherited to the 
male instead of the female descendants. One female informant from Siring 
village, for instance, expressed that her house was among four houses built on 
a plot of familial land (tanah keluarga). Sadly, the proof of ownership over the 
land was not listed in her name, but rather her eldest brother who did not even 
live in one of the houses. As of the first payment due, there was conflict 
amongst members of her family about how much each member of the family 
would get. Although there was an internal arrangement in the family before 
submitting the files to Lapindo, the informant said that most of the 
compensation money went to her brother whose name was listed on the file. 
Similar situation also happens in a marriage relationship, ownership of land and 
houses usually goes to the husbands instead of the wives. Another female 
informant from the Jatirejo village told a story of her father who did not come 
from Porong and the land was the legacy of her grandparents from her 
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mother’s side. In the process of land titling, occurred before the mudflow, the 
land and the house built on it were listed under her father’s name. As a 
consequence, all the compensation money went to her father, instead of her 
mother. Sadly, after the disbursement of the down payment, her father left her 
mother for another woman and brought most of the money. These examples 
are only some evidence for the marginalization of women victims as a 
combination of the Javanese culture and the reduction of compensation to 
land transaction. 
Land acquisition 
The mode of victimization, which accounts “files” rather than “humans,” 
has brought about new problems to the inside map victims who do not 
possess official certificates issued by National Land Body (BPN). Most victims 
only have extra-legal deeds of their land issued by a district head (camat), but 
Lapindo’s subsidiary to handle the transaction, Minarak, insists to only 
purchase assets with certificate from BPN and disregard the existence of 
extra-legal deeds. Such a decision has been favoring mainly newcomers who 
bought their land or houses from previous owners or a housing estate. These 
newcomers usually have, at least, a certificate of “timesharing rights” (hak guna 
bangunan) of land from BPN. Therefore, these newcomers were easier to get 
compensation rather than the natives who only possessed extra-legal deeds of 
their land. As discussed above, to facilitate the transaction of victims without 
land certificates Minarak offered an option of “cash and resettlement” to KNV. 
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According to my discussions with some activist-interlocutors and law 
scholars in the course of the fieldwork, the decision to obligate Lapindo to 
purchase land from their owners indicated in the 2007 regulation contravenes 
the Agrarian Law (No. 5 of 1960) (cf. Kurniawan 2012). The act, which is 
hierarchically higher than the regulations, is the regulating law concerning land 
proprietary and use in Indonesia. According to it, private companies, such as 
Lapindo or Minarak, are not entitled to have a “proprietary rights” (hak milik) of 
land in the country and therefore every land transaction to a private company 
will automatically be “legally void and [the ownership of] the land falls to the 
State” (art. 26 par. 2). The issue was raised by the National Land Agency (BPN) 
on a letter (March 24, 2008) released to the Sidoarjo branch of the agency 
(BPN Sidoarjo). The letter elaborated some procedures of land transaction with 
Lapindo that should be followed. According to it, along with the transfer of 
ownership from previous landowners to Lapindo, the land status will eventually 
become “State’s property” (tanah milik negara). Subsequently, the government 
will grant the company a “timesharing right” (hak guna bangunan) on the land 
that it had already paid. 
Most victim-informants I met did not have any knowledge about such legal 
consequences of their land transaction with Lapindo. Lapindo, on the other 
hand, has been aware of this issue since the beginning. In December 2006, 
there was a statement from Vice President of Energi Mega Persada (Lapindo’s 
parent company) Jusuf Martak who said that the transaction mechanism (for 
compensation of victims) would not only mark the transfer of proprietary rights 
of the land from landowners to the state and opened a possibility of Lapindo to 
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pursue reimbursement from the government over the money which the 
company has disbursed to victims (LAS et al. 2006). For such a possibility to 
occur will depend highly on whether the government will give Lapindo the 
timesharing rights or not. The scenario would be: if the government decides to 
grant Lapindo with the rights, then the money would not be reimbursed; but, if 
the government decides not to provide Lapindo any rights over the land (and 
thereby the government will self-manage the land), the company will get the 
reimbursement from the government. 
Aside from the issue of victimization and land dispossession, the victims 
have to deal with the problem of finding new dwellings. To find a land lot, the 
victims have to deal and struggle with market mechanism. One main issue has 
been the rocketing price of land as a consequence of the increasing demand of 
land. In 2007, for instance, the land price in the surrounding of disaster zone 
had reached up to twenty times of the normal land price following the mudflow 
(Soegiherprajoko 2008).33 To most inside map victims with small assets of land 
and buildings, market mechanism was nothing but another disaster because 
they could not afford to purchase a new land or house with the twenty-percent 
down payment of the compensation they got from Lapindo. Therefore, the 
company’s decision to pay the remaining compensation by installments has 
become another obstacle for these victims to find new dwellings. In the 
meantime, the government has been maintaining a naïve view seeing the 
relationship between victims and Lapindo as simply a relationship between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 According to my own interview with a credit employee of a state-owned bank branch in 
Pasuruan in June 2012, the soaring land price has gradually dropped and began to meet with 
the normal inflation rates since many victims have already got new dwellings and the 
decreasing demand for new land. 
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sellers and buyers in a regular marketplace; what happens between the two 
parties will stay with them on the ground that there is no regulation that 
obligates the government to intervene in such a situation. 
3.8. Mitigating or escalating disaster? 
In a modern world, the government has been the most expected political 
institution to deal with physical and social repercussions following 
environmental hazards (Zack 2009; Rozario 2007). The aim is to prevent the 
hazard from becoming a disaster. A common political response to 
environmental hazard is disaster reliefs, which can be defined as the acts to 
reduce the damage and restore the situation into a normal state. Unfortunately, 
in every environmental-related project (including disaster mitigation) there are 
inherent risks that may trigger more social and ecological crises in the society. 
The government’s decision to reduce the responsibility of Lapindo turned 
out to be problematic, and the same applies to the transition of the disaster 
politics paradigm from “mining accident management” to “spatial 
management” to “state treasury management.” This implied a different framing 
the mudflow from anthropogenic to just another natural phenomenon. Thus, 
the governmental definition of the hazard became in fact crucial for the 
creation of the subsequent social disasters for the populations in broader 
surroundings and longer timeframes, or in other words: the political decision 
made the disaster a more systematic issue. This demonstrates that political 
decisions can mitigate social issues or escalate them. 
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In principle, there are three mitigatory tasks performed by the government. 
First, there was an attempt to terminate the mud eruption with the relief wells 
technique, which was was failed or foiled. On the one hand, statements of 
government officials claim that the failure was due to some technical difficulties 
in the field (Hadimuljono 2007); on the other, independent experts claim that 
Lapindo foiled the effort owing to the fact that Lapindo was in control by 
financing alone all expenses for closing the eruption (Schiller, Lucas, and 
Sulistiyanto 2008; Mudhoffir 2013). 
Secondly, to keep the mudflow from overflowing to larger areas the 
government has built semi-permanent embankments around the eruption. In 
turn, the embanking project has resulted in the creation of a-800-hectare 
artificial mud lake and broader ecological degradations in some areas from 
which the materials for the embankment are taken. In addition to the 
embanking, the government has been spilling the mudflow to the Madura Strait 
through the Porong Canal/River. The spilling has led to nothing but more 
ecological threats along the canal/river for the mud contains heavy metals and 
other dangerous essences—something that the government has been denying 
all this time. 
A third mitigation priority is how to handle social problems resulting from 
the hazard. By doing so, the government has been prioritizing the victimization 
and compensation of victims as if such will solve all the social and ecological 
problems of the mudflow. In many cases, instead of resolving the problems, 
the victimization and compensation mechanism has become another disaster 
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for victims. The victimization considers less social aspects than physical 
damages generated by the mudflow. 
Up to recently, there has been no official data on the number of the 
mudflow victims. One main reason for this is the reduction of “humans” into 
“files” since the compensation is accounted from the ownerships of land and 
buildings. Additionally, there is a transition of meaning from “compensation for 
the loss” to “transfer of ownership.” According to Lapindo, there has been no 
compensation but rather transaction, to say that, the victims selling their 
assets to Lapindo as the buyers (see chapter 4). In other words, the 
victimization marked by the issuance of presidential regulations is nothing but 
legal bases for the eviction of the people living in the disaster zone because 
they do not have other option but to sell their assets and move to another 
places respectively. In turn, such a mechanism will bring about more 
complications in the future. As the chapter shows, despite the destructive 
impact of the mudflow to the social and ecological aspects in Porong, a more 
serious threat is coming from the disaster politics for it generates a systemic 
disaster to emerge and exist. 
In a review article, British geographer Raymond Bryant summarizes three 
dimensions of political ecology analyses into a politicized environment (Bryant 
1998). They are the “everyday,” “episodic,” and “systemic” dimensions. Bryant 
categorizes environmental disaster into the episodic model of politicized 
environment on the grounds that disasters materialize in a limited time and 
landscape (Bryant 1998, 84), but what happens in Porong is beyond this model 
within which vulnerability is the central concept. Instead of focusing on 
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vulnerability, the chapter considers risks to explain the emerging social 
complications in Porong nowadays. It is a key concept to understand systemic 
environmental problems as for the impacts are not limited in particular 
timeframe or landscape and a common response to such is public distrusts of 
official experts (Bryant 1998, 84). Environmental-related development projects 
have been proven to be potent in creating new social and ecological threats 
that may befall beyond particular time and space (Button 2010; Bryant and 
Bailey 1997; Oliver-Smith 2010). Such have been reoccurring in Porong and it 
seems to me that the government overlooks the inherent risks within the 
disaster politics by limiting its authority restricted only to what the mitigation 
policies indicate. 
This has made some problems turning into a more systematic, complex 
state. The chapter aims to provoke comprehensive studies of the social and 
ecological networks of the mudflow hazard in broader landscape as well as 
longer timeframe. For the eruption continues to occur, it is very likely that the 
problems resulted from the mudflow will grow. The chapter focuses on the role 
of the government in dealing with the mudflow hazard in Porong, Sidoarjo and 
addresses how the disaster politics failed to meet the problems of the victims 
and resulted in unexpected social complications in practice. It does not aim 
the hazard that resulted from the mudflow per se, but rather investigates the 
growing social disaster that is produced by the disaster politics. It begins with 
the assumptions that the government has been a key actor to mitigate 
environmental disasters and deal with the social and ecological crises resulted 
from them bringing everything into the normal state. Combining the changing 
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political definition of the causes of the mudflow with the mitigation policies and 
the data from the fieldwork, I argue that instead of alleviating the physical and 
social crises of the affected people, the government has contributed in 
transforming a serious hazard into an ongoing social disaster rather than 
resolving the issue. 
 !
 
Map 3 Map of mud-volcanoes in Java and the Brantas Block
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Chapter 4  | Contested Statements 
4.1. So, what is a hero? 
In mid-May 2012, I attended a small, unplanned reunion with some friends 
after attending a funeral of a friend who died in a plane accident. In the 
reunion, I heard many stories about misfortunes, accidents and, of course, 
disasters. One story is particularly significant to open this chapter. According 
to the storyteller, it is based on a real story about a high school classroom 
conversation concerning the Noah’s Ark. 
A pupil gave his view, “God sent a huge flood to humans as a punishment 
because they no longer respected Him. Before this all had happened, God 
told Noah to built a giant ark to save any things it could carry.”  
Another pupil entered the discussion, “Actually, Noah made the flooding.” 
Suddenly the whole class turned their look at him. 
“How come?” the teacher asked and everyone waited in silence for the 
answer.  
The pupil gave his view. “Well, let’s use our common sense. How did Noah 
get so much wood to build an ark of that size? The flood occurred because 
Noah had chopped down all the trees to build the ark. As of heavy rain 
occurred there were not enough trees to absorb the overflow of water. 
Noah is the one who should be blamed for causing the flooding.” 
 
The story has one crucial point that is relevant to this chapter, the power to 
contest a mainstream interpretation of a disaster, the flooding in the story of 
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the Noah’s Ark that has been derived for centuries. Instead of perceiving Noah 
as “the hero” for saving people and other animals from the flooding, the pupil 
framed him as “the bad guy” for chopping down the trees that had led to the 
flooding. This altered understanding of the Noah’s Ark story is something that 
is very relevant to the main issue addressed in this chapter: the social 
construction of truth of an environmental catastrophe in discursive fields. 
4.2. Discourse and the social construction of reality 
It is because the first eruption was occurred adjacent to a natural gas 
exploration site, the Banjar Panji 1 well, it is easy for public to blame the 
company, Lapindo Brantas (“Lapindo”) for waking the mudflow in Porong. The 
blame is a serious threat for Lapindo due to its economic, social, and political 
consequences. If it is true, Lapindo should bear all the costs to compensate 
the victims and insure the rehabilitation of social and ecological damages in 
Porong. Even more, the company could be put on trial for causing to such a 
catastrophe. Thus, the claim of the mudflow as an anthropogenic disaster is 
something that Lapindo has to deal with and this is the main subject of the 
chapter. 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the present study investigates “discourse” 
beyond just a concept in linguistic, which consists of words/phrases/sentences 
that structure a sentence. It resonates Foucault’s argument that discourse is 
related to practices and power (Foucault 1978, 101). Discourse is a series of 
practices of grouping statements around particular issues and raising them up 
in certain discursive fields. Thus, discourse determines the orchestration and 
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governance of social reality. To Foucault, power is not a result of certain 
political purposes gaining recognition from others, but rather exists through 
resistance to certain discourses and the production of counter-discourses 
(Foucault 1981). What is core in Foucault’s theory of discourse is a question of 
the will to truth, the question aimed not onto the search for the truest 
statements but rather to break down political strategies behind truth claiming. 
Foucault is therefore not trying to dismantle political ideology for he argues 
that all kinds of “truth” are the outcome of different discourses in relation to 
epistemic practices (Foucault 2007). 
This chapter explores the politics of truth performed by Lapindo in 
struggling with the claim of “anthropogenic disaster” and promoting a counter-
claim of “natural disaster” concerning the mudflow in Porong in three 
discursive fields: science, the media and politics. The choosing of these fields 
is following John Hannigan’s argument on how environmental issues are being 
socially constructed. Hannigan suggests the unraveling of social construction 
of environmental issues one should focus on three concerns: the claims, the 
claims-makers and the claims-making process (Hannigan 2006, 64–66). The 
chapter limits the claims to “anthropogenic disaster” and “natural disaster” 
claims, the claims-maker to Lapindo, and gives more portions on the 
discussion of the claims-making process in three different discursive fields: 
science, the media and politics. 
According to Hannigan, the claims-making process can be elaborated into 
three stages: assembling, presenting and contesting claims (Hannigan 2006, 
67–75). The key agents in the assembling claim stage are the scientists for they 
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perform some primary activities such as discovering, naming and determining 
the foundation “scientific” theories and evidence of the problem. Nonetheless, 
the field of science, as Pierre Bourdieu puts it, is the field where the “specific 
issue at stake is the monopoly of scientific authority” (Bourdieu 1975, 19, 
emphasis in original). Even more, Bruno Latour gives a very clear illustration of 
what is happening in science: 
Scientific facts are like trains, they do not work off their rails. You can 
extend the rails and connect them but you cannot drive an engine through 
a field. (Latour 1983, 155) 
Therefore, to have a success in wining a claim, scientists or, substantively, a 
group of scientists must provide solid evidence of which can only be obtained 
by performing an effective division of labor in conducting the research. Or else, 
they will only fall in ambiguity by delivering conflicting scientific evidence.  
A second stage of the claims-making process is presenting claims. It takes 
place in the media for they have a significant role to gain moral supports from 
general public to particular claims. Indeed, the media are not just a means to 
share and receive information about some events. They are not about a 
window “to see” what happens out there in the disaster site, but also a 
framework “to understand” about such (Tuchman 1978). This situation is 
reminiscent of Rene Magritte’s The Human Condition discussed in 1.2. In 
presenting particular scientific claims, the media workers are required to 
connect them with popular events in the society and describe them in dramatic 
and perceptible descriptions through various rhetorical strategies in writing the 
news (Hannigan 2006, 70–72). However, media news is less just a plain 
representation of reality than a result of rigorous negotiations between 
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journalists and their sources and employers (Ericson, Baranek, and Chan 1989; 
Gamson et al. 1992; Bourdieu 2005). The process of making news about 
particular issue is, indeed, getting more complicated when the issue is 
influential for the sustainability of the media as economic organizations 
(Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Scheufele 1999). 
All in all, mass-mediated environmental issues have shown some clear 
tendencies (Hannigan 2006, 89–92). First and foremost, the media are framing 
environmental issues as “scientific” discourses. Secondly, the media tend to 
contextualize such discourses into human-interest discourses, such as to what 
extent humans contribute to and will be affected from them. In so doing, the 
media present dramatic, if not mystical, narratives. Thirdly, the media seek for 
long-term political and economic prospects from raising such narratives. It is 
not only about pursuing economic incomes but also about positioning 
credibility in the competition with the other media. Fourth, as such, the media 
situate environmental issues in a conflicting framing. Last but not least, media 
news have become a main reference for politicians to perform the final process 
of claims-making process, contesting claims in political arena. In contesting 
claims, politicians are invoking actions (and reactions) to gain political supports 
to concrete the claims into policies. 
The chapter is mainly grounded on archival data, with some ethnographic 
data from the fieldwork will be presented to give contexts of the archiving. The 
first two sections will briefly describe the position of Lapindo in Indonesia and 
in the mudflow and the emergence of the “anthropogenic disaster” claim. The 
subsequent three sections will discuss the strategies of Lapindo in three 
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different fields: science, the media and political arena. I conclude that to some 
extent Lapindo has been enlivening and reviving the power competition over 
the mudflow in Porong. 
4.3. Lapindo Brantas 
Lapindo is one subsidiary of the Bakrie & Brothers (henceforth, “the 
Bakries”). It was directed under the management of a subsidiary of the Bakries 
in the energy sector, i.e., Energi Mega Persada (EMP), before in 2008 it was 
fully transferred to another the Bakries’ Malaysian-based subsidiary in cement 
plant, Minarak Labuan Co (MLC). 
The Bakries  
The Bakries is among giant family conglomerates in Indonesia. It was 
founded in February 10, 1942 by Achmad Bakrie for pepper and coffee trading 
(Pohan 2011, 9). In 1985, Achmad appointed his eldest son, Aburizal, to take 
the lead of the conglomerate starting from January 1, 1988 (Pohan 2011, 222). 
Achmad passed away on February 15 after having an intensive treatment 
because of illness at the age of seventy-one in Japan, just a month after the 
substitution. Aburizal’s siblings are two brothers, Nirwan and Indra, and one 
sister, Roosmania. By 2012, the Bakries is a holding company of more than 
fifty subsidiaries and delivering business in many sectors (ranging from metal 
industries to energy and mining to telecommunication to media enterprise to 
infrastructures and real estates), with a net income of 355 billion rupiah (c. USD 
36 million) (Bakrie & Brothers 2012). With such a business, Aburizal alone 
ranked at thirty in the 2011 Indonesia’s 40 Richestaccording to The Forbes 
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magazine, with net worth of USD 890 million (Fan 2011). However, in the last 
few years Aburizal neither any member of The Bakries exists in the list. 
The Brantas Block 
Lapindo has been operating in one active oil and natural gas exploration 
block in East Java, namely “the Brantas Block,” since 1996. The block is 
covering two main areas: offshore area (stretching from Mojokerto to 
Pasuruan) and onshore area (in the Madura Strait). It is the block in which the 
controversial Banjar Panji 1 well was located (Map 3). 
According to a report of the Indonesian Audit Body (BPK), the Brantas 
Block was officially opened for an exploration and mining field starting from 
April 1990 with permission from the late president Soeharto (BPK 2007, 10). 
Huffco Brantas, a subsidiary of a Texas-based company, Huffco Inc., signed a 
thirty-year production-sharing contract (PSC) of the Brantas Block with the 
Indonesian state-owned oil and natural gas company, Pertamina. The contract 
is also known as the “Brantas PSC.”From that moment on, the composition of 
participating interests of the contract has changed for several times (BPK 
2007, 12). The first appearance of Lapindo in the block was on April 11, 1996, 
when Huffco transferred the contract to a subsidiary of the Bakries in oil and 
natural gas mining, namely “Ladinda Petroindo.” It was established in 1990 by 
Rennier Latief, Indra Bakrie and Roosmania Kusmulyono (the last two names 
are the siblings of Aburizal Bakrie). It seems to me that the name “Lapindo”is 
the acronym of “Ladinda Petroindo,” while “Brantas” 	
the name of 
the block where it operates. As of the transition, the name “Huffco Brantas”
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
      177 
was changed to “Lapindo Brantas” (BPK 2007, 17). By 1996, the shareholders 
of the Brantas PSC were half on the hand of Lapindo and another half on an 
Australian company, Novus Petroleum (BPK 2007, 20–21). Previously, in 1995 
Novus bought participating interest of the Brantas PSC and established a new 
subsidiary, named “Novus Brantas.” Starting from June 2004, Novus Brantas 
operates in Indonesia as a subsidiary of Medco Energi International (BPK 2007, 
12–13, 19–20). Medco Energi International is another private mining company 
established and owned by another Indonesian conglomerate, Arifin Panigoro. 
Medco Energi set up a new company, named “Medco Brantas,” to replace 
Novus Brantas. A few months later Medco Energi sold eighteen percent of its 
shares of the Brantas PSC to another Australian company, Santos (BPK 2007, 
19). Thus, by the time when the mud began to flow (May 29, 2006) the 
composition of shareholders of the Brantas PSC was Lapindo Brantas (50 
percent), Medco Brantas (32 percent), and Santos Brantas (18 percent) and 
acting as the operator of the block is Lapindo (BPK 2007, 11). 
The term “ shareholders of Brantas PSC”is quite tricky for laypeople in 
the industry. Many of my informants, mostly victim-informants, were referring 
the term bluntly to “the owners or the shareholders of Lapindo,” whereas it 
should be understood as the shareholders of the block’s participating sharing 
contract (the Brantas PSC), in which Lapindo was only one of them. Lapindo’s 
shares were owned by Energi Mega Persada (EMP), the second largest 
Indonesian private oil and natural gas company holding the contract of eight 
blocks in the country (Equity Research Team 2006, 12) and recently expanding 
its business to other countries in Asia and Africa (The Jakarta Post 2013). 
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Following the wake of the mudflow in Porong in late-May 2006, EMP had 
attempted for several times selling Lapindo’s shares to other companies. In 
September 2006, for instance, EMP tried to sell Lapindo to Lyte Ltd., another 
affiliated company of the Bakries (EMP 2006c). The plan was failed because 
the Indonesian Supervisory Body for Stock Market and Financial Institution 
(Bapepam-LK) rejected it. A month later, EMP almost succeeded in selling 
Lapindo to Freehold, a company based in British Virgin Island and unrelated to 
the Bakries (EMP 2006d). However, Freehold canceled the transaction because 
the deal had spread controversy in the society. Eddy Sugito from the Jakarta 
Stock Exchange (BEJ) stated: “The cancellation was a wise move because the 
liability scheme of the Lapindo mudflow disaster has not clear yet” (as quoted 
in JOE et al. 2006, my translation). 
Minarak Labuan 
When president Yudhoyono issued a presidential regulation (No. 14 of 
2007, see chapter 3), it was estimated that Lapindo must spend about 3.8 
trillion rupiah (c. USD 421 million) to finance initial disaster mitigation and 
compensation of victims. This excluded other Lapindo’s financial obligations in 
performing initial mitigatory reliefs, such as terminating the eruption and 
constructing embankments. That number was way much greater than 
Lapindos total assets, which were estimated to be no more than USD 90 
million (Equity Research Team 2006, 22, 28) and therefore a huge cash 
injection from other party(-ies) was needed in immediate. To meet these 
sudden needs, especially in financing urgent countermeasures for initial 
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impacts of the mudflow, EMP had been receiving loans up to USD 30 million 
from another subsidiary of the Bakries, Minarak Labuan Co. (MLC) (EMP 2008; 
2007). MLC was established as a cement plant in the Labuan province, 
Malaysia in 1997 with the money from the Bakrie Capital Indonesia. 
In July 2007, EMP released an astounding statement saying that Lapindo 
was no longer under the management of EMP due to the conversion of MLC’s 
loans with its shares in Lapindo. From that moment on Lapindo has been 
transferred into the management of its new owner, MLC. In addition to the 
transfer, EMP stated also that MLC would take over all its indemnifies related 
to the Brantas Block and responsibility in financing the disaster mitigation in 
Porong (EMP 2008). Another clear evidence of MLC’s presence in the mudflow 
incident is the establishment of Minarak Lapindo Jaya (publicly known as and 
thenceforth, “Minarak”), a new subsidiary of Lapindo which main duty is to deal 
with the transaction of land and buildings with the “inside map” victims. 
Based on my readings into some documents of the government and the 
company, I discovered that the existence of MLC in the case is more than just 
to secure Lapindo’s position in the wake of the mudflow but also to obtain the 
entire participating interests of the Brantas PSC. A couple of months before 
the conversion of MLC’s loans to Lapindo’s shares, in March 2007, Medco 
Energi divested its participating interest in the Brantas PSC to another the 
Bakries’ affiliated company, the Prakarsa Group. Medco agreed with the 
transaction because MLC would stand behind Prakarsa in taking over Medco’s 
obligation to the block and the mudflow (Bapepam-LK 2007). Furthermore, in 
December 2008, Santos unexpectedly announced that it had transferred its 
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participating interest to MLC. In addition to the transaction, Santos would 
disburse a final payment of USD 22.5 million to MLC in order to support the 
long-term disaster mitigation in Porong and therefore it would receive a release 
from any claims related to the block or the mudflow (Santos 2008). The 
transaction marked a full acquisition of the Brantas PSC into the hand of the 
Bakries, through MLC. 
However, from the viewpoint of Lapindo and the Bakries the most 
dangerous threat comes from the spreading understanding of “anthropogenic 
disaster” over the mudflow. This could bring the company and the 
conglomerate to a more severe situation, that is, the Bakries has to insure all 
the expanding damages resulted from the mudflow and the social and 
ecological rehabilitation in Porong and Lapindo’s executives could be put on 
trial for resulting in such a catastrophic environment. Hence, “anthropogenic 
disaster” is a claim that Lapindo and the Bakries must deal with and contest. 
4.4. The formation of the “anthropogenic disaster” claim 
Very early in the morning of May 29, 2006, a reporter from the Kompas 
daily newspaper received an SMS from a colleague informing him that a gas 
leak had occurred in Porong.34 The reporter went to the Renokenongo village 
without having breakfast. When he arrived, he detected a strong, sulfur-like 
smell from gas that had burst from beneath the earth’s surface. Also, he saw 
white smoke coming from a paddy field, together with a mixture of hot mud 
and water erupting from the same spot. The smoke affected two villagers who !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 The story is based on personal communications with Laksana Agung Saputra, the reporter, 
and early reports from the daily concerning the incident. 
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had already been taken to the nearest district’s health clinic (puskesmas). That 
morning, External Relations Coordinator of Lapindo, Arief Setyo Widodo, held 
a press conference, stating that the company was still investigating what had 
caused the subsurface gas leak. 
As of the conference finished, for he had not had breakfast, the reporter 
went to a nearby food stall (warung) to get a cup of coffee with which to begin 
the day. Knowing that her customer was a journalist, the stall’s owner, Sri, 
accompanied him to a house rented by Lapindo’s workers, where they met 
Syahdun, Lapindo’s drilling foreman. He told the reporter, “The gas explosion 
was triggered by fractures in the borehole.” The next morning, the statement 
concluded the first article to appear in the daily about the mud incident 
(Saputra 2006a); what is more, the daily was frequently quoted in subsequent 
reports of the incident. And it was the beginning of how the claim of 
“anthropogenic disaster” spreads following the wake of the mudflow. 
Whistleblower 
A week after the initial eruption, on June 5, 2006, one of Brantas PSC’s 
shareholders, Medco Energi, published an open letter to Lapindo.35 On the 
letter, the company stated that the eruption had been triggered by Lapindo’s 
drilling activity in the Banjar Panji 1 well. It also informed the publics that a few 
weeks prior to the incident (on May 18, 2006) a meeting had taken place, at 
which Medco’s representatives had warned Lapindo of the need to install 
safety casing to a certain depth, but they intentionally neglected to do this. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 The letter, entitled “The Banjar Panji-1 well drilling incident,” is written in English. 
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incident at the well, claimed Medco, was due to “gross negligence” on the part 
of Lapindo who did not follow the drilling procedure according to the plans. In 
addition to this, Lapindo’s representatives claimed in writing that everything 
was under control and all the damages, if any occurred, would be 
compensated through the company’s insurance cover as a mining company 
(EMP 2006a; 2006b). These initial statements indicated that there was a link 
between the eruption and Lapindo’s drilling activity. 
In mid-August 2006, on behalf of TriTech Petroleum Consultant, Simon 
Wilson released a preliminary report in regard to contributing factors and 
causes of the loss of the Banjar Panji 1 well, addressed to the directors of 
Medco (Wilson 2006). TriTech was hired by Medco to provide a professional 
research service program to generally investigate the problems that occurred 
during the drilling operations at the Banjar Panji 1 exploration well and, in 
particular, to identify possible factors contributing to the loss of control of that 
well. Relying on documents provided by Medco and meetings with Medco’s 
geological and drilling staff at Medco’s office, Wilson pointed out a series of 
instances of Lapindo’s incompetence, which had resulted in the loss of the 
well. He considered Lapindo’s decision to remove the drill string from the 
borehole at midnight on May 28, while the well was in an unstable condition, as 
“incompetent and in contravention of good well control practice” (Wilson 2006, 
2). In addition to this, he listed five contributing factors in the loss of the well, 
ranging from the planning phase to its execution (Wilson 2006, 2–3). They are: 
1) the use of cement in measuring the probable weakening or fracturing of the 
well at a depth of 3,595 ft. (c. 1,096 m) between April 29 and 30, 2006; 2) 
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fractures inside the borehole somewhere at a depth of 4,241 ft. (c. 1,293 m) on 
May 28, 2006; 3) continued drilling without any casing to a depth of 8,500 ft. (c. 
2,591 m); 4) if, Wilson claims, casing had been installed, it would have been 
easier to control the well afterwards; and 5) the decision to install the casing 
inside the Kujung Carbonate, not before it. He claims that if Lapindo had 
implemented all these measures differently, then the well could have been 
saved (Wilson 2006, 11–12). Although the report focuses more on the loss of 
the exploration well and does not mention the mudflow, it claims Lapindo’s 
incompetency in the drilling of the Banjar Panji 1 well. 
A month later, in September 2006, Neal Adams Services issued a report 
which was sent to Rico Moegandi, a lawyer for Medco Energi (Adams 2006). 
The report includes supplementary crucial information about the start of the 
mudflow eruption, something that had not appeared in Wilson’s report. Adams 
refers to a “blowout,” and illustrates two blowouts that occurred: the first was 
inside the well, “a subsurface blowout,” which had led to a “well kick,” and the 
second occurred aboveground, adjacent to the well. 
According to the Dictionary of Mining, Mineral, & Related Terms, there are 
nine definitions of “blowout” and the closest definition to the abovementioned 
“subsurface blowout” is the fourth one: 
the high-pressure, sometimes violent, and uncontrolled ejection of water, 
gas, or oil from a borehole. (The American Geological Institute 1997, 57) 
And the following “aboveground blowout” refers to the ninth definition: 
a general term for a small saucer-, cup-, or trough-shaped hollow or 
depression formed by wind erosion on a preexisting dune or other sand 
deposit, esp. in an area of shifting sand or loose oil, or where protective 
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vegetation is disturbed or destroyed; the adjoining accumulation of sand 
derived from the depression, where recognizable, is commonly included. 
Some blowouts may be many kilometers in diameter. (The American 
Geological Institute 1997, 57) 
According to the same dictionary, the term “kick” has three meanings, but 
what was meant to happen in Banjar Panji 1 is “a quick snap of the drill stem 
caused by the core breaking in a blocked core barrel or sudden release of a 
momentary bind” (The American Geological Institute 1997, 297). 
The primary cause of the subsurface blowout was, according to Adams, 
due to “numerous operational mistakes as well as errors and omissions” 
(Adams 2006, 5). Lapindo violated the original Well Plan by failing to install 
casing at 6,500 ft. (c. 1,981 m) and also at ~9,000 ft. (c. 2,743 m). Furthermore, 
he claimed that by installing casing string and proper cementing would have 
prevented the well kick and subsequent blowout that occurred aboveground. 
Similarly to Wilson’s discussed before, Adams identified the well kick as having 
occurred at a depth of 4,241 ft. (c. 1,293 m), when the string was pulled out of 
the hole from a depth of 8,737 ft. (c. 2,663 m) on May 28, 2006. He claims that 
although Lapindo had made several attempts, some of which were almost 
successful, to stop the well kick and the underground blowout, these attempts 
were actually the main cause of the subsequent aboveground blowout. He also 
saw some other errors as having been made in the drilling of the Banjar Panji 1 
well that might have contributed to the blowout (Adams 2006, 7). 
The report again raises the issue of Lapindo’s incompetence in the 
inconsistency in sticking to the original drilling plan. To depict the deviation 
made by Lapindo Adams presents a diagram comparing the actual Porong 1 
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well with both the planned and actual Banjar Panji 1 well. He marks two red 
circles on the actual Banjar Panji 1 well and a sentence in red and bold font 
that reads as follows, “Significant deviations from planned geology” (see Fig.  
4.1). By showing it, in which the actual Porong 1 well is also depicted, Adams 
wanted to highlight the fact that if Lapindo had followed the drilling plan such 
an incident would not have occurred. 
 
 
Fig.  4.1 Diagram of comparison between the actual Porong 1 well and the planned and actual 
Banjar Panji 1 well (Adams 2006: 21) 
 
Furthermore, Adams gives more details about what was happening in the 
crucial moments leading up to the mud eruption, which can be summarized as 
follows: 
On May 27, 2006, when Lapindo was preparing to drill to a depth of 9,090 
ft. (c. 2,771 m) to 9,230 ft. (c. 2,813 m), the H2S probe sensor, located at 
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the shale shaker36 area, detected 25 ppm of concentrated H2S. Some 
crews continued to drill, while others were evacuated to a briefing point. 
The drilling continued to 9,277 ft. (c. 2,828 m). 
On May 28, 2006, when drilling from a depth of 9,283 ft. (c. 2830 m) to 
9,297 ft. (c. 2,833 m) was resumed, lost circulation37 occurred. Lapindo 
thus started to pull the drill string out/up to a depth of 8,500 ft. (c. 2,591 m) 
without any circulation (according to Adams, this action was very reckless. 
Instead of pulling the string out, Lapindo should have left it inside the hole). 
Early on May 29, 2006, when the string was pulled out/up to a depth of 
4,245 ft. (c. 1,294 m), Lapindo indicated a well kick had occurred and tried 
to shut the well. At the same time, a high concentration of 500 ppm of H2S 
was spotted surrounding the shale shaker. Lapindo had succeeded in 
killing the well, but been unsuccessful in pulling the string out. A few hours 
later, H2S bubbles were detected above the earth’s surface and the 
remaining crews were subsequently evacuated. 
The following day, on May 30, the intensity of the bubbles was found as 
having decreased and more time elapsed between the 
appearance/formation of each bubble than before. On the evening of May 
30, 2006, Lapindo injected cement into the borehole and the number of 
bubbles decreased. 
The next day (May 31), Lapindo continued to cement the borehole. The 
number of bubbles continued to decrease but on June 1, muddy water 
from the crater was noticed flowing from the area surrounding the well. 
Lapindo began to remove its equipment from the drilling site. On June 2, 
the operator ran the string into the hole to a depth of 3,536.5 ft. (c. 1,078 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 “Shale shaker” (or only “shaker”) refers to “a mechanically vibrated screen through which a 
returning drill fluid is passed to screen out larger chips, fragments, and drill cuttings before the 
drill fluid flows into the sump” (The American Geological Institute 1997, 497). 
37 “Lost circulation” refers to “the condition during rotary drilling when the drilling mud escapes 
into porous, fractured, or cavernous rocks penetrated by the borehole and does not return to 
the surface” (The American Geological Institute 1997, 320). 
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m). While Lapindo worked, firing guns38 and cracks around the rig were 
detected. On the next day (June 3), Lapindo started to derig the mast and 
the daily report ended here. 
 
According to Adams, the bubbles at the rig site on May 29, 2006 were a 
clear indication of a subsurface blowout. Yet, instead of dealing with this issue, 
Lapindo focused more on preserving the well by cementing the borehole on 
May 30, 2006 (compare with Lapindo’s report, EMP 2006a). Adams therefore 
claims that “if the focus had shifted to the blowout, the blowout may have 
been killed” and for that reason, considers the decision to continue to drill (on 
June 2) as behavior/action which “borders on criminal negligence as it 
endangered personnel, the rig and the surrounding environment” (Adams 2006, 
13). 
Obviously, the above-discussed reports can be interpreted as a part of 
Medco’s strategies to absolve it of any future responsibility in the wake of the 
mudflow. Not only this, it has tended to place responsibility for the mudflow 
with Lapindo alone. However, since March 2007, along with the divestment of 
Medco’s participating interest of the Brantas PSC to the Prakarsa Group (see 
4.3), Medco has no longer been involved in the production of knowledge over 
the case. In the meanwhile, another participant of the Brantas PSC, Santos, 
responded calmly to the issue and waited for the investigation into the cause 
of the incident rather than believing the media’s speculation about industrial !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 “Gun” refers to “a borehole in which the charge of explosive has been fired with no other 
effect than to blast off a small amount of material at the mouth of the borehole” (The American 
Geological Institute 1997, 249). It also relates to “blowout shot,” “an improperly placed or 
overcharged shot of black blasting powder in coal (where used), frequently results in a mine 
explosion” (The American Geological Institute 1997, 57). 
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negligence (Santos 2006a; 2006b). Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 
mudflow, Medco’s statements—from the letter and the reports—have played 
an important role in the formation of the “anthropogenic disaster” claim by 
pointing out Lapindo’s incompetency and inconsistency in the drilling of the 
Banjar Panji 1 well. Such a claim is very problematic for Lapindo and the 
Bakries; it is something they must contest. 
4.5. Scientific uncertainty 
In the course of the mudflow hazard, earth scientists, especially geologists, 
have become key actors in the struggle for knowledge, for they have been 
utilizing their scientific authority to produce authoritative knowledge concerning 
the mudflow’s trigger. The existence of external factors, such as Lapindo, who 
may or may not have a direct influence on the formulation of scientific claims, 
therefore, must comply with specific regulations that are only applicable in the 
field of science in order to intervene in the production of knowledge of the 
disaster. 
The origin of the dispute 
From the outset, the argument of an anthropogenic mudflow has been 
dominating the scientific field to explain the unnatural phenomenon in Porong. 
The first scientific paper about it was published in the February 2007 edition of 
the Geological Society of America monthly magazine, namely the GSA Today. 
It was written by four British earth scientists proposing the argument that the 
mudflow is anthropogenic, instead of natural event (Davies et al. 2007). In the 
article the adopted name for the mudflow is “LUSI” (abbreviated from lumpur 
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Sidoarjo, meaning “Sidoarjo mudflow”), from which the term become so 
popular in the following scientific articles. 
Davies et al. emphasize the issue of “the absence of steel casing” as one 
factor which caused to a fracture in the borehole (Davies et al. 2007, 6). This 
led to the fracturing of the well with the result that high pressure steam fissured 
the surrounding layer of soil and pushed the underground mud so that it 
spurted out elsewhere instead directly from the well. Interestingly, they ignore 
the possibility that an earthquake might have triggered the eruption for several 
reasons, but the most important here is the claim that: 
[a]n earthquake could have generated new fractures and weakened the 
uncased section of the well, but it would be highly coincidental for an 
earthquake-induced fracture to form 200 m away from this well and 
provide the entire fracture network required for an eruption on the Earth’s 
surface. (Davies et al. 2007, 8) 
 
Their argument is clear the mudflow is anthropogenic for it was triggered 
by the drilling activity. Nevertheless, the inference-making process in the article 
could be seen as being very problematic since it is based on a hypothetical 
interpretation on the part of the authors, rather than observations and reliable 
data from the field. Yet it is very easy for someone to refute or contest their 
claim, the conclusion has cornered Lapindo as the accused party of causing 
the eruption. In response to the publication of the article, as reported in the 
Nature magazine (February 22, 2007), Lapindo’s representatives, Bambang 
Istadi, personally contacted Richard Davies instructing him to revise the 
proposed conclusion, but he ignored them (Cyranoski 2007). 
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In July 2007, another scientific paper was published in the Earth and 
Planetary Science Letters journal. The leading author of the paper, Adriano 
Mazzini, is a professor of geology at the University of Olso, Norway. 
Intriguingly, the name Bambang Istadi, representing EMP’s (Lapindo’s parent 
company) in-house geologist, appears as one of the article’s co-authors 
(Mazzini et al. 2007). It is foreseeable that the article is a part of Lapindo’s 
strategies to scientifically contest the anthropogenic claim that was proposed 
in the earlier paper and, at the same time, to counter it by proposing the 
argument for an “earthquake-induced mudflow.” They argue that, because the 
drilling never reached the Kujung Formation, it cannot be said that the mud 
erupted in/from the borehole (Mazzini et al. 2007, 377, 384–385). They give two 
crucial statements: first, that a well kick never occurred and, secondly, that no 
fluids ever erupted through the well. Then, they argue, “the hypothesis of an 
eruption entirely attributed to drilling is inconclusive” (Mazzini et al. 2007, 386, 
emphasis added). 
By any means, the word “entirely” in that sentence is somewhat tricky. On 
the one hand, it raises the possibility of the existence of other factors, besides 
drilling, which might contributed to the eruption, but, on the other hand, it does 
not directly suggest that the drilling was completely unrelated to the eruption. 
In this gap, they raised a theory that argues tectonic activity (an earthquake) 
could trigger particular geophysical phenomena (geyser, methane, and mud 
eruptions), even from a distance of several thousand of kilometers from the 
epicenter and with a time delay of a few days. Relying on the theory they 
propose a counter-argument stating that a major earthquake in Yogyakarta on 
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May 27, 2006 had a great impact on the geology in the surrounding area up to 
a hundred kilometers away, especially on the activity of the other mudflows in 
Java, as they observe in the following: 
The most significant eruption was observed at Purwodadi mud-volcano 
(central of Java) that also erupted boiling mud and water. Between 
December 2006 and January 2007 new eruption sites with characteristics 
similar to LUSI appeared in the central (Bojonegoro mud eruption) and 
western (Serang mud eruption) part of Java following the earthquakes. 
(Mazzini et al. 2007, 384) 
 
In addition to this argument, using data gathered from geochemical 
analysis to the materials, such as gas, water and the mud, that come up to the 
surface, they claim that the mud originated from a layer the depth of which is 
much lower than the deepest part of the well. This can be proven by the fact 
that the samples of material from inside the borehole were less smectic than 
samples taken from the mud eruptions, proving that the erupted mud came 
from a source different to the borehole (Mazzini et al. 2007, 379). The claim 
represents a stringent attack on the “anthropogenic” camp, for it argues that 
the mud is not originated from the borehole.  
The politics of/in science 
Regardless of which argument is correct, the aforementioned articles 
raised oppositional scientific arguments and this signified the start of the 
scientific (and public) debate on what triggers the mudflow. A year later, in the 
same journal another article corresponding to Mazzini et al.’s (Mazzini et al. 
2007) was published by Richard Davies and his colleagues (Davies et al. 2008). 
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This time, the name Rudi Rubiandi, the former head of the investigation team 
established by the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (see 3.4), appears 
as one co-writer of the article. It was written collectively by the proponents of 
the anthropogenic argument to refute the earthquake theory. They present 
crucial data in defending the argument that the eruption was indeed an 
anthropogenic one. 
Relying on two main sources data (i.e., historical records of earthquakes 
and drilling records from the Banjar Panji 1 well), the authors come out with 
some crucial statements. First, the May 27 earthquake was too far from Porong 
to have had a great effect on geological conditions and if there was a direct 
impact, the magnitude was too weak when it reached Porong to have triggered 
a mudflow on its own (Davies et al. 2008, 629, 631). The second and most 
frequent statement to be repeated in the article is that “there were larger 
earthquakes and located closer to Sidoarjo but did not trigger any mud-
volcano elsewhere” (Davies et al. 2008, 629, 633, 635; cf. Manga 2007). 
Although they agreed with the fact that a subsequent earthquake (on August 8, 
2007) had significantly increased the mud eruption rate in Porong, they 
disagreed with the conclusion that the earthquake was the “sole cause” of the 
eruption. They, therefore, claim that the May 27 earthquake was coincidental 
and nothing to do with the eruption previously discussed. 
Furthermore, they recite two important statements from the anthropogenic 
argument: “well kick” and “subsurface blowout.” Relying on drilling records 
from the well which they got from Lapindo, they point out that the well kick 
really did happen on May 28, 2006 (Davies et al. 2008, 634), contradicting 
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earlier claims that such an event never occurred (see Mazzini et al. 2007, 386). 
While a well kick is a regular event in most drilling activity, without a proper 
casing being installed, the situation in the Banjar Panji 1 well turned into a 
disaster, and they claim that: 
if the casing had been set deeper in the hole as was planned prior to 
drilling […] [t]he chances of the pressure during the shut-in exceeding the 
higher leak-off pressure would have been much lower. In other words, the 
well may have tolerated the shut in pressure and not failed had the casing 
been set deeper in the hole. (Davies et al. 2008, 636–637)   
 
The absence of steel casing was, according to them, only one of many 
contributing factors. The main trigger of the eruption was Lapindo’s reaction of 
pulling the drill out and shutting the well to deal with an influx of fluids and gas 
in the borehole (cf. Adams 2006; Wilson 2006). Such actions, according to 
them, had increased the pressure in the borehole and led to an subsurface 
blowout (Davies et al. 2008, 637). In order to make their argument more 
convincing, the authors present a series of diagrams of their interpretation to 
show what happened inside the borehole at the crucial moment (Fig.  4.2). 
What is noteworthy here is the fact that the diagram aims to convince people 
that the eruption was actually anthropogenic. Indeed, diagrams are a group of 
statements to summarize all the arguments in a complex article in a modest 
way that even laypeople can understand them (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). 
In other words, instead of being just illustrations, diagrams, too, are 
“statements.” 
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Fig.  4.2 Summary diagram of the Banjar Panji 1 well according to Davies et al. (2008:236) 
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Replies and comments 
The issue of what triggered the mudflow in Porong was raised at the 
American Association of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG) conference in Cape 
Town, South Africa (October 26-29, 2008). However, a final decision on the 
cause was not reached and the issue was brought to a vote in the plenum. Of 
74 participants who had the right to vote more than half (forty-two) voted in 
favor of the view that the mudflow was anthropogenic, triggered by Lapindo’s 
drilling (Mudhoffir 2013, 17–18). The rest are: three voters agreed that it was a 
naturally-born mud-volcano, caused by the earthquake of May 27; thirteen 
voted that the mudflow was a “hybrid”—the result of a combination of both 
drilling and the earthquake; and, sixteen voted for the need for further research 
on the matter before final conclusions could be drawn. Needless to say, those 
who voted for the “earthquake” theory were those affiliated with Lapindo 
(Batubara 2013). 
Apart from the issue of these minority views, the voting mechanism at 
AAPG conference is very problematic for a scientific forum. Instead of using 
scientific and allegedly “objective facts” to come to a so-called rational, 
scientific conclusion, the forum used a mechanism of democracy-by-numbers. 
Thus, instead of settling the debate, the conference further muddled it and the 
question of what triggered the mudflow, and prompted counter-statements in 
other scientific forums. Accordingly, the voting was clear evidence of the 
existence of other claims to the “anthropogenic” one, such as the claims of 
“natural-born mud-volcano,” “hybrid mud-volcano,” and “still needing further 
research.” 
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Of all the different factions, the proponents of the earthquake theory have 
become more deliberate than others to prove that their claim is the most valid. 
One efficacious strategy of the earthquake theory has been the publication of 
the April 2009 special edition of the Marine and Petroleum Geology journal on 
“mud-volcanism.” Adriano Mazzini edited the volume that contains seventeen 
research papers about mud-volcanoes all over the world and includes one on 
Mars. Five papers about the mudflow in Porong are grouped together in a 
special section in the volume, which all of them draw on the theory that the 
volcano occurred naturally. 
Among others, one paper in particular attempts to refute statements from 
the “anthropogenic” claim which appeared in earlier papers (Sawolo et al. 
2009). Since the authors work for EMP, Lapindo’s parent company, the article 
also aims to convey the fact that the operator of the Banjar Panji 1 well, 
Lapindo, has carried out the drilling according the proper procedure, unlike 
what most other factions have alleged. They also try to claim that Lapindo is a 
professional company and only works with reputable subcontractors. What I 
find most intriguing about the article is the fact that the authors claim to have 
the most complete data about the drilling in the Banjar Panji 1 well and, for this 
particular reason, they claim that the conclusions drawn by other parties with 
no links to the company are therefore based on incomplete and insufficient 
data. They raise, for instance, the issue of the subsurface blowout as the main 
concern to be discussed in the paper (Sawolo et al. 2009, 1775, 1780). Based 
on the drilling record they have, the authors argue that a subsurface blowout 
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never occurred and any attempt to connect the mudflow with drilling in the 
Banjar Panji 1 well is therefore unacceptable. 
In short, the article is another example of how Lapindo using its resources 
to contest the “anthropogenic disaster” claim in the field of science. What is 
more, they argue that Lapindo followed a proper drilling procedure. The kick 
was dealt with within three hours of the onset and the well was killed 
afterwards; it is therefore impossible for a subsurface blowout to have 
occurred (Sawolo et al. 2009, 1780). Thus, they do not see the pulling of the 
drill string out of the hole as an error but rather as an unintentionally successful 
attempt to kill the well. 
Furthermore, they argue that if it is true that the mud came from the well, 
then it should have come out of the top of the well instead of from anywhere 
else (Sawolo et al. 2009, 1777–78). However, according to them, this is not 
what happened on May 29, 2006. Rather than erupting from the top of the well, 
the first eruptions were detected in other places adjacent to the well. Based on 
these findings, they simply claim that the drilling activity in the Banjar Panji 1 
well had nothing to do with the eruption (Sawolo et al. 2009, 1780). Yet the 
authors do not propose an alternative answer to the question of what triggered 
the eruption, another article in the same volume uses the abovementioned 
article’s main findings to promote the claim of a naturally-born mud-volcano by 
arguing, again, that it was triggered by the May 27 earthquake (Istadi et al. 
2009). 
As the articles problematized statements of an anthropogenic mudflow 
eruption, it prompted a long commentary published in the same journal in 
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2010, which claimed that the conclusion of the article pointed out 
“inaccuracies, incorrect interpretations and deviations from the daily drilling 
report” as a result of “unrealistic” calculations (Davies et al. 2010, 1651). 
According to these authors, the previous article by Sawolo et al. begins with 
“incorrect assumptions” regarding the method of measuring the pressure at 
the bottom of the borehole. The statement problematized here is “the actual 
pressure at the bottom of the well” when the well was in a static position, 
because there was a maximum pressure limit in an uncased well that Lapindo 
could handle (Davies et al. 2010, 1653). However, there is a different version of 
the actual pressure allowed/permissible/that Lapindo could in fact handle. 
According to Sawolo et al.’s calculation, the pressure was lower because the 
well was in an open position (Sawolo et al. 2009), while according to Davies et 
al. the well was successfully closed with cement and this would have increased 
the pressure at the bottom of the well and prevented the mud from flowing 
directly from the well (Davies et al. 2010). 
Davies et al. readdress the possibility that the eruption could have been 
triggered by the May 27 earthquake (Davies et al. 2010). Sawolo et al. mention 
a seven-minute time lag between the earthquake and mud loss occurring in the 
well (Sawolo et al. 2009, 1777), of which, according to Davies et al., it is too 
difficult to verify if the mud loss was really a result of the earthquake, despite 
the presence of other factors within this relatively short time lag (Davies et al. 
2010). They then rehearse two key statements countering the earthquake 
theory. First, that the impact of the earthquake of May 27 on the geology in 
Porong was too low, given its distance from the well. Secondly, many other 
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earthquakes had a direct impact on the eruption site but none resulted in an 
eruption. And as a conclusion, they return to the anthropogenic claim: 
We can be more specific about the critical errors which were: a) having 
such a significant open-hole section with no protection casing, b) 
overestimating the pressure the well could tolerate, c) after complete loss 
of returns, the decision to pull the drill string out of an extreme unstable 
hole, d) pulling the bit out of the hole while losses were occurring, and e) 
not identifying the kick more rapidly. (Davies et al. 2010, 1656) 
 
The commentary prompted further discussion which was published in the 
same journal (Sawolo et al. 2010). Interestingly, the discussion begins with a 
paragraph containing a serious accusation targeted at Richard Davies and his 
colleagues, as it says: 
It is obvious that Dr. Davies’ papers lack the complete dataset; this is 
puzzling to the Authors [Sawolo et al., AN] since Lapindo Brantas have 
been open and offered scientists to examine and access their drilling data. 
Strangely, Dr. Davies never took up the offer, and instead, they continue to 
“cherry-pick” drilling data that supports their hypothesis and disregarded 
the weightier data set that does not. In the opinion of the Authors, if Dr. 
Davies and his colleagues were to integrate all the available data into their 
analysis, then their conclusions would likely be different. (Sawolo et al. 
2010, 1658, emphasis added) 
 
The incompleteness of the data used to draw the conclusion that the 
mudflow was anthropogenic was the main issue problematized in the 
discussion. In the article, Sawolo et al. claim that the conclusion drawn by 
Davies et al. in their previous articles (e.g., Davies et al. 2008; 2010) is 
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misleading because of the random and incomplete data used (Sawolo et al. 
2010). In order to demonstrate how misleading it is, they include a table 
showing the different datasets used in their previous paper and their 
opponents (Sawolo et al. 2010). According to them, the absence of some 
crucial data led Richard Davies and his colleagues to a draw a conclusion 
which is “nonsense,” even though publicly acceptable (Sawolo et al. 2010, 
1661). 
Furthermore, they address the issue of their method of measuring the 
pressure at the bottom of the well and why it led to their drawing a contrasting 
conclusion to Davies and his colleagues. According to Davies et al., the 
minimum pressure was estimated to be 21.29 MPa/km, slightly higher than the 
maximum compression that an operator could handle in the absence of a 
proper casing (21.03 MPa/km) (Davies et al. 2008, 634–635; 2010, 1653). The 
pressure was the main factor that led to the fracturing of the borehole. The 
fracture was followed by cracks in the surrounding soil and resulted in an 
aboveground blowout elsewhere, but not from the well. On the contrary, 
Sawolo et al. claim that, according to their calculation, the actual pressure was 
at the maximum limit of 17.27 MPa/km, far below the pressure allowed for the 
borehole (21.03 MPa/km) and that therefore the pressure would not have led to 
a fracture occurring inside the borehole (Sawolo et al. 2009, 1776; 2010, 1664). 
Additionally, they also depict a diagram and place it next to the diagram that 
appeared in Davies et al.’s paper (Davies et al. 2008), to claim that the source 
of the mud is not from the borehole or even exits through it (Sawolo et al. 2010, 
1673; Fig. 4.3). 
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Fig.  4.3 Two different versions of the origin of the mudflow; natural (left) vs. anthropogenic 
(from Sawolo et al. 2010: 1673) 
End of argument? 
The effort to claim of natural disaster over the mudflow in scientific field did 
not stop there. In late May 2011, there was an international geology 
symposium held in Surabaya to discuss the future of the on-going mudflow in 
Porong. It was organized by the Humanitus Sidoarjo Fund (HSF), in 
accordance with BPLS. HSF was just one program of an Australian non-
governmental organization, the Humanitus Foundation. To run the program, the 
foundation received a million dollar grant from the Russian Institute of Geology 
to conduct further research into the on-going mudflow disaster in Porong. With 
the full support of Russian scientists, the HSF planned a project to map the 
geodynamics of the mudflow and its surrounding area in order to prevent 
future disasters from occurring in the region. Since the beginning of the 
program, the HSF has been cooperating and coordinating its work with BPLS 
and it has therefore increased the number of organizations that support the 
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argument for a natural-born mud-volcano, working together with the company 
and the government. Such a position can be seen in the composition of the 
speakers at the 2011 symposium in Surabaya. Of twelve speakers, only two 
geologists, Richard Davies and Mark Tingay, from the “anthropogenic camp” 
were invited to give their views on the anatomy and durability of the mudflow. 
Additionally, HSF also funded a research conducted by a team of German 
geologists that has published a paper in the Nature Geoscience journal in July 
2013 (Lupi et al. 2013). Relying on data from simulations, the authors claim that 
the enormous amount of seismic energy released by the May 27 earthquake 
resulted in an increase in volcanic activity on the island of Java, such as Mount 
Merapi in Central Java, Mount Semeru in East Java, and, of course, the 
mudflow in Porong. One remarkable statement which appears in the article 
concludes: “the borehole [of Banjar Panji 1, AN] was a witness to, and not the 
perpetrator of, the initiation of Lusi” (Lupi et al. 2013, 642). 
By the time of writing this study (November 2014), there has been no 
further reaction from the proponents of the “anthropogenic disaster” camp. In 
2011, however, Richard Davies and his colleagues wrote another article, which 
was published in the Journal of the Geological Society, London. This time, 
instead of addressing the debate concerning the trigger of the mudflow, they 
calculate the longevity of the mud eruption, which they predicted would take at 
least 26 years to decrease to less than 0.1 mega liter of mud per day and 
would remain active at a low level for thousands of years after that (Davies et 
al. 2011). 
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4.6. Framing the media 
“Bad news is good news” is the law of media. Following the law, a disaster 
is always a facticity. A 1973 survey by the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association, for instance, found that “accident and disasters” were sought by 
39 percent of the informants, it was the highest rate in comparison with 
political news (25 percent) and general/non-local/human interest news (25 
percent) (Sood, Stockdale, and Rogers 1987). A disaster, thus, is always 
economically beneficial for the media industry. The more people are curious to 
know about what happens in the wake of a disaster, the more they will 
consume media. Simultaneously, reporting a disaster is a rare opportunity for 
the media to provide valuable aids to the local victims, to monitor the 
rehabilitation processes, and, of course, to level up the ratings and 
circulations. 
Self-censorship 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, Lapindo is a small part of a giant family 
conglomerate in Indonesia, the Bakries, which is a parent company of one 
media giant in Indonesia, namely Viva Media Asia (publicly known as and 
henceforth, “Vivanews”). Vivanews is an umbrella company of several national 
television channels (TVOne, ANTV and Channel[V]), which are broadcasting 
nationally, and some local media in East Java (such as, ArekTV and the 
Surabaya Post daily). Thus, just by leveraging these media Lapindo and the 
Bakries can give space to Lapindo’s representatives, members of the family, or 
other their-affiliated people (e.g., geologists, lawyers, politicians, cultural or 
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religious leaders and, even, victims) to articulate their statements about the 
mudflow and the disaster easier than victims and, even, government officials.  
This situation has favored Lapindo to easily frame the disaster and 
disseminate it through these media. Yet, a more strategic practice to frame the 
disaster is performed by the Vivanews journalists. In these media enterprises 
the reportage of the Lapindo case is being monitored with “self-censorship 
mechanism” (Tapsell 2012). One of my interlocutors, a television journalist of 
one Vivanews media outlet, told me the rejection from the editor to do an in-
depth reportage about the case (personal communication, August 2008). In 
another encounter, the same interlocutor said, “My media would not raise any 
critical news about the [Lapindo] case because everyone [in my media] is 
haunted by [Aburizal] Bakrie” (personal communication, April 2013). The fact 
suggests that there is hegemonic power over Vivanews journalists in making 
critical reports of the Lapindo case. 
The practice to frame every single piece about the case continues in the 
naming of the event/process. In an interview, Karni Ilyas, former chief editor of 
AnTeve and currently news director of TVOne, argued that the media naming 
of a disaster, whether natural or industrial, should be referring to the place, as 
he gave some examples like “Bhopal” and “Chernobyl” (Ambarwati 2007 in 
Andriarti 2010, 80). Thus, according to him, the media should be using the term 
“lumpur Sidoarjo” (Sidoarjo mudflow), instead of “lumpur Lapindo” (Lapindo 
mudflow) to name the disaster in Porong (see 1.3). The argument was meant to 
respond to the contention of many journalists and media analysts in Indonesia 
for the intentional utilization of lumpur Sidoarjo in the Bakries media, for it is 
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problematic because it contradicts with the fact that most people are using the 
term lumpur Lapindo in everyday life conversations. It seems to many people, 
the using of lumpur Sidoarjo in the media has been an efficacious strategy to 
drive the social construction of the disaster (cf. Suryandaru 2009).  
In addition to Ilyas’s argument, Dhimam Abror, chief editor of the Surabaya 
Post daily, was very inconvenience with the term lumpur Lapindo, because it 
was meant that Lapindo is the cause of such a catastrophe (personal 
communication, March 2009). He raised an issue of the court’s verdict saying 
that Lapindo is not guilty for causing the mudflow. He was referring to the 
verdict of the District Court of South Jakarta on December 27, 2007. 
Intriguingly, according to a critical reading of the verdict (Wibisana 2011), the 
judges’ decision was full of awkwardness because there was a tendency of the 
judges to rule out the fact that all expert witnesses (e.g., the geologists) agreed 
to one condition: the region where the drilling performed is a prone area for 
mud-volcanoes to occur. The judges, according to this study, should be 
assessing two critical issues addressed by the plaintiff: first, did Lapindo 
design the drilling in purpose to prevent a mudflow to occur and, secondly, did 
Lapindo consider a mitigation plan if such would happen (Wibisana 2011, 141–
143). Instead of addressing these issues, the judges bluntly decided that the 
mudflow was a natural-born due to the fact that the expert witnesses who 
stand for it outnumbered the expert witnesses who stand for the 
anthropogenic claim (Wibisana 2011, 139–140). 
Despite public’s criticism to the verdict, starting from the time of the 
verdict was announced it has been easier for Lapindo and its affiliated actors 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
 !206 
to publicly raise and maintain the statement “Lapindo is not guilty by law.” With 
the existence of such a statement Lapindo does not have to talk much about 
what actually happened in the Banjar Panji 1 well and can easily dodge 
public’s accusation to take full responsibility of the disaster. For Lapindo, the 
verdict is “final and legitimate,” the mudflow is a natural disaster, and, by the 
same token, Lapindo should not be the party who is responsible for insuring 
the damages and rehabilitation but the government instead. 
There has been also a claim that Lapindo is just another victim of the 
mudflow. However, instead of reclaiming all the cash that has been spent to 
handle the initial mitigation to the government, Lapindo has been carrying on 
the settlement of compensation of victims. In such a context, Lapindo sees its 
willingness to purchase villagers’ land and houses not as a legal obligation as it 
is indicated in the 2007 presidential regulation, but rather as the company’s 
moral and social responsibility indicated in the December 4 letter. 
Another statement “following the directive of the Bakries’s mother” 
(mengikuti perintah ibunda Bakrie) is also frequently articulated by the family 
members and other Lapindo-affiliated actors in the media and other public 
occasions. Lapindo has been framing the money that it has disbursed to the 
victims as “the Bakries’ charity” (sedekah dari keluarga Bakrie) to those who 
suffer from the disaster. This, of course, contradicts with mutual understanding 
of most victims I had interviewed with. They see the act of disbursing the 
money is an obligation given to the company to redeem all the losses resulting 
from the mudflow. According to them, Lapindo has triggered the mudflow and 
taken something (land, houses and other properties) away from them and the 
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compensation is seen a “debt” that Lapindo must pay back to the victims. 
Thus, by Lapindo saying “the money was charity” means that the money has 
been given to the victims without a tendency to pay any debt. On the contrary, 
it is now the victims who are indebted to Lapindo or the Bakries. Such an 
understanding explains why Lapindo has been so easily and without a guilty 
feeling in postponing and altering the compensation mechanism to the victims 
as it has been indicated in the 2007 regulation. 
What is more, in Lapindo’s progress report about the mudflow disaster 
(released in May 2011), it is mentioned that Lapindo is not the party who 
should be responsible for compensating the victims (Lapindo Brantas 2011). It 
has been saving the victims since at that time the government was still 
focusing on reconstruction and rehabilitation of the May 27 earthquake in 
Jogjakarta and Central Java. In other words, Lapindo is trying to change its 
image from “the bad guy” to “the hero” of the mudflow disaster. 
“Commercial approach” 
Self-censorship is not the only strategy Lapindo applying to intervene the 
social construction of reality about the disaster in the media. With a huge 
economic capital, Lapindo has intruded into the other media groups. 
According to Dhimam Abror from the Surabaya Post daily, representing 
Lapindo’s viewpoint, at the first place the Bakries-unaffiliated media did not 
report the case proportionally and reported with a tendency to blame Lapindo 
for causing the mudflow (personal communication, March 2009). The tendency 
was getting stronger after the investigation team, led by Rudi Rubiandini, 
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declared that Lapindo drilling triggered the eruption sometimes in September 
2006 and the team was representing the government, it was easy for the media 
to decry Lapindo for causing the eruption and demanding it to be responsible 
to recompense the victims and pay for the social and ecological rehabilitation 
in Porong. At that time, there was no systematic strategy of Lapindo to 
intervene in the social construction of the mudflow in the other media. But, 
following the issuance of the 2007 presidential regulation, Lapindo’s executives 
started their regular visit to several media offices in East Java to supply 
updates and documents concerning the progress of the efforts the company 
had done. It was aimed so that the media could be “fairer” in writing 
reportages on the disaster, especially about positioning Lapindo. 
The strategy was changing every time following the response of each 
media to such a visit. The attempt to steer the production of knowledge of the 
event/process through the media was getting more serious for the company 
prepared a special fund for such a purpose. Errol Jonathans from the Suara 
Surabaya Media group told me that Lapindo allocated one billion rupiah for 
each media in Surabaya. He said: 
One day, Lapindo’s representatives visited us. The objective of the visit 
was that they would like to thank Suara Surabaya for reporting the incident 
proportionally. With such a sacrifice, they wanted to accord us with 
something called “commercial approach” (pendekatan komersial). They 
brought one billion rupiah, but we rejected them. At the time we said, 
“Suara Surabaya only needs Lapindo’s openness about the disaster.” 
(Personal communication, February 2009)  
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The term “commercial approach” refers to a strategy to advertise in one 
media. It is used because Lapindo could not directly intervene in the news 
making process in certain media. Thus, by using economic capital, Lapindo 
started to buy more space for its appearance in various media and the 
approach was a success in certain media organizations. A Surabaya-based 
newspaper daily of Kompas Gramedia Group (publisher of the nation-wide 
Kompas daily), the Surya daily, for instance, took the offer and allocated a full-
page “advertorial” (abbreviated from advertising and editorial) for six months in 
2007. The advertorial page was designed as a “normal page” of the daily, 
marked with the choosing of font type and color and the layout of the 
headings, columns, and photos. Laypeople would perceive the page as a 
regular page of the daily because it was similar to the other pages. The 
decision to take an advertisement was the authority of the marketing division of 
the daily and had nothing to do with the activity of the journalist in the 
newsroom and therefore although the daily took Lapindo’s advertisement, 
former chief editor of Surya claimed that the newsroom was still independent in 
writing critical news about the case (personal communication with Dhimam 
Abror, March 2009). However, in the production of knowledge of the case, the 
“regular” news (about one or two per day) was incomparable to a daily full-
page advertorial. Another Lapindo’s success in implementing the “commercial 
approach” was the appearance of an advertisement in Kompas daily on 
November 8, 2007, page 21. The advertisement showed an effort of Lapindo to 
counter the discourse of “anthropogenic disaster” and promote a discourse of 
“natural disaster,” by stating: “The experts assure that the events that occurred 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
 !210 
mudflow in Sidoarjo is a natural occurrence, not the result of drilling by 
Lapindo Brantas Inc.” 
The Surabaya Post case 
The economic capital of the Bakries was quite a thrill for some local media 
with serious financial crises, such as the Surabaya Post daily. The daily, first 
published in Surabaya, on April 1, 1953, was one prestigious newspaper in 
East Java. Abdul Azis established and ran it as a family firm. After he died, the 
wife, Toeti Azis, continued to run the daily. Unfortunately, until she passed 
away none of the children was willing to continue running the daily. They 
decided to close the firm and therefore the daily in 2002. After ceasing 
publication for several months, some of former employees of the daily 
established a new firm in accordance with the effort to continue the publishing 
of the daily. Since then, the shareholders and management of the daily have 
been changing several times. Eventually, in July 2008, the Bakries took over 
the management of the daily by buying its majority shares and set two 
prominent directors of Minarak Lapindo Jaya, Bambang Prasetyo Widodo and 
Gesang Budiarjo, as managing directors of the daily (Tapsell 2012, 237). 
With this change, the daily’s culture in reporting the mudflow disaster 
changed drastically. One reporter said in an interview in 2010: “We seldom 
write about it [the mudflow] now. The mud is still spewing out, but for us, it is 
like the earth swallowed it” (as quoted in Tapsell 2012, 238). Indeed, Surabaya 
Post’s chief editor, Dhimam Abror, admitted that he had been treating every 
piece about the case with full of cautiousness: 
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The option was would Surabaya Post write stories about the mud with 
softer language or not at all. The decision was not to write it at all. It was 
taken without any pressure from the management. It was my decision as 
the chief editor. (Personal communication, March 2009) 
That decision is however very problematic, for not to write about the case 
could be interpreted as another evidence to what Gamson et al. call the 
hegemony of media owners in the making of the (non-)news (Gamson et al. 
1992). 
The price of criticism 
The desire to develop a story about the mudflow disaster and its victims in 
the national media in Indonesia has to meet some other technical obstacles. In 
East Java, most national media established representative offices in Surabaya 
and other medium-sized cities in the province (such as Malang, Kediri, Madiun, 
Jember) but surely not in Sidoarjo. To cover the mudflow disaster in Porong 
many national media rely mainly on their Surabaya-based reporters, with 
sometimes a small assistance of journalists from other cities, especially Malang, 
was needed. In the course of the fieldwork, I discovered that not all national 
media have their own reporter(s) in gaining data about what is happening in 
Porong. Sometimes, they only use a stringer or contributor, who is paid 
accordingly to the number of published news. Although the contributor is 
working under the flag of a national media giant, he/she gets salary far under 
the local living standards and without any social and health insurance too. This 
raises an old issue of the relation between journalists’ welfare and “budaya 
amplop” (meaning, “the envelope culture”) in Indonesia. The culture refers to 
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the habits of journalists receiving, or in many cases “pursuing” for, money and 
other gifts from their informants. 
For the economically unstable journalists, especially contributors, by any 
means amplop is very attractive. It is because the media where they work 
could not provide them with enough earnings, these journalists feel free in 
receiving gifts from their informants. The habit has been a serious problem for 
the production of knowledge of the Lapindo case and something that Lapindo 
notice with very well. Therefore, to intrude the production of knowledge 
concerning the Lapindo case in the other media, it is occasionally more 
effective for Lapindo to interfere in the very beginning of news making by 
fulfilling these reporters with their material needs (such as money, jackets, t-
shirts or many other merchandise/facilities). Such a practice is sometimes very 
effective to tame journalists’ criticism to Lapindo in the framing of the case. 
4.7. Muddy politics 
Aburizal and Golkar 
In the political arena, there are some crucial issues on how Lapindo could 
intervene the production of knowledge concerning the disaster in relation to 
the strategic position of Aburizal Bakrie in the national politic, especially his 
involvement in the Golkar Party (henceforth, “Golkar”), one of the oldest and 
the largest political parties in the country. 
Golkar had been the ruling party for almost thirty-years of the New Order in 
Indonesia. After the resignation of the late president Soeharto in May 1998 
marking the end of the New Order regime, the party was in a very serious 
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leadership crisis. Instead of dissolving the party, the cadres, led by Akbar 
Tandjung, the chairperson at the time, collected supports from more 
stakeholders, especially businessmen, and many businessmen, including 
Aburizal Bakrie, have been occupying several strategic positions in the party’s 
structure. In contrast to the other political parties in Indonesia, to gain voters in 
the election Golkar does not rely on charismatic leaders, such as Megawati 
Soekarnoputri in PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle), Abdurrahman Wahid in PKB (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, the Nation Awakening Party) or Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 
Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat). With such a strategy, Golkar won the 2004 
legislative election with 128 of 550 seats in the parliament, followed by PDIP 
(109 seats) and PKB (52 seats). The Democratic Party, Yudhoyono’s political 
party, was a small party with less than 10 percent of the seats in the 
parliament. To win the 2004 presidential election, Yudhoyono had to run with 
Jusuf Kalla as vice president candidate, who was then appointed as the 
chairperson of Golkar (2004-2009). Thus, albeit the president was from the 
Democratic Party, the dominating political party in national politics at the time 
was Golkar in which Aburizal was one key cadre. 
In a cabinet formed in October 2004, Yudhoyono appointed Aburizal as the 
Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs before he redesignated him as the 
Coordinating Minister for Public’s Welfare starting from December 2005 until 
the end of the first term, in 2009. Therefore, at the time the mud first erupted 
the leading figure of Lapindo’s holding company was acting as an active 
minister in the cabinet. Calling from a political economy perspective, Schiller, 
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Lucas, and Sulistiyanto observe a serious conflict of interest in the government 
dealing with the mudflow in Porong for Yudhoyono was needing political 
support from Golkar and collecting economic supports from private sectors, 
including the Bakries, to finance his political campaigns for the 2009 election 
(Schiller, Lucas, and Sulistiyanto 2008, 63–65). Subsequent to his re-election 
for the second term of presidency (2009-2014), Yudhoyono did not designate 
Aburizal as one minister. It is because Aburizal was elected as the chairperson 
of Golkar in October 2009 replacing Jusuf Kalla. With such a position 
Aburizal’s influence in the national politic has become increasingly formidable 
for he has an authority to control the party’s members who sit in various 
strategic levels in the making of a political policy. To date, members and 
sympathizers of Golkar have been playing a strategic position in refuting the 
claim of “anthropogenic mudflow,” although Lapindo or the Bakries does not 
directly employ or pay them. The ambiguous position of Aburizal who has one 
foot in both camps has been a critical issue in the disaster politics of the 
mudflow. 
Conflict of interests 
It is notable here to address that the government, too, has a strong political 
awareness in defining the mudflow as natural phenomenon instead of 
anthropogenic. The Indonesian Audit Body (BPK)’s report shows some 
improprieties in Lapindo’s natural gas exploration in the Brantas Block (BPK 
2007). According to a regulation issued of the Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources, every mining operator is compulsory to submit daily reports of its 
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drilling to the Directorate General of Oil and Natural Gas, representing the 
ministry. In practice, Lapindo never sent its drilling report and the ministry 
never gave a warning about it. The fact suggests that Lapindo’s activity in the 
Brantas Block, including the drilling of the controversial Banjar Panji 1 well, has 
been running without strict supervisions from a governmental agency. Even 
more, when the investigation team found that the drilling had triggered the 
eruption, neither the directorate nor the minister immediately declared that the 
mudflow was due to an operational accident (BPK 2007, 11), of which could 
strengthen the criminal investigation on Lapindo. 
The supervision from the Control Board of Oil and Gas Mining Activities 
(BP Migas) was oriented more on financial surveillance than technical issue of 
the drilling. BP Migas, which was established in 2002 as a governmental 
agency to control the oil and natural gas exploration and mining activities in 
Indonesia, never conducted an examination to Lapindo’s drilling plan to make 
sure that it had designed in accordance to the good oil engineering practice. 
Additionally, BP Migas did not monitor the drilling of the Banjar Panji 1 well 
(BPK 2007, 11–12). From the beginning, still according to the same report, 
there have been several improprieties of governmental apparatuses in granting 
permission and letting Lapindo to drill the controversial well of Banjar Panji 1. 
There are, at least, two irregularities of the Regent of Sidoarjo in granting 
Lapindo a “location permit” (izin lokasi) of the Banjar Panji 1 well. First, the 
permit contravened the spatial planning of the regency that was indicated in a 
Sidoarjo regency regulation (No. 16 of 2003). According to the regulation, the 
area where the Banjar Panji 1 well was located should not be allocated for 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
 !216 
industrial area, including mining. Secondly, the well was located less than five 
meters from a residential area, less than thirty-seven meters from public 
facilities (toll road), and less than a hundred meter from a main gas pipeline. 
This contravened the Mining Provisions Act (No. 11 of 1967), which indicates 
that exploration and mining wells should be located at least a hundred meter 
from vital objects, such as highway, railroad, residential area, and others public 
facilities. In addition to these irregularities, Lapindo’s fraudulent strategy in 
obtaining a location of the Banjar Panji 1 well by utilizing a local authority 
(village head) and dishonest to the villagers that the ground would be used for 
chicken poultry instead of a natural gas exploration site (see 2.4). 
Within such contexts, if the mudflow was defined as an anthropogenic, the 
legal and political consequences would not only affect Lapindo, but also 
various governmental officials, from village to minister level, who had 
contributed in permitting and letting Lapindo to drill the Banjar Panji 1 well in 
non-procedural and inappropriate ways. From here, one can see a shared 
interest of the government and Lapindo in promoting the mudflow as a natural 
disaster rather than an anthropogenic one. Therefore, it is very logical if both 
institutions are trying to secure their vulnerable position in the wake of the 
mudflow, even at the expense of other people, especially the victims. 
One notable political maneuver is the designation of an expert staff of 
Aburizal at the office of Coordinating Minister of Public’s Welfare, Sunarso, as 
the head of BPLS’s executive body (see 3.4). It has been beneficial for both 
Lapindo and the government since BPLS has become a key institution 
representing the government’s viewpoint and playing significant role to 
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promote the “natural disaster” claim. As discussed in 3.5, before the 
establishment of BPLS, the mitigation measures conducted by Timnas were 
shaped in a paradigm of “mining industry accident” of which was shifted to 
“spatial management” in April 2007, then “State’s treasury management” in 
2009. 
Currently, publics and the media perceive BPLS as the official body to 
handle the disaster and, therefore, the most knowledgeable and well-informed 
institution concerning the mudflow. However, in conducting its tasks BPLS has 
never been uncorrupted by the influence of Lapindo or Aburizal. On 
Wednesday, February 27, 2008, at the president office, Yudhoyono appointed 
Aburizal to preside a closed cabinet meeting concerning the strategy to handle 
the increasing problems in Porong following the unstoppable mudflow. The 
president, who had opened the meeting, had to leave early to meet the 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and before 
leaving the meeting, he told the forum to find a way to compensate villagers of 
three new affected villages (i.e., Besuki, Pejarakan and Kedungcangkring). 
Aburizal started the meeting by saying, “I wish to implement the president’s 
directive as soon as possible” (as quoted in Setyarso, Gunanto, and Syaifullah 
2008, my translation). On July 17, 2008, the government issued the 2008 
presidential regulation in regard to the mudflow indicating the purchasing of an 
area in three villages with the state budget. 
I noted public’s criticism over the government’s decision to compensate 
victims with the state budget since according to many people tax money shall 
not be allocated to bail Lapindo out from its responsibility for causing the 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
 !218 
disaster. They are still thinking that Lapindo is solely responsible for the 
compensation of victims. However, as already discussed in chapter 3, the 
sharing of responsibility between Lapindo and the government has already 
mentioned in the 2007 regulation: Lapindo is only responsible for the area 
“inside the map” of impacted area and the government will be responsible for 
the area “outside the map” (art. 15 par. 1 & 3). The decision to allocate 
compensation of victims in state budget has to be approved by the parliament. 
But since Golkar in which Aburizal is a key cadre then chairperson was the 
majority in the parliament, it was very easy for such a decision to get approval 
of the parliament. 
Ubiquitous normalization 
To date many politicians of Golkar, from national to local levels, have been 
acting as pivotal actors to counter public criticism about that decision. In the 
national level, for instance, the parliament established a Monitoring Team of 
Sidoarjo Mudflow Disaster (Tim Pengawas Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo, 
TP2LS) and appointed a principal politician of the party, Priyo Budi Santoso, to 
lead the team. The team consists of twenty-one members of the parliament 
and works separately from the structure of BPLS. The major task of the team is 
to monitor the implementation of the disaster politics, especially the utilization 
of the state budget in the mitigation. In reality, it has no direct authority in 
intervening the mitigation, including insuring the compensation payment. 
Nonetheless, instead of pushing Lapindo to pay the victims in cash as it is 
indicated in the regulation, it has become a key agent to support Minarak’s 
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alternative option of “cash and resettlement,” bartering the remaining 
compensation with a new house in Kahuripan Nirvana Village (KNV) (Rully and 
Kartoyo 2008). 
On the provincial level, I noted the existence of a special team, of which 
members were some leading scholars of political sciences from top universities 
in Surabaya. One of them, Martono, was also the Provincial Chair of Golkar 
and served as the campaign leader for the twice-elected (in 2008 and in 2013) 
East Java Governor, Soekarwo. The team has a significant role in the 
normalization of the “anthropogenic disaster” claim by publishing a weekly 
newsletter, Solusi (meaning, “solution,” and also a language play of “Lusi” the 
abbreviation of lumpur Sidoarjo), which was distributed to numerous 
governmental offices, universities and media offices in East Java and in 
Jakarta. The aim was to supply strategic stakeholders of the country with up-
dated information about the development of mitigation politics, yet according 
to the team’s viewpoint. 
The main discourse proposed by the team in Solusi is: Lapindo should not 
be the one who is responsible to insure the compensation of victims and the 
social and ecological rehabilitation in the wake of the mudflow disaster, but the 
government instead. Accordingly, Lapindo should be seen as one among many 
victims of the disaster and the government should treat it equally to the other 
victims. For instance, one volume of Solusi (December 3, 2007) mentioned that 
Lapindo has the same right as other citizens in the nation to get the same 
protection from the government, but in reality since the beginning of the 
eruption the government has overlooked the right of the company by 
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burdening it with some responsibilities that should be performed by the 
government. The disaster politics over the mudflow is interpreted by Solusi as 
a way of the nature telling the nation about a severe crisis of leadership in the 
government. 
In the Sidoarjo level, I noted that Golkar has been recruiting some victims 
as its cadres and promoting them as legislative candidates for the 2014 
election. 39  One intriguing cadre of the party was perhaps Mahmudatul 
Fatchiyah, the former village head of Renokenongo who had facilitated 
Lapindo in getting a location for the drilling of Banjar Panji 1 well (see chapter 
2). She was promoted as the legislative candidate from the party for the 
Provincial Council. Another strategy of the party in the regency level was to 
promote Bambang Prasetyo Widodo (director of Minarak Lapindo Jaya and the 
Surabaya Post daily) as the regent candidate, bundled together with Khoirul 
Huda, the leader of the association of Lapindo’s mudflow victims (Gabungan 
Korban Lumpur Lapindo, GKLL), as the vice regent candidate in the 2010 
regent election (Widianto 2010). At the same time, the Democratic Party 
promoted Yuniwati Teryana, Vice President of External Relation Lapindo 
Brantas, as the regent candidate, while the vice regent candidate was the 
regency chair of Democratic Party, Sarto. My activist-interlocutors view the 
candidacy of Lapindo’s or Minarak’s representative as the company’s political 
maneuvers to take control over the local politics at the regency. Fortunately, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 The modus also applies to other political parties recruiting disaster victims, especially 
group/local leaders as legislative candidates in both national, provincial, and regency levels for 
the 2014 election. 
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none of the candidates won the election. The winner was the former vice 
regent of Sidoarjo, Saiful Illah, with more than 60 percent of votes. 
Unforgiveable sin 
Approaching the 2014 legislative and presidential election, the national 
political situation in Indonesia was heating up. In May 2012, Aburizal declared 
to run for president from Golkar. He was very sure that the mudflow disaster 
would not be a burden for him or the party. Even more, he claimed that ninety 
percent of the compensation have been paid to the victims (SAT 2011). 
However, a couple of months after the declaration, in July 2012, a political 
survey conducted by a polling firm showed that, amongst all strong candidates 
for the Indonesia’s next president, Aburizal’s popularity reached the lowest 
point, with only 4.4 percent. Grace Natalie from the firm said, “the main reason 
they disliked Ical [Aburizal’s nickname, AN] was the Lapindo mudflow” (Dewi 
2012). The polling represents the fact that the publics in Indonesia still believe 
that the mudflow is a drilling-error. Furthermore, in numerous talks with 
environmental and social activists, I learned that the Lapindo case is 
repeatedly attributed as Aburizal’s “unforgivable” political sin. 
Lately, I noted that more and more politicians of Golkar are trying to 
straighten out Aburizal’s position in the Lapindo case, although without a 
proper understanding and suitable data about it. The case has become a 
precarious subject that has to be managed properly not only by Aburizal, but 
also by all members of the party in order to obtain votes in the 2014 elections. 
Recently, the party is the runner-up in the parliament election, with 91 of 560 
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seats in the parliament, behind the winning party, PDI-P, with 109 seats. With 
such an outcome, Golkar has to make a coalition with other political parties to 
promote its president candidate. Unfortunately, no political party wanted to join 
Golkar to support Aburizal’s presidential candidacy. As a result, the party has 
to merger with the Gerindra Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, the Great 
Indonesia Movement Party) to promote an ex-military general, Prabowo 
Subianto, as their president candidate. Such facts show that even with such a 
huge effort to normalize the Lapindo case, Aburizal has yet to succeed to clean 
his public image that has been tarnished by the case. 
4.8. Contesting the disaster, reviving the discourse 
As mentioned at the outset, the chapter focuses on Lapindo’s strategies in 
interpreting the newborn mudflow in Porong. To understand Lapindo’s 
positionality in claiming the mudflow, one must consider it as a part of a family 
conglomerate giant in Indonesia, the Bakries, and how it has been influencing 
the nation’s politics. In daily talks, it is very difficult to distinguish between 
Lapindo and the Bakries when having a conversation with victim-informants. In 
the eye of these victims, as the next chapter will show, Lapindo and the 
Bakries have become a single entity in the power battle over the mudflow.  
Lapindo is interconnected with other subsidiaries of the Bakries, such as 
Energi Mega Persada (EMP), Minarak Labuan Co. (MLC), Minarak Lapindo 
Jaya (Minarak) and Vivanews (the media enterprise of the Bakries). Being a part 
of the Bakries has benefitted Lapindo for the leading figure of the family, 
Aburizal Bakrie was acting as a minister in the cabinet and currently is the 
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chairperson of Golkar, one of the ruling parties in the country. Lapindo has 
been easily intervening the social construction of the mudflow by delivering 
their version of truth concerning the incident, which induces public’s confusion 
(Lim 2013). Currently, there is a polarization of two most conflicting arguments 
concerning the origin of the mudflow: anthropogenic (drilling-trigger) and 
natural (earthquake-trigger) (Batubara 2013; Drake 2013). The first emerges for 
there is a presumption that the eruption is triggered by Lapindo’s drilling of the 
Banjar Panji 1 well. It has been dominating public opinion therefore to a certain 
extent has become truth for the publics (cf. Mudhoffir 2013). The latter blames 
a major earthquake for triggering the eruption, which is proposed first by 
Lapindo, then also by the government. 
The chapter addresses the claim-making process of the “natural disaster” 
claim in three different fields of social construction of reality: science, the 
media and political arena (Hannigan 2006, 64–66). In the field of science, 
Lapindo has been collaborating with other earth scientists to refute the 
preexisting claim of “drilling error” over the mudflow. As a counter, Lapindo’s 
in-house geologists have been promoting “natural disaster” claim over it. 
However, science is another field of power struggle, as Pierre Bourdieu argues: 
The ‘purest’ science is a social field like any other, with its distribution of 
power and its monopolies, its struggles and strategies, interests and 
profits, but it is a field in which all these invariants take on specific forms. 
(Bourdieu 1975, 19, emphasis in original) 
Indeed, it is due to the nature of uncertainty in science Lapindo has an 
opportunity to dispute a claim and counter it with another claim. Calling for 
Foucauldian theory of discourse, I problematize how Lapindo’s claims are 
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evidence of power exercises through various practices of convincing scientific 
audiences that the company’s claim to be the truest and others’ to be wrong. 
Truth is however just another historical category and therefore the will to 
truth is always problematic (O’Farrel 2005, 83). The main concern is beyond 
just the question of which claim is true and which is not, but more of what are 
the political consequences if certain claim is considered to be true. On the one 
hand, if it is true that the mudflow is anthropogenic, Lapindo will bear all the 
damage resulted from the disaster and can be criminalized for performing such 
a reckless drilling. On the other hand, if it is proven the earthquake initiated the 
eruption, Lapindo will not be responsible for anything but the government 
instead. 
In the field of mass media, as part of the Bakries, Lapindo can easily utilize 
the conglomerate’s media enterprise (Vivanews) to promote the “natural 
disaster” claim by reframing certain facts and pinpointing some others that 
may benefit the company. One remarkable and intriguing reframing is 
concerned with the money that Lapindo has spent for the victims, which is not 
framed as a “legal obligation” (as the regulation indicated so) or “paying debt” 
(as most victims though so) but rather as “alms” or “charity.” It seems to that 
Lapindo is trying to reframe its image from “the bad guy” to “the hero” of the 
disaster. As a result, many victims feel that they are now indebted to Lapindo 
or the Bakries. In the political arena, the interest of Lapindo to claim “natural 
disaster” over the mudflow coheres with the government’s interest for there are 
many irregularities at multi-layered governmental levels in permitting and letting 
Lapindo to do the drilling of the controversial Banjar Panji 1 well as well as 
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other wells in the Brantas Block. The scenario is: if the mudflow is proven to be 
anthropogenic, there will be many government officials, from village to minister 
levels, dragged to the court for their contribution to the reckless drilling. 
Hereinafter, efforts to defend the “natural disaster” claim should be view as 
the strategy of both Lapindo and the government in securing their position in 
the aftermath of the mudflow incident. The chapter describes how Lapindo has 
been dealing with the mudflow and by any means Lapindo has become a key 
actor in enlivening and reviving the battle of power over the disaster. 
 !
Chapter 5  | Muddied Memories 
5.1. “Fooled” 
Fooled 
 
My home was my heaven, my hamlet was 
my playground, at which we cheered, 
peasants were happy 
 
But now everything is just a story, 
you fooled me with the development and 
the foundation of it is my suffering 
 
Now there is no more heaven, no more 
playground, no more rice to harvest, no 
more room to breathe easily 
 
Hail, the greedy rich! Hail, the evil ruler! 
Don’t blame us for our resistances for you 
have disturbed, destroyed and ruined my 
dreams 
Tertipu 
 
Rumahku adalah surgaku, kampungku 
adalah ruang bermainku, di sana kami 
bersukaria, petanipun bahagia 
 
Tapi kini semua tinggal cerita, 
kau tipu aku dengan pembangunan, dan 
pondasi bangunan itu adalah deritaku 
 
Kini tak ada lagi surga, tak ada lagi tempat 
bermain, tak ada lagi panen padi, tak ada 
lagi ruang untuk bernafas lega 
 
Wahai orang kaya serakah! Wahai 
penguasa durjana! Jangan salahkan jika 
kami melawan karena kau mengusik, 
merusak, dan menghancurkan mimpiku 
 
The poem was written by Cak Irsyad, the founder and leader of Sanggar 
Alfaz of Besuki Timur (see 1.7). One child victim read it in the course of the six-
year anniversary of the mudflow, on May 29, 2011.40 The poem was among 
many performances of the victims commemorating the mudflow. Interestingly, 
it does not mention anything peculiar about the mudflow or any environmental 
hazard but rather addresses one crucial issue: development. Indeed, based on 
my countless encounters with many victim-informants, I learned that most of 
them identify themselves not just as victims of an environmental hazard (the 
mudflow) but also as victims of human politics (see 2.6). It is something that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Due to my absence in the 2011 commemoration, I am indebted much to Lutfi Amiruddin and 
Daris Ilma for their priceless fieldnote. 
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Oliver-Smith calls “disasters of development” which is typically marked by the 
increase in social resistance and civil disobedience (Oliver-Smith 2010). 
Resistance, then, becomes one means for powerless actors in their 
existence in society. As a matter of fact, resistance has become one focus of 
some studies of power as it shows the exercise of power in various power 
relations even by the “powerless actors” (e.g., Dwivedi 1999). To Foucault, 
resistance and disobedience are evidence of how power is being exercised 
(Foucault 1978) and therefore it is easy to argue for such a standpoint that 
victims’ resistance and disobedience exist as a counter to power exercise of 
other actors of the disaster (i.e., the government and Lapindo). The stronger 
the government and Lapindo insist on “natural disaster” claim, the stronger the 
victims persist in defending a counter-claim of “anthropogenic disaster” over 
the mudflow. 
Obviously, in the wake of a disaster victims are frequently understood as 
powerless parties who are depending on the help of others. However, 
throughout this chapter, I intend to show that the mudflow victims are not as 
powerless as most people would think. Instead, they are very creative to 
develop their own agency referring to specific cultural traditions that allow 
them to present their own interpretation of their situation. Quite unexpectedly, 
in the course of the fieldwork I discovered that the “anthropogenic disaster” 
claim has been enduring among victims not merely because of their 
resistances to the government or Lapindo, but also due to some preexisting 
cultural narratives in Javanese mythology about an idea that disasters as well 
as mudflows are never entirely natural events. These traditional narratives, of 
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which symbols were manifested in several commemorative practices of the 
mudflow, have facilitated victims to preserve the claim of “anthropogenic 
disaster.” By persisting with such a claim, mudflow victims become another 
prominent actor of the Lapindo case. 
5.2. On collective memories 
The last two chapters have discussed how two key actors of the disaster, 
i.e., the government and Lapindo, produce, circulate, and maintain particular 
statements to promote the claim of “natural disaster.” While Lapindo, with its 
political economy resources, have been trying hard to steer the discourse in 
several fields of the social construction of reality about the mudflow (chapter 
4), the government has been playing significant role in the field of policymaking 
and disaster mitigation (chapter 3). The present chapter aims to address how 
another prominent actor of the case, disaster victims, has been playing an 
important role in reviving the battle of power concerning the disaster through 
preserving a counter-discourse of “anthropogenic disaster” by maintaining 
their collective memories of the incident. The chapter will show how collective 
memories are never interest-free because they represent the struggle of 
victims in resisting to the “natural disaster” claim that the government and 
Lapindo have promoted. 
“Collective memory” has been one key concept in the field of sociology of 
knowledge coined by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in the beginning 
of the twentieth century (Brian, Jaisson, and Mukherjee 2012). Nevertheless, it 
was the World War II that has been considered as one major event for the 
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burgeoning study of collective memory nowadays (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, 
and Levy 2011, 29–36). The survivors and witnesses of the war were obliged to 
recollect and share their memories of the crisis in the purpose of writing 
historiography, a production of knowledge about the event/process. While 
scholars began to construct historiography about the hostile but prominent 
event/process in the world history, the media industry also started to produce 
images, fictions and documentaries about the horror and the heroic of the 
event/process. According to Halbwachs, historical recollection tends to 
establish and defend an objective truth about the past, while social 
remembrance aims to search anything in the past that is relevant for our 
present lives. In other words, history is “the past that [is] no longer an 
important part of our lives,” while collective memory is “the remembered past 
that actively shapes our identities” (Olick and Robbins 1998, 111). 
However, since 1960s there has been critiques concerning the subjectivity 
of historiography, which were continued by postmodernist thinkers in 1980s, 
who argue that historiography is just another means of ideological domination 
(Olick and Robbins 1998). Truth claim of a historiography is nothing but an 
attempt to socially reconstruct meanings about past event/process for 
particular political purposes in the present and the future. “History,” Foucault 
writes, “has been the object of a curious sacralization” (Foucault 1998, 280). It 
has a propensity to functioning certain collective memories in sustaining a 
certain regime of truth. Therefore, both history and collective memory are 
another discursive fields in which power is being competed.  
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To understand the work of collective memories in the social reconstruction 
of reality, Halbwachs proposes a distinction between “autobiographical” and 
“historical” memory. He writes, 
There is reason to distinguish two sorts of memory. They might be labeled 
if one prefers, internal or inward memory and external memory, or personal 
memory and social memory. I would consider more accurate 
“autobiographical memory” and “historical memory.” The former would 
make use of the latter, since our life history belongs, after all, to general 
history. Naturally, historical memory would cover a much broader expanse 
of time. However, it would represent the past only in a condensed and 
schematic way, while the memory of our own life would present a richer 
portrait with greater continuity. (Halbwachs 1980, 52) 
 
Sociologist Gérôme Truc elaborates autobiographical memory as the 
reconstruction of the past from our own personal experiencing the event and 
historical memory from the secondary, fabricated of historical records 
(documents, media, witnesses’ testimonies) (Truc 2011). Elaborating 
Halbwachs’s theory, British sociologist Paul Connerton classifies three types of 
memory (Connerton 1989). The first he calls “personal memory,” referring to 
any acts of remembering of a subject’s particular life history event: “I did such 
and such, at such and such a time, in such and such a place” (Connerton 
1989, 22). A second is “cognitive memory” in which “the person who 
remembers that thing must have met, experienced or learned of it in the past” 
(Connerton 1989, 22). A third type, which is the most prominent concept to 
develop in this study, is “habit-memory,” or the action to not only recollect 
both autobiographical and historical memories of the past, but also to 
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articulate those remembered memories into particular social performances and 
bodily practices (Connerton 1989, 22–24). Habit-memory is a key to 
understand commemorative practices as not just merely practices in which 
people share their personal experiences and historical records of the past. 
Rather, in those practices, people are contesting and challenging others’ 
experiences and historical records of the past and such is closely related to the 
notion of power. To remember is therefore not merely just a psychological 
process but also an exercise of power because it establishes powerful 
narratives of the truth about past events. 
Reconstruction of the past is therefore never been a neutral process, for 
there exists inter-subjective conflicts amongst individuals and this could have 
influence the recollection and reconstruction of memories of the past (Forrest 
1993, 446). In the case of disaster commemoration, victims have an 
opportunity to articulate their own meanings and memories about how the deal 
with environmental hazards. In this sense, disaster commemorations are more 
than just some acts to recollect and represent catastrophic event/process in 
the past to the present time but also to give new meanings of such an 
event/process for particular future purposes. This chapter argues that disaster 
commemorations are actually discursive fields in the sense that they allow 
power to exist through the recalling and disremembering particular memories 
related to the disaster and its subjective meanings to the remembering 
individuals. They are distinctive social times in which agencies of disaster, 
especially disaster victims could have a chance to select some of their 
memories and include/exclude them in several practices to commemorate the 
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event/process. Moreover, in these particular moments, disaster victims have 
an opportunity to add or modify some meanings of the event/process. 
Nonetheless, it is not the intention of this chapter to examine the accuracy 
of those recalled memories. What matters is how certain memories about the 
disaster were organized in accordance to preexisting narrative structures and 
how commemorative performances contributed significantly in the knowledge 
production of the disaster. The chapter is grounded on the data that are 
collected from a series of fieldwork in the disaster anniversaries (every May 29). 
Based on the observation into five disaster anniversaries (in 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, and 2014), I discovered no uniformity of how victims commemorate the 
mudflow; nonetheless, I detected some coherencies between the structure of 
those commemorative practices and the structure of some narratives in the 
Javanese culture, especially about disasters and mudflows. Hence, in this 
chapter, I will focus on describing some of these narratives and discuss them 
in relation to particular symbols appeared in some disaster commemorations 
performed by disaster victims as their effort to exist as one prominent actor of 
Lapindo case. 
5.3. Muddling with history 
The section describes the origin of how “traditional narratives” become 
discursive in the course of the mudflow in Porong. In 4.4 & 4.5, I have outlined 
two competing “scientific” claims in regard to the origin of the mudflow in 
Porong. Each claim has been proposed and defended by some earth scientists 
(e.g., geologists) in various “scientific” forums. The polemic among these 
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scientists is spinning around the issue of whether the eruption was triggered by 
a reckless drilling of Lapindo Brantas or by a major earthquake occurred two 
days prior the first eruption was detected. The former leads to anthropogenic 
disaster claim, while the latter leads to natural disaster claim. Obviously, it has 
been the intention of Lapindo to escape from all liabilities resulted from the 
mudflow. Lapindo has been one key actor in enlivening and reviving the battle 
of power in the course of the mudflow by intensively, aggressively promoting 
some statements to support the earthquake theory in certain discursive fields 
of social construction of reality (chapter 4).  
In addition to Lapindo, there is also the government that has been 
unintentionally promoting the natural disaster claim. According to my critical 
readings to mitigation policies of the mudflow (chapter 3), I discovered that 
these policies do not explicitly mention about what has triggered the mudflow 
as well as they do not indicated whether the mudflow is natural or industrial. 
Instead of being a strategy for disaster management, those policies are 
suggesting some schemes of the management of spatial and state proprietary. 
Nonetheless, there has always been a tendency from some governmental 
apparatuses to maintain the claim of natural disaster in several public forums. 
One forum that is important for the chapter is a joint convention of IAGI (the 
association for the Indonesian geologists), HAGI (the association for the 
Indonesian geophysicists), and IATMI (the association for the Indonesian 
petroleum engineers) in November 2007 in Bali. The conference was the 
beginning of the discursiveness of the so-called “cultural interpretation” of the 
mudflow in scientific forum, and then continued in other discursive fields. 
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In that so-called “scientific” forum, one geologist, Awang Harun Satyana, 
was delivering an intriguing paper which focuses on the historiography of 
mudflows in Java (Satyana 2007). His argument followed an idea that 
environmental hazards were determining factors for the collapse of two great 
empires of Jenggala and Majapahit in the Ancient Java. Yet the idea is not 
anew since some scholars have argued for it, but due to the lack of 
archaeological and historical evidence no one can be sure of what specific 
environmental features that have caused it (cf. Rahardjo 2011). Hilariously, 
relying on the data taken from three works of Javanese literature, such as Serat 
Pararaton, Serat Kanda and Babad Tanah Jawi, and one popular Javanese 
folktale of Timun Mas, Satyana claimed that the hazards in these texts were 
mudflows. Thereby, he wanted to reinforce the idea that mud-volcanic 
eruptions are regular natural features in Java and, when he learned from the 
dimension of the current catastrophic mudflow in Porong, he claimed that 
these particular features were the main causes for the collapse of two major 
empires in the Ancient Java. The following paragraphs will retrace some data 
from the sources with a strong intention to show that Satyana’s conclusion is 
very problematic for some reasons. 
Serat Pararaton  
The first work of Javanese literature, which was cited by Satyana, is Serat 
Pararaton (Book of the Kings). He claimed that the event Pagunungan Anyar 
(Javanese, “the new mountain”) was a massive, catastrophic eruption of a 
mudflow leading to the collapse of the Jenggala Kingdom. According to my 
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own reading of an English translation of the book (Phalgunadi 1996), the focus 
of the book is not about how the reign of Jenggala ends, but rather about the 
origin of the Singhasari, then Majapahit kingdom (cf. Berg 1964). The book also 
consists of a list of the kings and some major events during the reign of both 
kingdoms. It mentions the event Pagunungan Anyar and the year of when it 
happened (c. 1371 AD). However, it is not clear whether the event was a 
mudflow or just a regular volcano as well as was it the major cause for the 
collapse of the kingdom. Thus, relying on what the book is trying to tell, one 
could argue the conclusion drawn by Satyana to claim the cause of the 
collapse of the Jenggala kingdom was due to a mud-volcanic eruption cannot 
be accounted. The possibility of natural hazards as major factors to the 
collapse of the kingdom is still open for further discussion, but to arrive at such 
a conclusion one needs reliable historical and archaeological evidence. 
Serat Kanda and Babad Tanah Jawi 
The lack of historical or archaeological evidence is also a primary concern 
to discuss Satyana’s readings to Serat Kanda (Book of Tales) and Babad 
Tanah Jawi (the Origin of Java). In this case, he claimed that the event Guntur 
Pawatugunung (Javanese, “thunder of a rocky mountain”) was a mudflow and 
it was the natural hazard that has led to the collapse of the Majapahit Kingdom. 
There has been a long debate among historians in the utilization of both 
books as the sources for Javanese historiography owing to the obscurity of 
who wrote them (Braker 1980; Ricklefs 1972; Florida 1995). Pigeaud 
categorizes the two books into the same genre of Javanese literature in the 
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sense that they were written in the eighteenth century and for the purpose of 
interpreting the beginning of Islamic courts in Java (Pigeaud 1967). What 
makes them different is the fact that Serat Kanda is one variant of Babad 
Tanah Jawi (henceforth, “Babad”) which can only be found in the Surakarta 
Palace (cf. Day 1978; Ricklefs 1979). Indeed, there are many other versions of 
Babad but mainly the moral story is mainly about an idea that the sultans of 
Java are descendants of both the Prophet Muhammad and the kings of 
Majapahit (Johns 1964). Likewise, the rise of Islamic courts, according to 
Babad, is the revival of Java after the fall of the previous non-Islamic empires. 
As such, Babad is not focusing on the collapse of the Majapahit Kingdom but 
rather trying to tell the people about the rise of Islam and Islamic courts in Java 
as something that has been predicted before. This phase is portrayed to be 
more serene than the struggling years of the preceding Singhasari and 
Majapahit reigns, as it is described in Serat Pararaton. 
According to my own reading of an English translation of one version of 
Babad (Ricklefs 1978), it is mentioned the event Pawatugunung, but again 
similar to the event Pagunungan Anyar in Serat Pararaton it is unclear whether 
the event was an eruption of a mudflow. Therefore, to claim that the event 
Pawatugunung was a mudflow and that it has led to the fall of the Majapahit 
Kingdom requires more historical and archaeological evidence other than just 
relying on these sources. In spite of the lack of evidence, it seems to me that 
Satyana’s reading into Serat Kanda was superficial. I noted a small section of 
the book telling about the existence of a salt-water lake on Java, which is 
apparently to be the Bledug Kuwu in Grobogan regency, Central Java (Pigeaud 
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1968, 358). Bledug Kuwu has been the most popular preexisting mudflow in 
Java and therefore the miss to discuss this issue can be seen that Satyana 
was careless in reading that book—that is, if he did actually read it.  
Furthermore, from the etymology of the term bledug, I shall argue that the 
Javanese do not correlate mud eruption with a volcanic activity. It literary 
means “a sudden and forcible bubble” (in other contexts, it can also mean 
“dust” or “baby elephant”). It is closer to the Indonesian letupan, “bubbles” (as 
we find in boiling water) than letusan, “eruption” (of a volcano or a bomb). Of 
the latter the Javanese would refer it to jeblug (“explosion”). The term has been 
recorded in the early nineteenth century colonial report of a visit to Bledug 
Kuwu (Goad 1817). Thus, referring the events Pagunungan Anyar and Guntur 
Pawatugunung to mudflows juxtaposes with the categorization of bledugs as a 
volcanic activity of which is only applied for geologists, not for laypeople. 
The Timun Mas folktale 
Another problematic issue in Satyana’s paper was the fact that he utilized 
a popular Javanese folktale of Timun Mas as one source of his historiography 
of mudflowes in Java. The folktale can be summarized as follows (Satyana 
2007, 25–27): 
Once upon a time, there was a peasant widow, Mbok Sirni, who wanted 
very much a child. Buto Ijo (“Green Ogre”), who heard to her grief, 
accosted Sirni. Ijo was willing to fulfill Sirni’s wish under one condition. 
When the child has grown up, she must give that child for his meal. 
Because she was so longing to the presence of a child, Sirni agreed to the 
terms given. The ogre gave her a cucumber seed to be planted 
immediately. The seed grew fast and bore a large gold-colored cucumber. 
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Curios with the cucumber, Sirni split it and she found a baby girl. She was 
named Timun Mas (“Golden Cucumber”). 
Timun Mas grew into a lovely girl, to whom Srini was very fond. One day 
Buto Ijo came and wanted to recollect Sirni’s promise, delivering the child 
for his meal. Sirni was very sad because she has devoted her love to Timun 
Mas. She told to Ijo that that time Timun Mas was not yet ready and big 
enough to glut the ogre. She asked to Ijo for giving her another two years. 
The ogre agreed and left her house. Sirni was very sad because the ogre 
would someday take Timun Mas from her. The gods heard Sirni’s sadness. 
They told both Sirni and Timun Mas to go to a mountain to meet a hermit. 
So, they went to the mountain and met the hermit. The hermit gave a small 
packet to Timun Mas. The packet contained of four essences: a cucumber 
seed, a needle, salt, and terasi, shrimp paste. The hermit gave instructions 
that Timun Mas would use the essences only if the ogre was about to take 
her away. 
Then, it came the day Buto Ijo visited Sirni to collect the promise of giving 
Timun Mas to him. Knowing the ogre was coming to eat her, Timun Mas 
immediately ran away and the ogre chased her. After running and getting 
tired, Timun Mas used the first essence from the package, the cucumber 
seed. It sowed rapidly to a dense cucumber bush, bore with large 
cucumbers. The ogre paused the chase to eat the cucumber. Once his 
stomach is full, the ogre returned the chasing. This time he almost caught 
Timun Mas, but she had thrown the second essence, the needle, into the 
ground. It suddenly became a dense bamboo forest. The ogre was 
wounded, punctured by the bamboo rods. Nevertheless, he could pass the 
obstacle and continue to pursue Timun Mas. Knowing this, she 
immediately unwrapped the third essence, the salt, and there was a sea. 
The ogre for a moment sunk into the sea, but with his power he swam 
across that sea and went back in chasing Timun Mas. Eventually, Timun 
Mas had to use the last essence, shrimp paste (terasi). After she threw it 
there was a mud lake. Buto Ijo was shocked as his body submerged into 
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the mud lake. He thrashed in trying to save himself out from the mud. 
However, his efforts were futile. The ogre was dead as he was slowly 
sucked and sunk into the mud lake. Sirni was so relieved and happy to see 
Timun Mas returned home safely. 
 
Satyana argued the Javanese created the folktale as an effort to illustrate 
and explain a precedent mudflow in the island and therefore it supports his 
argument that mudflows are common environmental features in Java. In all and 
any respect, relying on a folktale for historiography is baffling. Instead of 
clarifying some facts of the preexistence of the phenomena such an effort 
raises nothing but controversies. According to Nurcahyo, there are many 
versions of the folktale circulating in Java and not all mention about a mud lake 
in which the ogre sunk and died (Nurcahyo 2014). 
There are some variants of how the ogre died drowned into the sea (from 
the salt) or tripped over a rock. Hence, the main structure of the folktale is not 
sending a particular message about natural disaster nor mudflows in Java. On 
the contrary, it is a manifest of people’s imagination about the relationship 
between peasants and the profiteering economic system. It is a story of 
political struggle of Javanese peasants against the profiteering Ijon system 
(from ijo, a Javanese word for “green”). The system is a traditional economy to 
provide peasants with high-interest loan, which they shall pay it with their 
upcoming harvest. According to some scholars, such a mechanism is 
detrimental to the poor peasants because they would be bonded with certain 
“moneylenders” (pengijon) (Partadireja 1974). The peasants could not sell their 
crops at a higher price to someone else as they have bonded in a preexisting 
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contract to sell the crops in order to pay their debts to particular 
moneylenders. This system has been long prevailing since many Javanese 
landless peasants (buruh tani) do not have sufficient cash in financing some 
unprecedented needs (especially, children education) and some other 
immediate expenses (especially, medication). Thus, instead of serving the 
poor, the system has become one crucial factor for the impoverishment of 
many Javanese peasants. For many years, the Indonesian government has 
been trying to stimulate the creation of microcredit through its banking system, 
but such does not seem to be succeeded in eliminating the system. 
In the folktale, the Ijon system is manifested in the relation between Mbok 
Sirni (symbolizing a poor peasant) and Buto Ijo (symbolizing the system). Sirni 
has bonded herself to a profiteering contract with the ogre, of which says that 
she will give her future harvest in order to pay back the kindness of the ogre 
giving her a magical seed. Instead of obeying the agreement between Sirni and 
the ogre, Timun Mas chooses to struggle against the ogre. She does not wait 
for a messiah to come and rescue her, but rather search for some modalities 
that she can use to face the ogre. The story ends with Timun Mas’s victorious 
defeating and killing the ogre. As we can see, the story is actually illustrating 
the triumph of the peasant (Sirni and Timun Mas) over the profiteering system 
(Buto Ijo) after having some modalities. (Later in the chapter, I will discuss how 
disaster victims adopt the narrative structure of the folktale to design the 
commemorations of the mudflow.) Thus, Satyana’s effort to raise and 
reproduce the folktale has brought a new hope to people in facing an 
oppressive system on the ground that it depicts the dead of the notorious ogre 
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by drowned into an artificial mud lake. As such, the folktale has become a 
boomerang instead of affirmation of the “natural disaster” argument. 
Actor of power 
Actors are subject to and the subjects of power and therefore I am very 
critical in investigating the contexts within which Satyana wrote the paper. At 
the time the paper was written, Satyana was working as a geologist at the 
Control Board of Oil and Gas Mining Activities (BPMigas). BPMigas was a 
governmental agency of which responsibility was granting private mining 
companies, including Lapindo, the permission to do oil and natural gas 
exploration in the country. Within such a context, Satyana’s paper is 
representing more or less the viewpoint of the government framing the 
mudflow in Porong as a natural event. 
In previous chapters, I have critically discussed the position of the 
government within the incident and what would (and could) happen if the 
mudflow were officially declared as an industrial accident—triggered by 
Lapindo’s improper drilling of the Banjar Panji 1 well. It would not only affect 
Lapindo, the well operator, but also many government officials, including 
Satyana himself as BP Migas in-house geologist for the board authorized such 
a drilling. According to a report by the Indonesian Audit Board (BPK), BP Migas 
was proven to not examine the drilling plan of the controversial Banjar Panji 1 
well as well as the other exploration wells in the Brantas Block. An examination 
to the drilling plan should have been done to ensure that it was designed in 
accordance to a good mining procedure and would not lead to any 
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catastrophic consequences. These facts are in contrast to the data presented 
in Satyana’s paper. 
By relying on the paper, BP Migas should have known from the beginning 
that the geology structure of the Brantas Block, where the Banjar Panji 1 well 
was located, is very conducive for a mudflow to emerge. Knowing this, instead 
of giving a special treatment, BP Migas allowed and permitted the drilling of 
exploration wells in the block without a strict technical supervision. What is 
more, in the course of the drilling, Lapindo never sent its daily reports to a 
governmental agency by way of a standard, regular mechanism in every oil and 
natural gas exploration activity in Indonesia as it is indicated in some 
governmental regulations (BPK 2007, 11–12). There was no government 
agency, including BP Migas itself, supervising the drilling or even demanded 
regular reports from the operator. The government had only received and 
examined the logbook just a few weeks after the mudflow erupted, which was 
done by the investigation team formed by the Minister of Energy and Mineral 
Resources. 
At first, the government relying on the report of the investigation team 
confirmed that the mudflow was a mining accident and it was manifested in a 
presidential decree concerning the formation of Timnas in September 2006. 
However, as of the issuance of a presidential regulation (No. 14 of 2007) in 
April 2007 marked a paradigm shift from mining accident management to 
spatial management (chapter 3), Satyana, speaking publicly in November 2007, 
was among government apparatuses to promote the discourse of “natural 
disaster.” His paper is therefore one among other efforts of government 
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officials in securing their position from the worst possibility that may occur 
following the mudflow. 
The muddling historiography of Javanese mudflows proposed in the paper 
was intended to divert the discussion of the involvement of the government in 
the newborn, catastrophic mudflow in Porong, East Java. However, as the 
chapter will show, the paper has become a blunder for such a claim and 
“traditional” narratives, especially Timun Mas folktale, have become powerful 
tools for the empowerment of victims to be actors of the disaster. 
5.4. Javanese mythology of mudflow  
In any case, Satyana’s paper has opened subsequent researches of 
cultural narratives concerning mudflows in Java in a much more 
methodological fashion. I use the term “cultural narratives” in its position 
against “scientific explanations” discussed in chapter 4. Although such a 
definition will bring about controversy, it is to which my informants and 
interlocutors referring in distinguishing different rationalizations of the mudflow. 
Among others, one significant contribution of Satyana’s paper to the chapter is 
perhaps an idea that since mudflows are common environmental features in 
the island there should be some specific preexisting narratives about these 
phenomena in Javanese culture. 
“Scientific explanations” have been very dominating in public spheres for 
science has been perceived to be the most valid way to explain the nature in a 
modern society (Latour 1993; 2004). In the course of the fieldwork I hardly 
found victim-informants who explained the incident in accordance to a 
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“mythical” interpretation. On exception was perhaps one Renokenongo villager 
I met in 2009 who interpreted that Lapindo had accidentally drilled the body of 
a sleeping serpent deep beneath the earth. According to him, the mudflow is 
the result of the angry serpent that has been awoken from its long sleep. 
According to my further inquiry, the Javanese mythology is indeed connecting 
mudflows with the existence of a giant serpent. In the following paragraphs, I 
am presenting Javanese mythology of mudflows. However, rather than to just 
reproduce and analyze them in the way of they are being structured (Lévi-
Strauss 1963), I am more interested to address how the mythology has 
influenced victims’ commemorative practices of which will be the main 
discussion afterwards. 
Two texts 
In the course of the fieldwork, I have collected two written sources telling 
about the myth of Bledug Kuwu mudflow in central Java. The first text is a 
book, entitled Asal Mula Sumber Garam Kuwu (the Origin of Salt Source in 
Kuwu; henceforth, “Asal Mula”), which I collected from the main library of the 
University of Indonesia, Depok (Sumarsih n.d.).41 The book was published by 
Ditjen Kebudayaan, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan (the Directorate 
of Culture, the Ministry of Education and Culture). The year of publication is not 
clear but since the book was part of the Proyek Pengembangan Media 
Kebudayaan (Media Development for Culture Project) I assume that it was 
published in the second half of the 1970s. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 I thank to Ahmad Faisol and Mujtaba Hamdi at the Department of Anthropology, University 
of Indonesia for helping me to collect the book. 
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I was aware of the existence of the book from Denys Lombard’s article, Le 
Campa vu du sud (Lombard 1987). In two footnotes of the article, Lombard 
mentions briefly the existence of “a salt source,” which is apparently the well-
known Bledug Kuwu in Kuwu district, Grobogan Regency. According to a 
colonial record, the salt from the mudflow has been very famous for the 
consumption of the Surakarta Palace (Goad 1817) and until the first half of the 
twentieth century there was massive salt production in some mudflows in 
Grobogan (Brown 1984). However, the salt production from these mudflows 
have been declining drastically as of the national politic changed rapidly in the 
aftermath of the 1965 coup in Indonesia (Haryatno 2012). 
A second text, a photocopied book I collected from the caretaker of 
Bledug Kuwu in the course of a fieldtrip to the mudflow in June 2013.42 The 
book entitled Legenda Terjadinya Bledug Kuwu (The Legend of Bledug Kuwu; 
henceforth, “Legenda”) (Anonymous 1995). It does not indicate anything about 
any identity of the writer or the publisher and from the caretaker no valuable 
information about the originality of that material can be collected. The Legenda 
is written in a good EYD (Ejaan yang Disempurnakan, the Enhanced Indonesian 
Spelling System), almost no typo or misspelling and very easy to be 
understood. These facts lead to an assumption that the author must be a well 
educated, if not a schoolteacher. Although the identity of the writer and the 
authenticity of the content are in vague, the book is somehow very problematic 
as to it has been distributed to the visitors of Bledug Kuwu and therefore it has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 The fieldtrip to Bledug Kuwu (and Bledug Kesanga) was part of Walhi Jatim (Friends of Earth, 
East Java) “Bengawan Solo Expedition” in June 2013. I would thank to all participants for this 
valuable expedition. 
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a very specific function: to provide people with cultural narratives about the 
origin of the mudflow. 
Aji Saka, the savior of Java 
Relying on these sources, I learn that the Bledug Kuwu is associated with a 
mythological serpent, namely “Baruklinthing.” The serpent was the son of a 
Javanese legendary figure, Aji Saka, and since the mythology begins with his 
story I will summarize it as follows.43 
Aji Saka (Javanese, meaning “valuable/sacred/magic pillar”) was a prince of 
India. Instead of succeeding his father as the next king, he wanted to 
explore the world and he began an adventure to the East accompanied by 
two companions, Dora and Sembada. They arrived first in Champa where 
Aji Saka married a princess. After the wedding, the three continued their 
journey to the island of Java and left the bride in Champa. Before arriving in 
Java, they landed on an island (believed to be the Madura Island). Aji Saka 
asked Sembada to stay on the island, while he and Dora continued the 
journey to Java. He entrusted Sembada to keep his heirloom creese (keris 
pusaka) and Sembada vowed to him that he would not leave the island and 
would keep the creese with his life and give to no one else, except Aji Saka 
himself. 
Aji Saka and Dora continued the journey and landed on Java. At that time, 
Java was ruled by a kingdom, namely Medang Kamulan (Javanese, 
meaning “the confined outset”). Before arriving at the palace of Medang 
Kamulan, Aji Saka overnighted in a peasant’s house. From the peasant he 
learnt that the people of Medang Kamulan were living in unhappy because 
their notorious king Dewata Cengkar (Javanese, meaning “without 
understanding of God”) loved to eat human flesh. It was by coincidence the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 The legend presented here is reproduced by tailoring both sources (Asal Mula and Legenda). 
I am very aware of the existence of other versions of the legend of Aji Saka. However, I noticed 
that the structure of the legend would not be much different. 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
      247 
king began to like eating human flesh. One day the palace chef cut and 
cooked his little finger. The king eventually ate it and he liked it. Since that 
day, the king was addicted to human flesh. Every day since, the troops 
were ordered to search for people to be served to the king. The peasant 
told Aji Saka that on the next day the troops would take his daughter as the 
king’s next meal. He told the peasant not to worry because he would 
replace the daughter’s position and promised that he would end the cruelty 
of the king. 
The next morning, when the troops came to the house to take the 
peasant’s daughter, Aji Saka offered himself to be taken by them. He was 
brought to the palace. When he met the king, Aji Saka asked a reward 
from the king a piece of land as wide as his headband. The land should be 
given to the peasant and he demanded the king’s promise to no longer 
disturb the family. The king agreed. Aji Saka, then, stood in the palace front 
yard, held one side of his headband and Dewata Cengkar held the other 
side of the headband starting to measure the length of the headband 
himself. Surprisingly, the headband was longer than anyone ever expected, 
especially Dewata Cengkar. The headband continued to extend until the 
Southern Ocean. Dewata Cengkar was shocked. He fell and drowned to 
the sea and instantly transformed into a white crocodile. Knowing that Aji 
Saka has defeated their king, the people of Medang Kamulan were very 
happy. They crowned him as their new king replacing Dewata Cengkar. 
After the coronation, Aji Saka recalled that he left his heirloom creese with 
Sembada. He sent Dora to pick up Sembada along with the creese to 
Medang Kamulan. Dora vowed to Aji Saka that he would not return to 
Medang Kamulan without bringing Sembada and the creese. Dora went to 
find Sembada and the two were reunited. Dora told Sembada everything 
that had happened with Aji Saka in Java and the intention of his coming. 
Unexpectedly, Sembada refused to leave the island either to give the 
creese to Dora. He insisted that he must keep his vow to Aji Saka: to guard 
the creese with his life and give it to no one except Aji Saka himself. Only 
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Aji Saka himself could undo the vow. Dora, on the contrary, insisted that he 
had made a vow that he would not return without bringing Sembada and 
the creese. Shortly, there was a quarrel between the two. The quarrel then 
turned into a physical fight. Because they both were equally strong, they 
died concurrently. 
Aji Saka realizing belatedly of Sembada’s vow tried to catch up with Dora. 
However, he was too late and found both of his companions died in a 
fierce battle in order to keep their vows to him. To commemorate his two 
loyal companions, Aji Saka wrote a story out of twenty letters: 
h n c r k d t s w l 
(ha na ca ra ka da ta sa wa la) 
(“This is a story of two loyal companions”)  
p q j y z m g b v x 
(pa da ja ya nya; ma ga ba tha nga) 
(“They were equally strong and robust; and died concurrently”)  
 
The narrative structure of Aji Saka legend is a different from the Javanese 
mythology of rice goddess, Dewi Sri (see 2.4). Whereas the myth of Dewi Sri is 
associated with the origin of agricultural lives, the legend of Aji Saka is more 
likely referring to the origin of political order in Java (cf. Pigeaud 1967, 153–
154) as well as the advent of Islam and the rise of Islamic court in Java 
(Ricklefs 2001, 13–14). Therefore, whereas Dewi Sri guides the relation 
between humans and nature, Aji Saka gives directions of how humans 
interrelate each other. The legend emphasizes the important role of a 
newcomer, foreigner to the Javanese since Aji Saka is not only a person who 
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defeats the notorious Dewata Cengkar, but rather a messiah who saves the 
people from the evil king (Priest 1995). 
Many scholars have argued that Aji Saka is to be more a fictional rather 
than a historical figure (e.g., Lombard 1987; Ricklefs 2001). The Aji Saka 
mythology and its variants were written in the early development of Islamic 
courts in Java (Pigeaud 1967) and they tell specifically about the civilizing of 
Java, e.g., the introduction of literacy (Lombard 1987) and religion (Ricklefs 
2001) into the Javanese. The “Aji Saka alphabet” is indeed one of many 
evidence of Indianization of Java for it is a simplified form of Sanskrit and was 
invented after the Kawi (Old Javanese) alphabet (Robson 2011). Currently, the 
Javanese recognize these twenty letters as Aksara Jawa (the Javanese 
alphabets). In some cities in central Java, such as Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
(Solo), people can find these alphabets on street name signs, in addition to the 
Latin alphabets. Indeed, in many elementary schools in the central and east 
Java, in which writing using these alphabets is one competence for the pupils 
to master, the legend of Aji Saka is very popular. Before teaching the pupils 
how to write using the alphabet, teachers would tell the legend of the invention 
of the alphabets they about to learn and the meaning behind them.44 However, 
it is perhaps due to the reproduction of the story has been focusing only on the 
advent of Aji Saka as the savior of Java by defeating the notorious king Dewata 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 The legend of Aji Saka is not the only story about the origin of the Javanese alphabet. There 
is, for instance, the legend of Empu Sangkaadi, who embraced Islam and became a 
companion of the Prophet Mohammad. Empu Sangkaadi was the one who introduced the 
alphabets as well as Islam to the Javanese (Robson 2011). East Javanese scholar Ayu Sutarto 
also mentions some other legends about the origin and meaning of the alphabets circulating in 
East Java, yet the structure of those narratives is quite similar the introduction of the alphabets 
and Islam (Sutarto 2006). 
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Cengkar until the invention of the Javanese alphabets, not many Javanese 
would ever heard the story of Aji Saka’s son, Naga Baruklinthing. 
Naga Baruklinthing 
Relying on my reading of both Asal Mula and Legenda, I noted an 
ambiguity about the origin of Naga Baruklinthing (naga, Javanese meaning 
“serpent”; baruklinthing, Javanese meaning “newly-flaked”). In Asal Mula, it is 
told that Baruklinthing was born from the peasant’s daughter whose home was 
overnighted by Aji Saka during the journey to the Medang Kamulan palace. It is 
divulged on the night Aji Saka stayed she borrowed his knife, which accidently 
fell on her lap, and this made her pregnant with a serpent. Differently, Legenda 
tells that Baruklinthing was originated from an egg of a rooster after it drunk Aji 
Saka’s urine. It is also told that both Aji Saka and the girl, namely Rara 
Cangkek, had a feeling for each other but none of them ever expressed the 
feeling. After the troops took Aji Saka to the palace to replace her position as 
the king’s meal, she found the egg, kept it and hatched it in a rice barn. She 
was surprised to find a serpent in the barn she hatched the egg. Instead of 
disposing it, she brought it up as her own child and named it Baruklinthing. 
Baruklinthing is however the main figure in the legend of Bledug Kuwu in 
both Asal Mula and Legenda. The legend can be summarized as follows:45 
One day, Baruklinthing came to the Medang Kamulan palace with a strong 
intention to meet the king, Aji Saka. He wanted to ask for recognition as 
the king’s child. Aji Saka was surprised to know that he had a child of a 
serpent. However, he did not necessarily reject the request. On the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 The story reproduced here is tailored from Asal Mula and Legenda. 
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contrary, he would admit Baruklinthing as his son only if Baruklinthing could 
kill the white crocodile of the Southern Ocean, of which was the incarnation 
of his mortal enemy, Dewata Cengkar. Baruklinthing has to cut the 
crocodile’s head and bring it back to Medang Kamulan. 
Inwardly, Aji Saka assumed that the task was impossible for Baruklinthing 
to accomplish. He was pretty sure that Baruklinthing would not be able to 
kill the crocodile. Instead, he expected the opposite that the crocodile 
would defeat and kill Baruklinthing. In other word, the task to kill the 
crocodile is a subtle way for him to reject Baruklinthing from becoming his 
son and so that he can be free from the shame of having a child of a 
serpent. Baruklinthing accepted the challenge and began his underground 
journey to the Southern Ocean to battle the white crocodile of Dewata 
Cengkar. The battle took days, weeks. Unexpectedly, Baruklinthing 
succeeded in killing the crocodile and aimed to return to Medang Kamulan 
with bringing its head.  
Baruklinthing, who were traveling underground in fatigue after having a long 
battle against Dewata Cengkar, had to surface for several times to take a 
rest. The spots where Baruklinthing surfaced turned into bledugs (mud 
eruptions).46 Up at a time when Baruklinthing was so tired, he surfaced in 
the Kuwu region and transformed into an ugly boy. An old man tried to help 
and asked for his name but he could not remember anything else except 
that he was in a journey to Medang Kamulan to meet Aji Saka. The old 
man, then, named him Jaka Linglung (Javanese, meaning “dazed man”). 
After resting for a while, Linglung transformed again into his original serpent 
form and entered the spot to continue the journey. The spot in where 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 In some other Javanese literatures they are mentioning the existence of Naga Linglung or 
Baruklinthing as a key figure for the origin of some other lakes in Java (see Pigeaud 1968, 62, 
481, 484, 506). A similar plot of a girl impregnation with a serpent after she accidentally 
dropped a knife into her lap, for instance, is in evidence in the structure of the legend of Lake 
Grati in Pasuruan and of Lake Ngebel in Ponorogo—both lakes are located in east Java. In 
these areas, the name of the legendary serpent is also Baruklinthing. Notably, there is one 
folktale of a serpent which was transformed into an ugly boy, who was named Baruklinthing, 
and created the lake of Rawa Pening in Ambarawa, central Java (Pigeaud 1968, 358). 
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Baruklinthing surfaced and transformed into Jaka Linglung is now known 
as the Bledug Kuwu. 
 
Asal Mula ends with the story of Baruklinthing realizing that the task to kill 
the white crocodile of Dewata Cengkar was just a ploy to get rid of him. 
Therefore, instead of continuing his journey to Medang Kamulan, he went to 
other place and vanished. Legenda, contrariwise, has a different, longer plot 
for the ending of the legend. 
After transforming back to the original form, a serpent, Baruklinthing 
continued the journey to the Medang Kamulan palace to meet Aji Saka. 
The king finally admitted Baruklinthing as his son and permitted him 
residing the palace. Yet, Baruklinthing found himself uncomfortable with 
royal life, especially with the food. He began to eat some domestic pets in 
the palace one by one. Knowing this, the palace guards reported to Aji 
Saka about this uncanny habit of Baruklinthing. The king was very angry 
and sent Baruklinthing in an exile at the Kesanga Forest as the punishment. 
In addition to the exile, Baruklinthing should never hunt for his meals and 
only eat the food which was voluntarily given to him. 
The condition went on for some time. Up to one day, a group of ten boys 
was playing around the forest and had to find a cave to shelter from a 
sudden heavy rain. Nine of the ten boys ensconced in the cave and 
forbade a boy from entering the cave because his body’s odor. After the 
rain stopped, the boy, who stayed outside the cave, could not find his 
friends. Instead, he discovered a giant serpent with a bloodied mouth. It 
turned out that the cave was the mouth of Baruklinthing and the other boys 
who sheltered from the rain were eaten by it. The boy ran home bringing 
this bad news to the villagers. 
The villagers, then, reported the incident to their king, Aji Saka. The king 
was getting angrier with Baruklinthing. This time, he told the mother Rara 
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Cangkek to punish the serpent herself. With the help from her father, 
Cangkek, who was very fond of it, nailed it to the ground with pegs along 
his body from head to tail so that he could not move. Baruklinthing finally 
died in that forest and in the place where he died there is another bledug, 
which is currently called Bledug Kesanga (Javanese, meaning “the ninth 
eruption”). 
 
It seems to me that Legenda does not aim to merely describe the origin of 
Bledug Kuwu, but rather to promote some other mudflows in Grobogan, 
especially Bledug Kesanga, to tourists visiting the popular Bledug Kuwu. This 
strong intention is very visible in the endnote of Legenda, of which reads, 
“visitors who have witnessed Bledug Kuwu would be incomplete without 
visiting the earth of Kesanga.” 
Bledug Kesanga is located c. 15 km eastern of Bledug Kuwu. Its crater 
occupies an area of c. 200 ha (for comparators, Bledug Kuwu is c. 50 ha and 
the artificial mud lake in Porong spreads out an area of more than 800 ha). It is 
located up on a hill and inaccessible to a four-wheel vehicle. One has to walk 
more than an hour from the nearest hamlet. A wide, dry savanna surrounds it 
and one hardly finds wet paddies nearby (Fig.  5.2). Instead of showing highly, 
massive mud eruptions, Bledug Kesanga shows a similar characteristic with 
Kalang Anyar mudflow in Sedati, Sidoarjo (see 2.4) with only small streams of 
mud flowing from several spots and unclear where the main vent is. 
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Fig.  5.1 Bledug Kuwu (Photo courtesy of Lutfi Amiruddin, 2013) 
 
 
Fig.  5.2 Bledug Kesanga (Photo courtesy of Lutfi Amiruddin, 2013) 
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Javanese mudflows 
Apart from the problem with the fictional figure of Aji Saka, historians have 
long debated about the existence of the Medang Kamulan Kingdom owing to 
the lack of historical and archaeological evidence (Soekmono 1958; 1967; 
Rahardjo 2011). Whereas some historians and archaeologists say that the 
kingdom is nothing but a fictional estate, laypeople believe that it had been 
there. But, instead of addressing the debate, I am more interested in focusing 
on how Javanese mythology of mudflows are structured and how the structure 
of the mythology might cohere with the process of constructing collective 
memories of the victims of the newborn in Porong. 
The main idea of the Aji Saka legend is the role of a newcomer, foreigner to 
civilize, educate people in Java—not to conquer, as the colonizers to their 
colonies. The legend is part of a broader Javanese mythology regarding the 
advent of Islam and the rise of Islamic court in Java. Therefore, the narrative 
structure of the legend complies with the structure of the mythology, of which 
contains three prominent points: 1) the early preachers were foreigners; 2) in 
due course they performed some magical events; and 3) the conversion to 
Islam started from with the court centers (Ricklefs 2001, 13–14). As we can 
see, all these themes are in evidence in the structure of the legend of Aji Saka. 
It is told that Aji Saka was a foreigner traveling to Java, he had performed 
some magical events (killing the notorious king with his headband), and he 
became a king first before starting the teaching. Christian theologian Douglas 
Priest, intriguingly, compares the legend with the Christian Holy Bible and 
argues that the Aji Saka figure is an indication of the idea of messianism in 
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Javanese culture (Priest 1995). The structure of the mythologies—the advent of 
Aji Saka to salvage the people from their notorious political regimes—complies 
perfectly with the idea of the advent of Christ to salvage the world (Priest 1995, 
238–240). Of course, comparing Aji Saka with Christ is very problematic, yet 
the logic of a messiah, a savior to come and salvage the people has been the 
main structure of both the legend and the Bible. Both figures were playing vital 
role in bringing their people to a more “civilized stage” of human life. 
The legend of Bledug Kuwu is an unequivocal interpretation that mudflows 
are not entirely natural. It can be interpreted from the existence of a chthonic 
being, a male serpent of Baruklinthing, throughout the legend. According to 
Dutch anthropologist Robert Wessing, in Southeast Asia a serpent symbolizes 
the impureness of being (Wessing 2006). It is usually a creature of which form 
is a hybrid, a mixture of human and snake. It is imperfect in being either human 
or snake, but it can live in two different worlds, the underworld and the earth. 
Perhaps, the most popular serpent in Javanese literatures is Nyai Rara Kidul, 
who has been discussed widely by various scholars (e.g., Jordaan 1984; 
Wessing and Jordaan 1997; Wessing 2007). Nyai Rara Kidul is a female 
serpent, the queen of the Southern Ocean, and perhaps has been the most 
important and sacred being in Javanese mythology. It is told that the kings of 
Islamic courts in Java are considered by way of married to this female serpent 
so that they could gain the power over their subjects. 
Contrariwise, the legend of Bledug Kuwu mentions the existence of a male 
serpent, the unwanted child of the king. Whereas most female serpents are 
perceived as the genesis of live (see Wessing 2006; 2007), Baruklinthing is 
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perceived as the source of misfortunes or even deaths. There are some 
Javanese mythologies mentioning the relation of Nyai Rara Kidul and Naga 
Baruklinthing/Linglung. In one myth, it is told that Nyai Rara Kidul has a suitor 
of a serpent too, namely Naga Linglung. In Serat Kanda, a version of Babad 
Tanah Jawi, it is told that after he defeated the white crocodile, Naga 
Linglung/Baruklinthing married to Retna Blorong, Nyai Rara Kidul’s daughter. 
Only after that, he began his return journey to Medang Kamulan, in due course 
he popped up and made some lakes (Pigeaud 1968, 484). 
By saying that mudflows (or any other environmental features) are 
originated from a serpent, it could be interpreted that both humans and the 
nature have contributed significantly in triggering these features. In other word, 
the cause of mudflows is never entirely natural for humans, or at least 
humanlike creatures, contribute to such phenomena to exist. In the Javanese 
culture, this idea does not only work for mudflows but also other environmental 
features, such as mountains, lakes, rivers, straits, and many more. It seems to 
me that the Javanese always perceived their environments in a context that 
their existence and dynamics are never detached from human activities. Up at 
this point, I am quite amazed by the fact that I could not find any scientific, 
modern explanation presented in a geologic paper proposing the possibility of 
the newborn mudflow in Porong as hybrid, as per one result of the conference 
in Cape Town, in October 2008. The dispute of the geologists over the 
mudflow in scientific forums has been circulating around whether the mudflow 
was triggered entirely by human (drilling) or purely by natural (earthquake) (see 
4.5). None is continuing to seek for the possibility of a “hybrid” mudflow, that is 
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to say that the mudflow is resulted from the combination of both the drilling 
and the earthquake. 
5.5. Expecting the coming of a savior 
The legend of Baruklinthing is structured in a plot of a boy searching for 
recognition from his father the king, which parallels the legend of Arya Damar 
shared around the Kalang Anyar mudflow in Sedati, Sidoarjo (see 2.4). 
Apparently, the noble king does not really expect to have a child from a non-
royal member. He sought to get rid of the child in a subtle way by giving him a 
dangerous task. He assumes that the task is too difficult for the child to 
accomplish. Surprisingly, the child successfully consummates the task. From 
here, the storyline is running to different directions. One version of the story 
ends with a late cognizance of the child realizing that his father, the king, does 
not want him and the child deliberately chooses to vanish, as in the case of 
Arya Damar, and Baruklinthing in Asal Mula. Another storyline continues with 
the king’s recognition of this imperfect being as his child, as in the case of 
Baruklinthing in Legenda. Nonetheless, living in accordance to a royal life is a 
very different experience for the child and therefore he violates some 
principles. The king, without hesitation, gives punishment for those who 
dishonor the regulations, even if that person is his own child. 
The symbol of a serpent appeared in Porong in the course of the four-year 
commemoration of the mudflow in 2010. That year the victims made three 
giant puppets made from bamboos and papers: an effigy of Aburizal’s head, 
Lapindo octopus (symbolizing the complexity of Lapindo’s networks) and a red 
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serpent (the guardian of the underworld). Along the body of the serpent, there 
was writing: “Prosecute Lapindo, criminal against humanity and environment. 
Lapindo victims, unite, to end this struggle.” On May 29, 2010, the victims 
paraded those puppets. It was theatrically performed the serpent attacked 
“Lapindo” and “Aburizal Bakrie” and escorted them into the mud lake. 
In Indonesia, environmental hazards have become distinct discursive fields 
for the citizens to criticize the government (Lapian 1987; Schlehe 2009) of 
which is also happening in the course of the mudflow in Porong. Disaster 
victims believe that Lapindo’s drilling is the main cause of the mudflow 
eruption. The more Lapindo denies it and the more the government is trying to 
shield Lapindo, the more people believe that there was something wrong with 
the drilling. The main concern is no longer with the mudflow as a catastrophic 
environmental feature, but rather the vagueness of the government in 
upholding the justice and the imbecility of Lapindo spreading the lie to the 
publics.  
The theatrical performance of the four-year anniversary signs how disaster 
victims were adjuring a decisive ruler, the government, to come and solve the 
mess that Lapindo has made. This did not mean that the victims succumbed to 
the situation. They had been trying as tough as possible in bargaining with 
Lapindo, but instead of showing a good will in resolving the victims’ sufferings 
it has been trying to ignore them. They, then, need a more powerful figure, in 
this case the government dealing with the company in order to end the perils. 
But, as I already presented in previous chapters, to expect the government 
standing in the position against the company is something impossible. One key 
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reason has been the fact that both institutions have a common interest in 
protecting their positions from any legal consequences that may occur if the 
mudflow is proven caused by industrial accidents. 
The idea of expecting and waiting for the government or other powerful 
figures to resolve victims’ problems does not suit to their real conditions. The 
victims are therefore searching for other cultural narratives, which may fit to 
explain what is happening with them. 
5.6. The evil spirit of “Aburizal Bakrie” 
In Indonesia, there is a typical view that interprets environmental disasters 
as not merely natural but rather cultural. The idea is to view natural hazards as 
the result of individual or collective misconducts (Lapian 1987). A recent study 
of the cultural interpretation toward volcanic eruptions of Mount Merapi in 
Central Java discovered that some people interpreted the hazards as the 
outcome of the power abuse of their rulers, either in local or national level 
(Schlehe 2009). Environmental hazards occur to balance the disharmonious 
relationship between human and nature and among humans. Thus, natural 
hazards are interpreted to be cultural in the sense that they are the result of 
some inappropriate manners of some humans to other humans/non-humans 
(Schlehe 2009, 277).  
In particular, the East Javanese view misfortunes, including natural hazards 
as a result of evil spirits possessing the communities (Wessing 2010). Such an 
understanding relies on a principle that human bodies are understood as 
containers for spirits. “The problem,” Wessing observes, “is that these 
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containers are thought to be porous, allowing spirits and other influences to 
move in and out, and leaving the person involved open to a loss of personal 
spirit or to possession, the invasion of the body by an alien spirit” (Wessing 
2010, 53). To prevent the original spirits from coming out of the bodies and 
therefore alien spirits would not be able to come in to the bodies some rituals 
should be performed. The main idea is to protect the human bodies and the 
spirits that dwell in them. In East Java, if a misfortune had happened there are 
other rituals to cast out these alien spirits and restore the original spirits back 
to their bodies. These rituals are called ruwatan (exorcism) and it has been 
manifested in the 2012 and 2013 commemorations of the mudflow. Yet, this 
idea would not appear if an idea of an alien spirit has plagued the society has 
never existed before. 
This idea complies with what the mudflow victims believe; in their case, the 
misbehaved actor in the course of the mudflow is Aburizal Bakrie. As 
discussed in other chapters, at the time of the mudflow erupted Aburizal was 
acting simultaneously as an active minister at the cabinet and at once is the 
leading figure of Lapindo’s parent company, the Bakries. Currently, Aburizal is 
chairperson of Golkar Party and this position has become critical for him 
because the victims frame him not only as the “bad guy” but even more as the 
“evil spirit” possessing both the society and the government. Within this 
context, Aburizal has been the main target of mudflow victims’ angriness in the 
course of various commemorative practices. 
Among many, I found that the most noticeable commemorative media to 
permeate the idea of Aburizal Bakrie as an evil spirit were wayang karduses 
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which literally means “cardboard puppets,” yet they were actually more likely 
paintings, sometimes sentences were added, on the media of used-cardboard 
(kardus). The paintings functioned both as banners for the parade of disaster 
commemorations. They served as the media for victims expressing their 
concerns about the disaster of which sometimes contradicting with and 
challenging the official statements from the government or the company. But 
what is the most important for this study is the fact that these paintings 
represent how the victims interpret the disaster they experience. 
Cardboard paintings 
Some paintings were representing victims’ imaginations colored with 
emotions, feelings and interpretations about the disaster and the impacts on 
their village, their lives and their future. Some paintings depict the impacts of 
the mudflow on the environment, such as fishes in the river, plants, paddy 
fields, houses, and many more. That disaster brings nothing but destruction 
appears to be one key theme of many paintings. It is a common for disaster 
victims delivering the message of obliterations in the disaster aftermath. 
However, what is more interested for this study to argue is the fact that the 
mudflow victims are seeing what happens to them less as an environmental 
disaster than as a political tragedy. 
The theme of political tragedy appears in some paintings. One painting, for 
instance, illustrates the sinking of the Garuda (the emblem of Indonesia) into 
the mud lake. The Garuda was not sinking because of environmental cause 
(the mudflow) but rather “greediness” (karna keserakahan) (Fig.  5.3). It tries to 
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relate the disaster to a larger issue of nationalism. The impacts of the mudflow 
not only threaten the people and the environment of Porong but also reach out 
to the nation.  
 
 
Fig.  5.3 The sink of Garuda into the mud (Photo courtesy of Anton Novenanto, 2012) 
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Fig.  5.4 The mud destroyed my village (Photo courtesy of Baswara Yua, 2013) !
 
Fig.  5.5 The Bakries and mudflow (Photo courtesy of Anton Novenanto, 2012) 
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Still related to the political tragedy, there are other paintings framing 
development and a corrupt government as the source of their crises. One 
remarkable example is one painting of the symbol of development, excavator 
destroying the village, and a sentence “My village is destroyed by mud.” The 
scene shows the ambiguity whether the village was destroyed by the mudflow, 
by the excavator (development) or by both factors (Fig.  5.4). Another painting 
was full of sentences attempting to explain a collusive relation between the 
Bakries and the government in the course of the disaster (Fig.  5.5). The 
sentences themselves can be divided into two sections. The first section is 
describing the mudflow impact to the societies in Porong and the second 
section is responding to the government decision to use the state budget to 
recompense the damages resulted from the mudflow, instead of obliging 
Lapindo to do so. What is more, they accuse the Bakries for stealing the 
treasure trove of their homeland. 
From these paintings, the victims are attempting to articulate how they 
identify themselves as victims of an environmental hazard (the mudflow) and of 
a corrupted politics. They perceive themselves as the politically oppressed and 
therefore they want to be free from such a situation. The idea, which has been 
vastly growing, exists in collective memories of the victims. To identify the 
mudflow as a political tragedy has been a focal discourse shaped the victims 
and articulated in some paintings. As of the court decided for the release of all 
lawsuits against Lapindo and awkwardly declared the mudflow as “natural 
disaster,” an understanding of a corrupt trial on the Lapindo case has 
developed among the victims. It was clearly shown in one painting with a 
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reading: “When the victims of Lapindo seeking for justice, the law and justice 
have been purchased.” It seems to me that disaster victims have a special 
concern to the issue of corruption, marked the existence of rats as the symbol 
of corruption in some paintings. One painting vulgarly illustrates the parliament 
building as the rats’ nest, while other painting pictures the rats are playing on 
the Indonesian national flag. There are other paintings designating the 
existence of corruption in the country, especially in the Indonesian parliament. 
Another painting depicts rats eating the Garuda of which scene tries to tell us 
that corruption is a serious threat to nationalism. 
The theme of corruption in relation to the Lapindo case has become clearer 
in some other paintings, which are illustrating a corrupt figure of Aburizal 
Bakrie. Sometimes it is written only as “Bakrie,” but some paintings use “ARB,” 
the acronym for Abu Rizal Bakrie, which is a rather new term to replace 
Aburizal’s original nickname “Ical” for the purpose of his presidential candidate 
for the 2014 election since in Javanese ical means “gone” or “missing” and this 
kind of meaning is perceived to be unfavorable for his popularity among the 
Javanese voters. I noted some mudflow victims spoofed the acronym into Aku 
Raja Bohong (I’m the king of lies) or Asal Ra Bakrie (as long as not Bakrie [is 
the president]) in some paintings. One painting, for example, portrayed a rat 
with the head of Aburizal, to say bluntly that Aburizal is a corruptor. The 
painting came with a reading, ARB rakus, hidup rakyat hangus (ARB’s 
greediness, people’s live burned). Another painting of “piggy bank” came with 
a reading: Bakrie babi nyolong duite rakyat (Bakrie pig has stolen money from 
the people). 
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From these paintings, one could instantly sense the rage of the victims 
against one figure only, Aburizal Bakrie. Even more, Aburizal’s plan to run for a 
president candidate has been one main subject in some other paintings, with 
which the victims were addressing a serious moral question owing to the fact 
that one of his company, Lapindo, has yet to complete its obligation to many 
victims (chapter 2) and is trying to escape from all the problems of the 
mudflow. Consequently, according to them, Aburizal is dreamy to be the next 
Indonesian president. I noticed that some paintings came with satirical 
readings: Awas, jangan pilih aku karena Aku Raja Bohong (Beware, don’t 
choose me because I’m the king of lies), Pilih aku, pasti tertipu (Vote me [and 
you will be] fooled), or Raimu kakean dosa, ora iso dadi presiden (Your look is 
full of sins [and therefore you] could not be a president). 
That Aburizal is the main target for the mudflow victims’ angriness is clearly 
visible in many of the paintings, however I noticed one painting to be the most 
sarcastic among others. It depicts the head of Aburizal is stabbed with a knife 
from his left forehead to his right cheek (Fig.  5.6). It includes two lines written 
in Arabic. The top line reads: 
	


(Aburizal Bakrie mautuhū khairun min ḥayātihī) 
And the bottom line reads: 
 

(khairu ʾn-nāsi ʾanfaʿuhum li ʾn-nās) 
 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
  !268 
The first sentence can be translate as “Aburizal Bakrie’s death is better than 
his life” and the latter, which was quoted from one hadith of the Prophet 
Muhammad, “a good person is the most beneficial for others.”47 
 
 
Fig.  5.6 Aburizal’s death is better than his life (Photo courtesy of Anton Novenanto, 2012) 
 
Reclaiming Timun Mas 
According to Cak Irsyad, the founder and leader of Sanggar Alfaz, the 
painting symbolizes that the rage of the victims to Aburizal has reached to “the 
god level” (marah tingkat dewa) (personal communication, May 27, 2012). The 
idea of the victims identifying themselves as the angry gods has allowed them 
to act as if they were the gods and for this reason they think they can do !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 I am indebted to Munir Ikhwan for the translation and transliteration of these sentences. 
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anything. And, as to them there has been no beneficial of the live of Aburizal, it 
is better for them to take his live rather than to let him live and torment more 
people. Such an idea complies with the structure of the Timun Mas folktale, 
especially in the fragment of the notorious ogre is eventually killed by the 
oppressed peasant. As discussed earlier in 5.3, the appearance of Timun Mas 
folktale as a tool to interpret the mudflow has brought a new hope to the 
victims as for the folktale is telling about how an oppressed peasant facing an 
profiteering economic system. The folktale symbolizes the system as a green 
ogre (Buto Ijo) and as the ending it drown into an artificial mud lake and died. 
In a section above, I have briefly discussed how the folktale can be related to 
the production of knowledge about the mudflow. In the following paragraph, I 
intend to address how the meaning of the folktale has changed drastically to 
become one propounding statement for the victims to commemorate the 
mudflow as an anthropogenic disaster. 
In October 2012, I involved in an intensive email-based discussion with 
some activists in planning the seven-year commemoration of the eruption in 
May 2013. Apparently, the discussion had been running before one of the 
discussant invited me to participate in it. At that time, the activists proposed a 
very nice, rich theme, which was “underground memories” (memori bawah 
tanah). The idea was in the seven-year commemoration would be a moment for 
the victims to present their memories about their submerged homes and their 
struggles in coping with social and ecological crises resulted from the 
mudflow. Meddling in that warm discussion, I proposed an idea to reproduce 
the Timun Mas folktale into a theatrical performance in the commemoration. I 
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argue that the main idea of the folktale is not a story of natural disaster 
(mudflow) but it had become an effective means of the camp. Based on such 
an understanding, I argue in the discussion, there should be an effort to 
deconstruct the structure of narrative of the folktale. Unfortunately, the idea 
received a resistance from one activist who tried to remind me that, by any 
means, the publics would interpret the reproduction of the folktale as a support 
to the natural disaster claim. I felt that at the time there was a strong public 
opinion that instead of power-free the folktale has been politicized; yet, it 
belongs only to the natural disaster camp. However, from time to time, I 
observed that there has been a changing viewpoint of the activists in defining 
and positioning the folktale in the incident. 
According to a local environmentalist-cum-journalist Henri Nurcahyo, there 
are many variants of the Timun Mas folktale circulating in Java and not all 
mentioning about a mudflow or mud lake (Nurcahyo 2014). Yet, their narrative 
structure is similar, there are other versions of the death of the ogre, such as 
drowned into the sea (from the salt) or tripped over a rock. By this, Nurcahyo 
wanted to say that the using of the folktale to claim natural disaster over the 
newborn mudflow in Porong is nothing but a manipulation of, if not an insult to, 
the Javanese culture. And this sort of thing, according to him, should not be 
continuing and for this reason he wrote and published a book entitled 
Rekayasa Dongeng dalam Bencana Lumpur Lapindo (Engineering Folktale in 
the Lapindo Mudflow Disaster). The main argument proposed in the book, 
which he has been struggling since 2011, is how the folktale is being used in 
power struggles over the Lapindo case to claim that the mudflow is just a mere 
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natural phenomena. He is referring to Awang Harun Satyana (see 5.3) and such 
an effort, according to him, was a misnomer for it was done by a geologist, 
who ideally should construct arguments based on scientific data, instead of 
fairy tales. 
The book focuses not on the search for the truth behind the folktale but 
rather on how it serves as a discourse. To Nurcahyo, every folktale contains a 
moral story that can be extracted by searching for meanings of each appeared 
symbol. According to him, the Timun Mas folktale is a story of the relation 
between the state (represented by the ogre) and the citizens (represented by 
Timun Mas and her foster mother) (Nurcahyo 2014, 43–47).48 There are two 
messages to be delivered from the folktale. First, it is a message to the 
government to not too arbitrary in dealing with the citizens. A second message 
is to the citizens for not easily giving up to severe conditions. 
Apart from the content, the book suggests culture as another discursive 
field for power competitions of the mudflow disaster. It begins with an effort of 
a geologist using a cultural feature, i.e., folktale, as a tool to promote the 
natural disaster claim. Nurcahyo proposes a way to reconstruct, or to be more 
precisely to deconstruct, meanings given to the folktale as a justification of the 
claim. He argues that the folktale is not a property of the natural disaster camp 
and therefore suggests that it can be utilized by anyone, especially disaster 
victims in interpreting the mudflow. It is clearly written in the dedication page of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Slightly different, Nilawaty interprets the relationship between Timun Mas and Buto Ijo by 
analogy with the unequal power relation between the mudflow children victims and Lapindo 
(Nilawaty 2012). 
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the book: “Dedicated for ‘the Timun Mas,’ who are always in patience until ‘the 
Ogre’ [will] drown in the sea of mud.”49 
In the course of the fieldwork, I noted how victims reclaiming the folktale as 
their tool to be resistant to the natural disaster camp. What is more, the folktale 
clearly illustrates the dead of a notorious ogre drowned into an artificial mud 
lake and the illustration matches perfectly with the idea to cleanse the 
community of the alien, evil spirit. And it was the reason of the victims made an 
effigy of Aburizal Bakrie to commemorate the mudflow and the occurring 
disaster as a medium of the exorcism. This brings us back to the description of 
the procession of drowning Aburizal in effigy presented at the outset of this 
study (see 1.1). 
An effigy of Aburizal Bakrie 
In preparing the seven-year anniversary of the eruption, the victims came 
out with an idea to make an ogoh-ogoh (the local name for “effigy”) of Aburizal 
Bakrie for the commemorative performance. The ogoh-ogoh was the focal 
object in the 2013 anniversary of the mudflow, in which the victims paraded 
“Aburizal Bakrie” from Porong square, alun-alun, coming through the Porong 
highway to the west side of the mud embankment. The climax of the 
commemoration was the throwing of Aburizal Bakrie in effigy into the mud 
lake. Subsequent to the procession, Irsyad started to pelt the ogoh-ogoh with 
mud, which was followed by some other victims. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 “Dipersembahkan kepada para Timun Mas yang selalu bersabar sampai dengan Raksasa 
tenggelam dalam lautan lumpur.” 
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According to Irsyad, the idea of making the effigy was inspired by a 
Balinese ritual, which is a specific theatrical performance a few days ahead of 
Nyepi (the first day of the Balinese New Year). The ritual, according to Irsyad, 
aims to cleanse the communities of evil spirits when they enter a new year. 
Nowadays, in addition to make effigies of mythological creatures (ogres or 
demons), the Balinese also creatively create some figures of the real life, which 
are deemed to be giving bad influences for the life of the communities. The 
climax of the procession is to burn down the effigies into ashes as a symbol of 
the cleansing the village of evil spirits and bad lucks. Adopting such an idea, 
the mudflow victims led by Irsyad made an effigy of Aburizal Bakrie since they 
saw him is the “evil spirit” who has brought nothing but miseries and sufferings 
to the people in Porong. They aimed to exorcize the evil spirit of Aburizal from 
the society. However, instead of burning the effigy to ashes, as the Balinese 
do, the mudflow victims drown Aburizal in effigy into the mud lake paralleling 
to what Timun Mas does to Buto Ijo.  
As we can see, the commemorative practices of drowning Aburizal in effigy 
emerge from a very discursive process—the victims felt they could no longer 
expect the presence of an assertive leader to resolve their problems with 
Lapindo, there has been a demonization of Aburizal’s figure from only a “bad 
guy” to an “evil spirit,” and simultaneously the narrative structure of the Timun 
Mas folktale gives a concrete visualization of how the evil died by drowned into 
an artificial mud lake. The narrative structure of the folktale has been 
increasingly influencing collective consciousness of the mudflow victims. 
Focusing on the sinking of the ogre into the mud lake, more victims and other 
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publics are utilizing and reproducing this idea in various commemorative 
practices of the mudflow. The victims adopted the folktale for its narrative 
structure offering hope for them and allow them to act directly—instead of 
waiting for a messiah to come, like the legend of Aji Saka and Baruklinthing 
offers. Although the narrative structure of the legend offers the same idea that 
mudflowes are not purely natural phenomena, it focuses on the role of a 
centralized power into a king, Aji Saka, which is a typical idea of power 
circulating in the Javanese culture (B. Anderson 2007). 
The idea of the advent of a messiah to salvage the Javanese is just a 
legitimization for the rising Islamic courts in Java and how the kings of these 
courts are believed to be the messiah for these people. Following such an idea, 
freedom, then, does not come from people’s struggle but rather from the 
goodwill of the rulers and this is quite the opposite of what is happening in 
Porong. The government was never standing for the mudflow victims. Instead, 
the government has been shielding Lapindo and the Bakries by reducing their 
responsibilities and excluding them from the obligations to perform disaster 
mitigation. Instead, the government is willing to take over Lapindo’s liabilities to 
deal with further damages resulted from the mudflow (see 3.5). To expect a 
political will from the government to resolve the Lapindo case is nothing but 
wasting time because, according to the victims, an evil spirit has possessed it 
and they must cast out that spirit themselves. 
In this context, the Timun Mas folktale provides a perfect narrative 
structure suggesting that ordinary people can become very powerful to face 
and defeat their oppressors if only they could get appropriate modalities to 
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fight. The concentration of the protagonist in the character of a peasant, Timun 
Mas, instead of a ruling king, such as Aji Saka, is something that evokes 
solidarities within the mudflow victims. It is like the folktale recommending the 
victims to articulate a single message: “We, victims, can solve this problem 
alone without the need to expect of a savior to come.” 
Nonetheless, the interpretation of the Timun Mas folktale has become 
uncontrollable. In the eight-year commemoration, for instance, the mudflow 
commemoration was shaped within the context of the 2014 legislative and 
presidential elections and intended as a black campaign for Golkar and 
Aburizal. The logo for the 2014 commemoration widely circulated in the 
Internet and many people (mostly victims and activists) put it as their Facebook 
or Twitter profile pictures. The logo illustrates the picture of Aburizal Bakrie 
framed by a figure of number eight and comes along with it is a reading: “It’s 
the time to drown the ogre of Lapindo mudflow” (Fig.  5.7). However, according 
to my victim-informants, the 2014 commemoration is nothing but a political 
campaign of one presidential candidate, then Indonesia’s new president (2014-
2019), Joko Widodo. The atmosphere of the year commemoration is as if Joko 
Widodo is a ratu adil (savior/messiah) to take down Aburizal from the nation’s 
political arena. This subsequent interpretation somehow contradicts to the 
previous processes of interpreting the mudflow disaster. 
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Fig.  5.7 The logo for the eight-year commemoration of the mudflow (Courtesy of Gugun 
Muhammad, 2014) 
5.7. A monument of tragedy 
Along with the making of an effigy of Aburizal Bakrie for the seven-year 
commemoration, the victims made a small monument of “Lapindo mudflow 
tragedy” and prior to the drowning of the effigy of Aburizal (on May 29, 2013) 
they erected it on the top of the embankment (Fig.  5.8). The idea of making the 
monument was something anew in the course of the Lapindo case for the most 
common practice for every commemoration has been throwing certain 
materials and objects, including the effigy, into the mud. The writing on the 
monument, which is more likely a tombstone, reads: 
Monument of Lapindo Mudflow Tragedy 
 
The Lapindo mudflow has buried our 
hamlets. 
Lapindo only gave fake promises. 
The government forsook to restore our 
lives. 
Our voice will never silence for the 
nation to not forget. 
Monumen Tragedi Lumpur Lapindo 
 
Lumpur Lapindo telah mengubur 
kampung kami. 
Lapindo hanya mengobral janji palsu. 
Negara abai memulihkan kehidupan 
kami. 
Suara kami tak pernah padam agar 
bangsa ini tidak lupa. 
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Fig.  5.8 Monument of Lapindo mudflow tragedy (Photo courtesy of Lutfi Amiruddin, 2013) 
 
A monument is not only having a function to help people to remember 
something in the past, it is also a tool to deliver some statements from the past 
to fit in the present (Hui 2009). Furthermore, it is a practice of articulating 
particular statements by freezing them and at the same time excluding some 
others (Assmann 2009). On the so-called “monument of Lapindo mudflow 
tragedy,” we can see four themes that are trying to deliver. The first is telling us 
about the impacts of the mudflow and the other three show how the producers 
of the monument frame the agencies of the Lapindo case: Lapindo is 
described as the party that has been spreading lies, the government is 
portrayed as the ignorant, and the victims is framed as the keepers of publics 
memories regarding the tragedy. The chapters that proceed have given the 
contexts of how such statements come into the monument. These statements 
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are not only intended as such by the producers of the monument, they are also 
intended to be immortal, indefinitely. I have discussed how disaster 
commemorations becoming moments for the social reassemblage of the 
victims to articulate their version of truth regarding the incident. By making and 
erecting the monument, they want to warn everyone who came and see it that 
what is happening is a tragedy in a tombstone. 
5.8. Inciting to memories, fighting for power 
The newborn mudflow in Porong, East Java has become a major 
event/process for the people in Porong. Not only that it has brought about a 
disaster to them, it also has forced them to recall their memories of the hazard 
not as a natural event but rather a political disaster and create their identity on 
the grounds those memories. Acting as the survivors and witnesses of the 
event, these victims creatively establish their agency and identity by 
recollecting their memories and articulating them through various 
commemorative practices. Indeed, their autobiographical memories have been 
rich sources for the historiography of the disaster as well as showing its 
complexities for each memory contains subjectivities of the remembering 
actors. In doing so, these victims have to manipulate those memories to win 
the battle of power over the mudflow. 
One could easily claim that the historiography constructed based on 
collective memories is just another source of ideological domination for such a 
recollection tends to select particular memories and exclude the others in 
establishing and maintaining a regime of truth governing the remembering 
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actors. However, in the course of the mudflow annual commemorations, 
disaster victims do not just only unload their autobiographical memories and 
adding different meanings to them (Halbwachs 1980) but what is the most 
important for this study is the fact that they are struggling to transform these 
abstract ideas into more concrete social performances (cf. Connerton 1989, 
22–24). Only by creating collective memories they become political actors and 
thus an influential political group in the Indonesian society to define the 
mudflow. To commemorate a disaster is therefore a battle of power to 
challenge others’ autobiographical and historical memories of the 
event/process. Such a practice, then, is not merely a psychological, individual 
process but rather a social, collective process and therefore it is a political 
process. 
Maurice Halbwachs indicates three prominent elements for maintaining 
collective memories: a group of people, a physical monument, and a social 
time (Coser 1992, 22). In the context of the mudflow disaster, there is a group 
of people (disaster victims) and there is a physical monument (the 
mudflow/mud lake) and these two elements meet in a particular social time 
(disaster anniversaries). Victims’ collective memories can function as a 
powerful force for the historiography of the incident and disaster anniversaries, 
then, are key moments for the production of knowledge about the disaster, 
especially from the victims’ viewpoint.  
“May 29” is less than a date in the astronomical calendar because it has 
become a sacred, social time within which mudflow victims can add, remove 
or change their meanings about the event/process. In the meanwhile the 
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artificial mud lake has become a physical monument which helps them to 
easily recall their collective memories about their past. Thus, it is now really 
depending on how these victims maintain that particular social time of disaster 
anniversary by constantly organizing commemorative practices on that date. 
In particular moments of disaster commemoration, disaster victims have 
the opportunity—that they may not get it in other moments—to recall some of 
their subjective experiences, incorporate some meanings and articulate them 
publicly through particular theatrical performances. These moments have 
become a prominent element for the empowerment of disaster victims by 
facilitating them expressing their identity as “victims of disaster.” However, as 
the chapter shows instead of identifying themselves as victims of 
environmental hazard there is a tendency to the creation of a more political 
cultural identity, i.e., “victims of human politics.” And this is the context that 
has been shaping the recalling of victims’ memories. 
The birth of the unnatural mudflow in Porong, East Java has become a 
landmark in the history of human-nature relationships in Java for this time the 
Javanese rabbles have an opportunity to be part of the production of 
knowledge concerning such relationships. Relying on critical readings into 
Javanese “cultural knowledges” about human-nature relationships, such are 
mainly delivering a similar message of the importance of a noble leader, a 
savior (ratu adil) in empowering the Javanese rabbles. The production of 
knowledge about such relationships has been centering on the courts since 
the Javanese believe that power is centered in some figures, mainly the kings 
of the Javanese courts (B. Anderson 2007). 
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The experience of the mudflow victims in Porong has been showing 
anomalous situation from those presented in the preexisting knowledge. The 
men in power are never standing on the side of the victims. Instead, they have 
been protecting the perpetrator of the mudflow disaster by taking over all the 
liabilities to deal with further damages resulted from the mudflow. As a result, 
to expect a political will from the men in power solving the Lapindo case is 
nothing but a wasting of time. This has somehow undermined democratic 
legitimacy of the government in favor of money and individual power. Thus, it is 
the time for the victims themselves to appear as key players to determine their 
own version of story by bringing into the present particular preexisting 
traditional narratives to support their version of truth concerning what is 
happening to them. Disaster commemorations have become discursive fields 
for the competition of power to win “the truth” over the mudflow in Porong. 
They are also prominent fields to preserve the claim of “anthropogenic 
disaster” and to counter the oppositional claim of “natural disaster.” Above all, 
they have facilitated the seemingly powerless actors, disaster victims, to 
become the subjects of power, to be an actor of the Lapindo case. 
 !
Chapter 6  | Conclusion 
6.1. Conflicting framings, different interests 
In this study, I have presented how three different actors of disaster are 
situated in ongoing, complex power relations owing to the fact that one’s 
efforts to deal with the hazard were always affecting the others’. Each actor 
maintained certain truth claims and resisted to others’ claim concerning the 
hazard, as a result of somewhat Foucault would have designated it as the “will 
to truth.” These interrelationships characterized how power was being 
practiced in the society. 
There were however many different ways and institutions of each actor to 
produce, reproduce, and articulate certain statements concerning the disaster. 
The government played a key role in producing policies and implementing 
mitigatory countermeasures to handle social and ecological damages resulted 
from the hazard. As the accused-party initiating the hazard, the company 
(Lapindo) has been one prominent actor in enlivening and reviving the battle of 
power by muddling up the social construction of reality concerning the 
disaster. The seemingly powerless disaster victims entered the battle by 
creatively recalling preexisting cultural features, establishing their own agency, 
and resisting to the official definition of the incident. In the course of the 
disaster, these actors were interrelated each others and power relations 
between them were shaped within the contexts of how every actor were trying 
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to change others’ framing of the incident. The competition escalated following 
the polarization of two dominating framings of the event: “natural disaster” and 
“industrial accident.” This study, as well as many others, has shown that in the 
course of the disaster there is a tendency of the government and the company 
working hand in hand supporting the first and the victims maintain the latter. 
And, as for the data I gathered from mutual trusts with my interlocutors and 
victim-informants, this study is intended to problematize the first and to 
address how the latter has been maintained. 
Obviously, all parties have agreed to see the mudflow in Porong, East Java 
as a disaster, yet they framed it differently. Each of the preceding chapters 
focused on how different actors maintained the discursiveness of the disaster 
resulting from the mudflow. Although the government and Lapindo promoted 
the same framing of the mudflow, they had different interests. Whereas the 
government is situated within the context of how to resume and recover the 
nation’s economy in the aftermath of the disaster, the company is more 
concerned with how to improve the image of the company and its affiliated 
individuals. Different from both actors, the victims’ interest mainly focused on 
the concern of how to punish the perpetrator of this catastrophe. 
Economic motives is central to Foucault’s conception of “governmentality” 
(Foucault 1991). According to Foucault, the government has the responsibility 
to provide security its citizens and for this reason economic motives—to meet 
the needs of its citizens—have been the main purpose for the establishment of 
a modern nation-state. Indeed, the organization of a modern state is actually 
rooted in the management of a familial economy. Each citizen is perceived as a 
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member of the big family of fraternity. Putting this logic into an environmental 
disaster situation, it has been an ethical obligation of the government as a 
modern political institution to develop prevention systems and strategies to 
face environmental hazards and make sure that they would not grow larger and 
broader. Thus, in dealing with environmental disasters the government’s main 
priority is how to recompense the damages of which means ignoring first the 
status of the disaster, despite it has the authority to define the event/process. 
The definition can be done later, but immediate countermeasures must be 
performed straight away to save the social and environment from the worst 
that might happen. 
In the Lapindo case, the Indonesian government has been situated in 
serious conflicts of interest that could be detected from the ways of the 
government composing the mitigation policy and modifying it over the time 
(chapter 3). Since the mudflow became an environmental hazard that interrupts 
the national economy, the collateral impacts which reached major industries in 
southern and eastern regions in East Java and also in Bali were the main 
concern of the Indonesian government. It seems that the government did not 
see the importance of finding what had caused the eruption because the most 
urgent was how to resume and recover the economy. Economic motives 
became more apparent in the aftermath of the mudflow as for the government 
only accounted economic factors for the compensation of victims and 
overlooked other impairments. Thus, instead of resolving the social and 
ecological crises the disaster politics was just another source for the disaster 
to be even more systematic (cf. Bryant 1998). 
Discoursing Disaster: Power and Actor of the Lapindo Case in Indonesia 
      285 
In the meanwhile, as the accused-party initiating the hazard, Lapindo was 
suffering from moral judgments delivered by general public for being an 
irresponsible company. Countering such judgments was the contexts of the 
company’s strategy to polish the image from “the bad guy” to “the hero” of the 
incident by muddling up the social construction of the disaster in various 
discursive fields. The strategy should be understood in the context that the 
company is part of a giant conglomerate family in Indonesia, the Bakries, and 
therefore the Lapindo case had not only infected Lapindo alone but also the 
family as one single economic entity. It is also the fact that the leading figure of 
the family Aburizal Bakrie, who was sitting as a minister in the cabinet when 
the mudflow erupted and currently is the chairperson of the Golkar Party, had a 
strong motive to secure his company and family from any repercussions of the 
mudflow. 
It was not only economic consequences that Lapindo and the Bakries are 
worrying about, but also the political and legal consequences that they would 
face if the mudflow was declared as anthropogenic disaster resulted from 
Lapindo’s drilling activity in the Banjar Panji 1 well. For this very reason, it is 
understandable if the family was willing to lose so much money to finance 
media campaigns to counter such a claim so that it would not experience 
greater losses. One crucial strategy was the refutation of the argument of 
drilling-trigger mudflow and the promotion of a counter-argument of 
earthquake theory in various scientific forums, taking a gap in the uncertainty 
principle in science. Not only that, there has been an effort from the company 
and the government to put the blame on the nature for causing such an 
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unnatural catastrophe—something which is against a modern thinking of 
environmental disasters less as natural than as social/cultural events. Thus, it is 
very difficult for the proponents of the natural disaster framing to popularize 
such since the regime of truth is now in favor of the anthropogenic disaster 
framing. The more the natural disaster framing’s proponents are attempting to 
control the social construction of the disaster, the more they will receive 
rejections from the society. This situation is somehow very advantageous for 
the proponents of the industrial accident framing, especially disaster victims, to 
confront the actors in power. 
The framing of “industrial accident” promoted by disaster victims is 
situated within the contexts of how these people find a way to punish the 
perpetrator of their sufferings. By looking through historical contexts of the 
politicization of the Porong region, I noted that the people of Porong are 
situated in a long history of repression in relation to human management and 
modification of the environment (chapter 2). The mudflow added another 
marginalization of these people experience on the ground that the disaster 
politics has been neglecting their actual needs to recover from the crises. The 
people can then identify themselves easily as victims of both the mudflow 
hazard and human politics. Transforming themselves from seemingly 
powerless to powerful actors the victims competed the other actors in power 
through the organization of disaster commemorations in which they challenged 
the pastoral concept of power in the Javanese culture, that is, the power 
centralized in particular leaders and objects. 
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The mudflow has situated them in power relations with the other actors in 
power, the government and the company. From their previous experiences 
prior to the mudflow, they see that the government never stands on their side. 
Even more, instead of being the figure to protect and help them to recover 
from the crises, the government has been one source of these crises by 
neglecting their needs and interests and favoring the corporations’. In the 
Lapindo case, the government is in the position of shielding the company and 
working together with it to frame the incident as just another natural 
phenomenon. Recalling and challenging Javanese traditions and conception of 
power, these victims came to a position that it is the time for them to become 
the subjects of power in defining the historiography of the event/process by 
utilizing a specific moment of disaster anniversaries as another discursive field 
by articulating their framing of the event as industrial accident (chapter 5). 
6.2. Actors of power  
The three actors illustrated how three-dimensional Nietzschean forms of 
power work in the society (Saar 2010). The government case showed the case 
of how the “real power” of those in command is practiced through a series of 
modifications of the environments and therefore controls over the populations. 
As such, the government issued disaster policies as the legal bases to perform 
mitigatory actions of the mudflow, define the disaster zone and who shall be 
considered as disaster victims, and determine sharing responsibility between 
the company and the government to deal with the disaster. Only with these 
policies, the government could have the authority to dominate other actors. 
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The case of Lapindo muddling up the social construction of the disaster 
showed how “symbolic power” is performed through the creation of meanings 
of the mudflow in various discursive fields. It addressed how environmental 
problems are discussed in terms of scientific discourses and brought about the 
hegemony of scientific authorities in the event. This kind of power put 
scientists as prominent agents of power in the so-called “modern society,” as 
if it is up to them nature should be defined correctly. The hegemony 
determined the way of people interpret the mudflow’s origin but since there are 
conflicting arguments about it the social construction of the mudflow is 
characterized by publics’ confusion and distrust of official definition(s). 
The case of the mudflow victims performing a series of disaster 
commemorations illustrated how a third form of power—“imaginary power”—is 
being practiced. Nietzsche would have called it the “will to power” working 
within the victims themselves in the course of being the subjects of the social 
world. It is a key concept to explain how these victims could have the reason 
and freedom to produce, reproduce and fight for what they believe to be true 
and against what they claim to be wrong. Punishing the perpetrator was the 
main idea of the victims since they were not only seeking for the compensation 
but also justice as well as power. This added to the government’s history of 
citizen neglect, the history that is rooted in the corrupt governmental 
apparatuses with some greedy corporations. This could be detected on the 
symbols the victims designed and performed in a series of commemorative 
practices of the mudflow. The symbols of the punisher were however changing 
over the time—from the government (in 2010 & 2011), to the victims 
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themselves (in 2012 & 2013), to the government again (2014)—yet, the main 
target remained the same—the corporation. 
The Lapindo case led us to the core problem of the social construction of 
nature. In the Western context, there was a radical shift of human-nature 
relation ideology from the medieval conceptions of human beings as “part of 
nature, part of God’s creation” to the modern, scientific ideas that put humans 
to be “ontologically distinct from nature” (Oliver-Smith 2002, 30). However, 
living a modernized world, we should have reconsidered the distinction 
between “human” and “nature” as to our physical environments are a result of 
rapid human modifications of nature and therefore they are never entirely 
natural but hybrid instead. It is now not that humans are part of nature, but 
more likely that nature is part of human cultures. This idea preexisted, too, in 
the Javanese cultures. Living in perhaps the most hazard-prone island in the 
archipelago with active volcanoes and other geological threats, the formation 
of Javanese societies and cultures is shaped within the context of how people 
consider their both fertile and catastrophic environments as parts of their social 
and political lives (Christie 2015; Reid 2015). 
As chapter 5 shown, the coming of modern, scientific, Western 
rationalization of nature and natural phenomena did not simultaneously replace 
the Javanese cultural, traditional explanations. To a degree scientific 
rationalizations exerted the search of hidden traditional narratives and marked 
what philosopher Jean-François Lyotard would have called “the postmodern 
condition” characterized by the “incredulity toward metanarratives” (Lyotard 
1984, xxiv). In this context, scientific explanations added preexisting narratives 
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of nature circulating in the society and stimulated the quest of other, conflicting 
narratives that might be non-scientific ones. Foucault would have designated 
those narratives as “discourses” transmitting and producing power in the 
society (Foucault 1978, 101). Discourse is not only as a group of statements, 
but also as a “regulated practice” allowing the articulation of some statements 
or silencing some others; it is therefore a power practice (Foucault 1972, 80). 
To that end, the idea of disaster that is resulted from the unnatural 
mudflow in Porong, East Java should be understood as a “discourse.” Indeed, 
the mudflow case shows us how “disaster” is a contested concept with 
“blurred edges” and one main concern of that contestation is a question of 
whether it is “a set of physical impacts or a set of socially constructed 
perceptions” (Oliver-Smith 1999, 22). To some extent this study affirms and 
adds to the latter arguing that disaster is not only a set of perceptions but also 
it may only occur in the presence of vulnerability in facing environmental 
hazards. It is to say that human actors are required for a disaster to exist; they 
are needed not only as their role as victims, but also determiner of whether 
environmental hazards would turn into or interpreted as “a disaster” (Button 
1999). As this study has shown, the existence of an idea that humans might 
have produced such hazardous environments situated the disaster in a more 
complicated state.  
6.3. Actors of anthropogenic disaster 
The Lapindo case has become a trigger for the emerging discourse of 
“anthropogenic disaster” in Indonesia. For the people of Porong, the case has 
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left a deep physical and psychological wound with regard to the social and 
ecological impacts of the mudflow. To date the eruption has yet to stop and 
this has raised more uncertainties of the possibility of the mudflow-impacted 
area expansion. Nonetheless, the image of social and ecological destructions 
of the mudflow has spread all over the country and become a terror for the 
people who live side by side with (or planned to be) a mining area. In Sidoarjo, 
the terror is manifested in the villagers’ refusal against Lapindo drilling in 
Kalidawir village (ARA 2012). In fact, the Regent of Sidoarjo said that he would 
not issue another permit for Lapindo in his territory if the company has not yet 
completed its obligation to recompense all the “inside map” victims (Sumedi 
2013). In Jombang, East Java, residents rejected Exxon Mobile’s plan to do 
exploration of oil (Praditya 2013). From Bandulan, Central Java, a geothermal 
exploration is rejected by the locals (Munir 2014). In Samarinda, East 
Kalimantan, local residents are questioning the mudflow that occurred in an oil 
exploration well of French company, Total (Anonymous 2013). All these 
resistances are coming from a spreading fear of a second “Lapindo mudflow” 
would occur to them.  
The fear results in the increase of local resistances against mining activities 
in several places in Indonesia. In the meantime, a network of non-governmental 
organizations is making the birthday of the mudflow, May 29, as the Anti-
Mining Day (“Hari Anti Tambang”; abbreviated as “Hantam,” a language play of 
“to smash”). Every year since 2011, publics’ solidarity for the mudflow victims 
in various cities in Indonesia has transformed into a movement to reject mining 
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by using the Lapindo case as a symbol of humanitarian tragedy due to a 
defective mining. 
There are certainly more actors of this extraordinary disaster who have to 
be excluded for the purpose of answering this study’s research question. There 
are still plenty of aspects that have not been written about the disaster. This 
study however proposes another truth of the disaster. This study is not an end, 
but rather a beginning for further inquiries addressing how actor and power are 
related to one and another in the context of environmental disasters. And 
therefore I am very aware that by writing it I have taken a role of being another 
agent of the anthropogenic disaster. 
 
 !
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